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ABSTRACT
This thesis is primarily concerned with the relationship between 
Sufism and curing. Other topics necessary to the understanding of this 
main area are additionally considered: an introduction is provided 
to Sufism per se, as an expression of Islamic mysticism; there is a 
consideration of the role of emotion in Sufism and particularly of love, 
which is also discussed with relevance to Middle Eastern society; then 
the main body of the thesis deals with the subject of Sufism and healing.
This introduction explores theology and the history of Sufism, and 
also anthropologists' views of Sufism and its r i tu a l.  The chapter on 
emotion is included as a necessary comment on one aspect of the causation 
of psychiatric problems: emotionality. The main subject of the thesis
guides this inclusion, as i t  explores in detail the healing of psychiatric 
illness by Sufis in the Middle East and North India, beginning with a 
discussion of Islamic cosmology and of psychiatric illness and sp irit  
possession, and progressing on to consider the model of Sufism as psycho­
therapy. This explores the central notion of Sufism and curing with 
some comparisons with other types of indigenous psychiatric healing.
Lastly baraka, that particularly Islamic notion of 'grace', 'blessing' 
or 'Spiritual power' is examined, as i t  is upon baraka's existence that 
Sufi healing power is based.
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PREFACE
During the three years I have been compiling this thesis, I 
have approached my subject from a variety of slants, but having an 
interest mainly in heterodoxy, the data that have struck me most 
particularly are those which concern branches of Sufism that are 
less orthodox. Examination of this type of data has led me to become 
concerned with the curing that some Sufis (and others) are involved 
with. Accordingly, though this thesis is basically about Islamic 
mysticism i t  has as its core an examination of the therapeutic aspects 
of Sufism. The data alone has led me in this direction, and indeed 
there is an entire sub-discipline in anthropology for discussions that 
explore the relationship between religion and medicine, especially in 
Islamic studies.
This thesis is entitled 'Sufism and curing*. I t  is mainly 
concerned with the healing of psychiatric illness in the Middle East 
and India, which subject i t  contextualises in the Muslim societies 
of these regions. The notion of psychiatric illness i ts e l f  is 
subsidiarily explored, as this idea is a Western one, and the 
parameters of mental illness in the Muslim world appear to d iffe r  
somewhat from those in the West. Naturally Sufism provides the 
raison d'etre for this piece of work. The thesis is predicated on 
its  existence.
The Sufism discussed in this thesis is possibly a l i t t l e  unfamiliar 
to those acquainted, say, with Sufi poetry or hagiography. Even for 
anthropologists, the Sufism I am most concerned with is more 'unorth­
odox' , more questionable qua Sufism than the Sufism usually studied.
Also I explore peripheral religious phenomena that sometimes are called 
Sufi and Sometimes are categorised as part of saint cults, or even of
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Shamanism. Nevertheless these phenomena have a relationship with 
Sufism: they are essentially mystical and owe a great deal to the
Sufis. Additionally I investigate the subject of s p ir i t  possession.
This has a certain relevance to Sufism in that many who attend Sufi 
hadra for curing purposes are purported to be so possessed. Also 
the cults of N. and N.E. Africa (here thinking particularly of the 
zaar) have certain parallels with Sufism,
Certain subjects need to be discussed in such a piece of work 
with a subject matter like Sufism. An introduction to Sufism is 
provided for those unfamiliar with the subject, that deals witi the 
history and theology necessary as a background. Also the viev* of 
anthropologists are considered, and there is a discussion of Su i 
r itu a l,  and a glimpse into the particular world of the Sufis.
Emotion is also relevant in this thesis. The emotional as z t s  
of illness are perhaps not the most frequently discussed, t- t  there 
is nevertheless a school of thought that places emotional sturbsnce, 
or emotionality, as a cause of certain diseases. I t  has p tic. r 
relevance to psychiatric illness. This is one facet of tf tig- cance
of emotion to the thesis. The other facet is the importar of tion,
particularly love, to the Sufis. Emotionalism is a frequt ch
directed at Sufi r itua l: Sufi ritual is said to be ernoti? i1y artic .
The sexual sublimation said to be achieved via the ritual ar 
relevant feature here. Sufi poetry is also redolent of t? 1ar
of love. Allah is the 'Beloved' and the Sufi seeker is h, :-elf
'Friend' or the 'Lover', knocking repeatedly at the door ■ ■f the ?ed 
to gain admittance.
An introduction to the f ie ld  of medical discourse is natm 
provided in this thesis as an outline of Islamic concepts of i ‘
Islamic cosmology is discussed to provide a background an:: the
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an examination of various illness phenomena in the Muslim world.
Here most attention is paid to psychiatric illness as this is mainly 
what the Sufis are called upon to cure. The crux of this thesis is 
the image of Sufism as psychotherapy. Various views of this postulate 
are considered and one particular ethnography explored in detail to 
e l ic i t  information that explains both the psychological world of 
the people in question and the position of the Sufis vis-a-vis these 
people. The notion of Sufism as psychotherapy is then analysed in 
comparison with data from N. India, and lastly there are parallels 
drawn with other types of curing: Shamanism and divining.
The last subject to be dealt with is perhaps the most important.
^  baraka, that intangible force behind the efficacy (or purported 
efficacy) of Sufi cures. What baraka is remains mysterious. I t  can 
be translated or glossed as 'grace' or 'blessing' or 'spiritual power', 
but what indeed is it? The last chapter attempts an explanation of 
baraka through the consideration of certain texts that discuss various 
aspects of i t .
Running through this thesis, like a long skein of wool, is the 
issue of power: the power of religion and mysticism in the Muslim world
the power of emotion; the power of the indigenous healer and, to a 
certain extent, the ambivalent power of the patient. Yet i t  is seen
most vividly and most aptly in the Sufi curing ceremony as a kiniof
emanation, or atmosphere, that pervades, or seems to, that kind of 
experience. I t  is the power of the inexpressible, the numinous. I t  
is the power that can perhaps produce a quasi-concrete phenomenon 
into which to convert i ts e l f .  Here I speak of baraka.
These are the key aspects of the thesis. More could be added
on a concrete level about the ethnography used and the various Sufi 
texts consulted. The literature covers a fa ir ly  wide spectrum of
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Sufism, and the anthropology of religion and medicine. The thesis 
attempts a synthesis of these three fie lds, albeit an idiosyncratic 
one.
A last word could be said about the materials used. All the 
texts I have consulted are to be found in or around the university 
of London, apart from some of the most recent texts. I have used 
the libraries of Senate House, S.O.A.S., and the British Museum 
extensively.
Lastly in Chapter Two I refer to a meeting I had with Dr. Javad 
Nurbakhsh when he was in London last year. This interview was fa ir ly  
lengthy and for me both rewarding and pleasurable, and I would like  
to thank Dr. Nurbakhsh for his time and his kindness to me.
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C H A P T E R  ONE  
WHAT IS SUFISM?
The t i t l e  of this chapter begs an answer. To provide i t  is quite 
a challenge, given the assortment of interpretations and analyses of 
Sufism available to the reader. Instead of directly answering this 
question I intend to introduce Sufism in such a way as to indicate its  
significance for this thesis is as well as its general nature. This 
chapter begins with a l i s t  of terms I have defined myself to help the 
reader along with what follows. After this there is a section on 
theology and historical background that provides an essential 
introduction ,to the subject. Certain concepts are outlined and 
several notions discussed. Thirdly there is an account of some of 
the preoccupations of anthropologists who consider Sufism. Fourthly 
there are some theoretical opinions concerning the study of Islam 
generally that are useful for my purposes, and lastly there is an 
excursion into the world of the Sufis.
I t  is certainly true that Sufism is an ambivalent phenomenon 
that can be studied particularly well in anethnographic context to 
e l ic i t  a variety of data, both purely factual and also interpretive. 
This embeds Sufism in a social context where its definition and 
interpretation can be approached as a social and historical process 
that has temporal and spatial co-ordinates, and boundaries. I intend 
accordingly to examine Sufism in such contexts, but to regard i t  also 
as a topic in free-flowing discourse of religion in which i t  has a 
significant voice.
Before I begin with this chapter proper I think I should f i r s t  
of all outline some relevant terms that do need some explanation.
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There is a glossary attached to this thesis, but a compilation of 
terms might be useful here. They divide neatly into three categories,
(1) The Phenomenological, (2) The Experiential, (3) Those concerned 
with Self and Person.
Phenomenological Terms
The f i r s t  term to explain is Tariqa. This Arabic word both 
signifies ‘way1 or 'path', representing the l i f e  which the Sufi leads 
qua Sufi, and also denotes the group of Sufis to which he belongs.
(For example tariqa could be translated as 'order' of Sufis, e .g ., the 
Mevlevi tariqa. ) Two connected terms, one Arabic and one Persian, 
signify the Sufi centre: these are respectively zawiya and khanaqah.
A loose translation could be 'lodge'.
Three related terms denote spiritual leaders. They are Sheikh and
P ir , and the female equivalent of Sheikh, Sheikha (as used in Constant-
inides 1972, shaykha. )
One term is used to denote devotees of Sufism who are not actually 
Sufis. This is muhibbin (see Chapter Four). Another term denotes a 
Sufi novice or learner: this is murid.
Five phenomenological terms describe different types of mystic.
They are (1) Sufi, which denotes a Muslim mystic, a follower of the
tariqa , wearer of the suf (wool). (2) Dervish (Persian) which can 
be used to refer to any Sufi on the Path, but is more commonly used 
to describe a wandering Sufi who is not a ff i l ia ted  with any particular 
centre. There are specific orders of dervishes, e .g ., the Qalandari.
(3) Murshid, which is an Arabic term denoting a Sufi master. (4) Khalifa, 
which refers to the 'successor* of the Sheikh, the 'second in command' in 
a Sufi group. (5) Marabout, which describes a saint (a fter  C15th.)  A 
reputation for being a marabout could arise from descent from the Prophet, 
religious learning, mystical intuition or the possession of supernatural
- 10 -
power.
Three terms that approximate to the phenomenological category are 
tasawwuf, haqiqat and baraka. The f i r s t  is the term used to describe 
the way of the Sufi: the tasawwuf referring to the experience of
Sufism. I t  is the word used throughout the Middle East for 'Sufism'.
The second, haqiqat, denotes the circle of rea lity , the all-encompassing 
truth of Divine Reality. One of God's names is A1 Haqq, the 'rea lity '  
or the 't ru th '.  The third, baraka, I discuss at length in Chapter Five. 
I t  is commonly glossed as 'grace' or blessing'.
Three related terms denote devils of different kinds. These are 
jinn zaar and sheitan. Jinn are acknowledged to exist in the Koran and 
are mischievous sprites with the power to harm humanity. Zaar are mainly 
alien invading sp ir its , which are basically non-islamic by nature.
Experiential Terms
Five terms are used to describe various experiences of the Sufis. 
They can also be more substantive and denote states of being. They 
are tauhid, which means unity with God, or a state of such unity; hal, 
which describes a state or condition one experiences on the spiritual 
path (or not - see Chapter Four); magam which signifies a station, a 
point, achieved on the spiritual path; and lastly two connected terms 
fana and baga which also denote points reached on the spiritual path, 
but can also be used to describe a condition ( i . e . ,  'in fana' , or 'in 
baga1.) Fana and baga are d i f f ic u lt  to define because they have 
definite theological meanings, as stations on the Sufi path. Fana 
can be glossed as the passing away of the self; baga as a state of 
permanence in the Godhead.
Four further terms have no real connection with the others, but 
are found in this thesis. They are Wajd, which signifies ecstasy;
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1ishq' which can be translated as ‘passionate love1; muhabbah, which 
can be loosely translated as loving kindness, and jidhba, which yet 
again is d i f f ic u lt  to translate, and is used as in the expression 
‘ in jidhba1, signifying a state of ‘attraction’ to an external 
phenomenon, in the sense used here, a vaguely spiritual and ecstatic 
phenomenon.
Dhikr is the last term in this category I would like  to mention. 
This will be frequently used and signifies the main ritual of the Sufis. 
I t  could be explained as ‘mentioning1 or ‘ recollecting1 the name(s) of 
God.
Self and Person
Four terms could be listed under this rubric: nafs, ruh, ‘aql and
qalb. Nafs is translated as ‘soul’ by Schimmel (1975: 112) but is also
used to denote the lower animal self. Schimmel ( ib id .)  refers to i t  
as ‘ the flesh*. Various predicates (nafs-a!-lawwama , the blaming 
soul; nafs mutma'ihna, ,the soul at peace) can be used to further 
specify the condition of the soul. A frequent image ( ib id .)  is 'that 
of a restive horse or mule that has to be kept hungry and has to 
undergo constant mortification and training so that, eventually, i t  
serves the purpose of bringing its  rider to his goal'.
Ruh refers to s p ir i t ,  and is often discussed along with nafs and 
qalb as a t r ip a r t i te  division of man's inner faculties with nafs as 
the lowest principle.
Qalb signifies the heart, which according to the Koran (Sura 49: 7
and Sura 16: 106) is the seat of fa ith .
' Aql denotes reason or in te lle c t. I t  is frequently mentioned 
in Sufi writing in contrast with 'love*.
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History and Theology
The literature of Sufism encompasses a variety of academic 
disciplines: e .g ., history, theology, anthropology. There are
historical works on countries and cultures from Morocco to Indonesia 
written by academics with an interest in Sufism or Islam, or, possibly, 
just a particular region in a certain historical epoch. Sufism has 
spread via the medieval trading routes from Arabia to India, to South 
East Asia and China. The diffusion occured between the Cl 1th and C14th 
approximately: its result is more interesting.
The result of the spread of Islam and Sufism is that various 
locations have been suggested as the original source of Sufism. Idries 
Shah (1977) explores the various claims to a defin itive origin for 
Sufism in Greek thought, in pre-Islamic Middle Eastern thought, in Indian 
philosophy, or even in the ideas of the Chinese Tao, concluding that 
Sufism is essentially an Islamic phenomenon with its  roots firmly in 
the traditions of the Muslim world, its  ideals epitomised in the l i f e  
of the prophet Mohammed. (See Gellnper 1981 p. 103 for an account of 
Sufism's origins).
The historical works often follow the lives of particular Sufi 
writers who have had a certain influence over the thought of Muslims 
in the culture where they were born. Middle Eastern works of such 
a kind proliferate in many languages: additionally there are the true
hagiographies, and the literary  scholarship surrounding the great Sufi 
poets such as Attar or Rumi. Figures like these are more than poets, 
more than religious figures even. In Foucault's terms, in his discussion 
of the 'author function', they could be seen as ' transdiscursive' 
(Foucault 1979: 153-4) as their writings have helped to create
other bodies of l ite ra ture , exegeses based in their works.
Thus the historical works of Sufism are accompanied by theological
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discussions between Sufis, at the time the famous writers were at 
work, and la ter came the armies of orientalists delving into the 
l itera ture , the history, the biographies, for their own purposes. 
Interpreters of the Sufi greats are legion: compilations exist in
vast numbers of selected tales, poetry and sayings of the famous Sufis 
of the medieval Islamic period around the C12-C13th.
The theological arguments provide a f ie ld  of study in themselves. 
Sufism being mysticism, i t  has always had an ambiguous relationship 
with Muslim orthodoxy. A1 Halla j, a famous Sufi figure was martyred 
for, among other things, his outrageous claims, the most notorious of 
which was 'ana'l-Haqq', ( ' I  am the tru th ') ,  (see Schimmel 1975 p. 52-77 
for an account of his l i f e ) .  Existentially and phenomenologically a 
person may argue such a claim: theologically i t  is naturally anathema.
Allah is the One Supreme God, the sum of the ninety-nine attributes, 
the creator of a ll created things, subsisting and existing at the 
supreme apex of the created 'hierarchy of being' that is made up of 
matter from the most subtle to the most gross, from God, via the jinns 
(demons) and angels through to all earth-bound entities. In this 
structuring of the cosmos, truth encompasses the whole, and is , given 
the parameters of Islam, Allah. In a certain image, the truth is a 
circ le , of which the Way, the Sufi path (tariqa) is a radius that 
pierces the circumference at one particular point alone: so the truth
the Sufis obtain is but a partial aspect of the whole truth of Allah. 
The Sufi goal, which is either unity with God or knowledge of God, is 
thus a personal goal and achieves but one individual apperception of 
the Truth, the one Reality of Allah.
Sufism provides an evergreen source of study and interpretation 
for orientalists. The more abstruse Sufi authors are discovered in 
their dribs and drabs and the hermeneutic exercise begins anew,
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accompanied by evaluations of the discovery's literary  worth. 
Translations abound, bringing the esoteric subject matter into the 
exoteric compass of English prose translation or poetic imitation.
Some renderings of the Sufi greats into English are excellent, 
profound, and create a poetry of value; other works popularise Sufism 
and produce a mish-mash of philosophy, psychology and religion that has 
l i t t l e  academic discrimination to commend i t ,  but a world of popular 
appeal and an interest to the interpretive anthropologist concerned 
with that which can be gleaned of other cultures' values and beliefs 
through an iconoclastic medium such as popularism. Sufism as mysticism 
could be said to be an attempt to become conscious of the One Reality, 
whatever this may be defined as. Schimmel (1975:4) suggests i t  can be 
wisdom, lig h t, love or nothing. I t  has been criticised 'because i t  
seemed to deny the value of the human personality and to result in 
pantheism, or monism, thus constituting the greatest threat to personal 
responsibility', (op. c it :  5). However, Ibn Arabi (d.1240) propagated
the doctrine of the insan-i-kamil (the Perfect Man), which was quite 
influential in la ter  Sufism. Man's relationship with God is constantly 
considered and reconsidered in Sufi theosophy. Man's primordial 
covenant with God was destined to be important to the Muslim conscience 
(op. c it :  24). This covenant of man to acknowledge and worship the
creator was, according to Schimmel, a ‘starting point for their under­
standing of free will and predestination, of election and acceptance'. 
The importance of mankind is however never underestimated in Sufism.
The 'hero' figure is a key image in the theosophy of many. The image, 
or figure, of Mohammed as the prototype for the Perfect Man is of 
great significance. 'The Perfect Man' is a miniature of Reality; he 
is the microcosm, in whom are reflected all the perfect attributes of 
the macrocosm. Just as the Reality of Mohammed was the creative
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principle of the universe so the Perfect Man was the cause of the
universe For Man alone the world was made' (Arberry 1950: 101 ).
In addition to the Perfect Man, represented by Mohammed, another 
key symbol in Islam generally, so accordingly, and to a more subtle 
extent, in Sufism, is the Book. Sufism takes its inspiration from 
the Koran, which issued from the mouth of Mohammad. The Sufi 
significance of the Koran is (1) in its outlining of the numerous 
and often contradictory Attributes of God that form the basis for a 
large portion of mystical theories and are used with magical connections, 
and (2) in its  enciphering of a practical and moral guidance for the 
l i f e  of the Muslim umma (community). Its recitation has the power to 
u p lif t  the hearer to a spiritually receptive state. More esoterically,  
or at least, more significantly for the practical anthropologist, the 
suras (verses) themselves have a certain magical power, and are s t i l l  
used as protective charms against, and in the treatment of, disease, 
and witchcraft.
The 'what' of Sufism is possibly d if f ic u lt  to ascertain even in 
the classical period (C9th-C13th). Trimingham (1971: 200) suggests
that,
'the Sufi way, whose reaches depend so much upon the 
individual's temperament and innate g ifts , is for an 
e li te  on ly '.
Indeed, the mystical aspirations and longings of the Sufi greats
are naturally a world away from the aims and goals of the masses.
The 'degeneration' of Sufism after its classical period is discussed
endlessly in the literature (Arberry 1950: 119-133). Trimingham
succinctly points to the need to integrate Sufism with the large
majority of Muslims in its  la ter, consolidating phase when the Sufi
orders became widespread, as emphasising this decay, or dichotomisation
of Sufi mysticism:
'Sufis recognised that the majority of mankind are 'born deaf', 
devoid of the faculty for mystical sensitivity. The 
devotional techniques of the orders attempt to radiate
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the same effects, give an illusion of a glimpse into Reality, 
to the ordinary man. So Sufis came to equate the ecstatic 
trance with loss of conciousness in the divine unity and 
this development is one of the signs of what has been called 
the degeneration of Sufism, but may be regarded as its  
adaptation to the needs and capacity of the ordinary man'.
(Trimingham 1971: 200)
The kind of Sufism personified by Uways al Qurani, the
'prototype of the inspired Sufi who has been guided solely 
by divine grace, knowing of the Prophet without outward 
connection1.
(Schimmel 1975: 28)
companion of the Prophet and key figure emulated by those who seek
illumination outside the regular mystical path without the mediation
and guidance of a Sheikh, might have been a blueprint for Ibn Arabi,
but not for the mass of Sufistically incluned Muslims.
Differentiation was possible in early Sufism between 'voluntaristic
and 'gnostic' modes (op. c it :  6). Jami separated the mystic and
prophetic spirits among the Sufis, the former being enraptured with
his/her own experiences, a more ascetic type of Sufi, the la t te r  being
capable of return from ecstasy to lead others along the right path
(op. c it :  7). The pivot of the Sufi way is no doubt the experience
of tauhid (unity): 'to declare that God is One' (Opcit: 17), however,
and in this aspect both strands of Sufism unite to appreciate the
mystical experience that enables the Sufi to say that he is such.
The way of the Sufi is the tasawwuf for which Schimmel recounts
a three-fold meaning: (1) according to the shari'a , the Muslim law,
(2) according to the tariqa, the mystical path, (3) according to the
haqiqa, the Truth.
' I t  is a purification on different levels, f i r s t  from the lower
qualities then from the bondage of human qualities, and




This language is necessarily complex as outlining a meta-physic or 
theosophy; also i t  is an aspect of Sufism that is generally submerged 
in the accounts of anthropologists. This may be unfortunate, revelatory 
of Sufism's 'decay', one could say, but possibly also redolent of the 
interest of the ethnographers, who for the most part are not unduly 
concerned with (or able to penetrate) the history, development and 
practice of complex, historically-elaborated theosophical systems, 
but rather concentrate upon their practical application. So the 
tasawwuf remains an anthropological conundrum: incomprehensible to
the eyes of the empiricist, or even to the phenomenological observer 
(e .g ., Crapanzano 1973) or the anthropologist concerned with narrative 
and biography (Dwyer 1983) who are involved in Sufi social discourse 
rather than in identifying the presence of the history of ideas in 
the anthropological present. One awaits Andrew Moyer's work on Turkish 
mysticism with anticipation of a different approach.
Schimmel's discussion of Sufism does seem to accentuate its  
amorphousness. This may be due to attributing Christian, Hindu and 
Buddhist influences to i t  in its  formative period (op c it:  69-72).
Its distinctive nature emerged however in the 11th-13th with the 
great writers (for example the theoretician Qushairi in the C11th, 
Ghazzali the lawyer/theologist in the same century, and the great 
poet Rumi and the controversial thinker Ibn Arabi by the 13th (see 
Schimmel 1975 and Arberry 1950). The C12th saw the formation of the 
great tarigas: Qadiriyya, Suhrawardiyya, and Shadhiliyya, whose
spread into India and N. Africa from the key Sufi centres of earlier  
times in Syria and Iraq fac ilita ted  the consolidation of Sufi influence. 
1502 provided another important watershed in the history of Sufism 
(op c it :  83). This was when Shah Ismail the Safavid won power, and 
marks the time from which Shi'ism became the creed of Iran, and diverged
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from Sufism. In the following century important developments occurred 
also in India during the reign of Akbar (1556-1605). His tolerance 
towards syocretism provoked a hostile reaction from the sober, Central 
Asian Naqshbandiya (op, c it :  360 f f ) ,  who subsequently acquired a 
certain amount of influence in the sub continent, previously the 
province of the more ascetically inclined Chistiyya order of Sufis.
The politic ization of Sufism was then not a new phenomenon. The 
martyrdom of Mansur Hallaj (912) in Iraq was partly due to his 
heretical declaration 'Ana'1-Haqq', (see earlier) but political 
involvements with the Carmathians of Bahrain, N. Sind and Multan 
made him suspect in the eyes of the Baghdad government, as did his 
association with the chamberlain Nasr al-Qushairi, a would-be reformer 
who favoured better administration and juster taxation in a time of 
powerlessness in the caliphate and instability in the bureaucracy.
His implicit call for a spiritual revival might have had effects on 
social organisation and even on political structures in a society,
‘where religious and political leaders lived in a state of 
stagnation with neither the strength nor the intention to 
revitalise the Muslim community'.
(op. c it :  68)
Later an indication will be given of the wider political significance 
of Sufism in its  anthropological meanings. But now i t  is useful to 
note that the Sanusi order of Libya (Evans Pritchard 1949) provide a 
salient example of how a Sufi order can achieve much p o lit ic a lly .
The members of this particular order played an important role in the 
defence of Libya against both the invading Turks, and la ter the 
Ita lians, uniting Bedouin opposition from their key position in Libyan 
society as representatives of the different tribal sections. Lewis 
(1955/6) also demonstrates how Sufi orders can be of 'structural'
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significance within a society, achieving much on a political level.
Their influence on both rulers and ruled has been, therefore, of the 
greatest significance in the Middle East, as seen in the banning of 
certain practices and groups in particular countries and at certain 
historical periods.
Some consideration should also be given to the Sufi 'path1, the 
esoteric means of progressing towards the goal of unity ( tauhid) .
This union Trimingham envisages as an emotional identification of seeker 
and sought in ecstasy. This ecstasy is called by Trimingham a hal, 
although in Sufism proper, hal more s tr ic t ly  refers to the succession 
of illuminations, through experiencing which, the Sufi progresses a 
further 'stage' (magam) towards the goal of spiritual perfection, 
(Trimingham 1971: 200). This ecstasy, hal, is achieved for the ordinary
Sufi via participation in the dhikr r itu a l. Trimingham suggests more­
over that the ordinary seeker only infrequently experiences this ecstasy, 
but the experience provides,
'a t lowest a release from the hardships of every-day 
existence and at a higher level some measure of freedom 
from the limitations of human l i f e  and a glimpse of 
transcendental experience'.
( ib id . )
Trimingham provides several accounts of the dhikr (op. c it :  201-7).
The dhikr is the key ritual of the Sufis, and its particular 
manifestations differentiate on a mundane level one order from 
another, and on a more complex level demonstrate the exact station 
along the path of a group or an individual. For example, the 
Maulawiya encourage the sama (hearing) and have musical accompaniment 
to the dhikr and are renowned as the 'whirling' dervishes because of 
their  dancing. The Naqsbandiyaa on the other hand perform a silent 
dhikr and forbid music.*
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* NOTE I t  should be mentioned here, however, that a number of artists  
and music lovers are numbered in their company - from Schimmel (1975: 
365). I t  could be said that i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to be too categoric about 
the manifestations of Sufism. The definitive nature of the foregoing 
is indicative of the reputable nature of the Orientalist sources I 
have been using, more than of the absolute characteristics of the 
information. A tendency in the literature  is to base interpretations 
on particular treatises. Selection of an individual treatise from 
the Persian or Arabic will result in a certain set of data; inclusion 
of another treatise as source material is likely to produce a 
conflicting viewpoint due to the plethora of opinions, the vast 
amount of theological discussion and debate among the Sufis them­
selves during the heyday of Sufism.
The stations (maqamat) and states (hal) are numbered by various 
Sufi commentators and vary in different accounts. In Trimingham's 
version (1971: 154) seven stages (stations) are given, after a
collection of treatises entitled Ar-Rasa‘ i1 al-Mirghammiya. These 
are said ( ib id .)  to correspond to the seven valleys traversed by the 
wandering seekers in Attar's poem Mantiq-at-Tair, translated simply, 
not esoterically, as The Conference of the Birds. These valleys are 
translated as Search, Love, Mystic Apprehension, Detatchment/ 
Independence, Unity, Bewilderment, Fulfillment in Annih ila tion .  
Obviously, as is repeatedly stated by some commentators, Sufi language 
'means' on several levels. I t  is partly due to the vast potential 
in the Arabic language for polysemy (due to the t r i l i t e r a l  roots 
partia lly ) and partly due to Sufi love for paradox, rhetorical device 
and allusion. One can however ascertain the purpose of progression 
along the 'path' through the successive stations. I t  is as aforesaid, 
purification of the ' nafs1, construed and translated by Trimingham
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(1971: 155), as the 'personality s e l f .
The station (maqam) denotes anyone 'Standing' in the way of God 
and his fu lfillm ent of the obligations appertaining to that 'station' 
and his keeping i t  until he comprehends its perfection, so far as i t  
lies in his power. Thus the magamat have a certain permanence and 
duration: a man cannot quit his station until he has fu l f i l le d  all
the obligations thereof (Nasr 1980: 61). The magamat are contrasted
with the hal: according to Nasr, stations belong to the category of
'acts'; states (hal) to the category of 'g i f ts ' .  The term 's ta te ',  
'denotes the favour and grace which God bestows upon the heart of 
his servant', (1980: 62). Hal can come to the uninitiated even before
he is sp iritua lly  disposed to the reception of grace, that is baraka. 
The hal can be experienced both by the beginner on the Sufi path and 
by the most experienced Sufi possessed of a high station.
'The expansion of the soul and the sense of joy i t  experiences 
in seeing a beautiful face or hearing a lovely melody foreshadow 
the hal of those travelling upon the path'.
( i b i d . )
Before the maqam is reached even the novice Sufi can experience a hal 
which causes him to transcend his usual state of being. The magamat 
are cumulative: they are states of being leading to unity, and their
descriptions are many in the works of the Sufis. One of the earliest  
and finest (to Nasr) accounts of the magamat is the 'Forty Stations' 
of the C11th. Sufi master Abu Said Ibn Abi'l Khayr. This numbers the 
maqam at forty, beginning with 'intention', 'conversion', 'repentance', 
leading to the fourth stage 'discipleship', which takes the Sufi in 
truth to the spiritual struggle (1980: 6 5 ff . ) .
The Sufi ritual that becomes an important feature in most of the 
literature is the dhikr, the 'recollection' of God. Dhikr is the 
eighth station on the Path in this account, and is translated by Nasr
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(1980: 66) as ‘ invocation1, calling on God. The Shorter Encyclopaedia
of Islam defines dhikr as 'remembrance' when taking place in the mind.
I t  is glossed as 'mentioning1 when spoken. In this Encyclopaedia i t  
is stated that dhikr is a relatively technical term, implying the 
glorificaiton of Allah with certain fixed phrases repeated in a ritual 
order with peculiar breathings and physical movements. Nasr, 
appreciating that to some Sufism signifies an attempt to transform the 
nature of man, states that the dhikr 'finishes by becoming man's real 
nature and the reality with which he identifies himself' (1980: 37).
This would mean that man is constantly remembering God, living in a 
state of pure other-wordly recollection.
'With the help of the dhikr as combined with appropriate 
forms of meditation ( f ik r )  man f i r s t  gains an integrated
soul then in the dhikr he offers this soul to God in
the supreme form of sa cr if ic e '.
( i b i d . )
The language is perhaps a l i t t l e  over emphatic, but Nasr's 
status as a Muslim scholar must be remembered. Later discussions of 
the dhikr can possibly rectify this impression and contextualise the 
experience in a social milieu rather than in an hermeneutic abstract. 
Nasr states of fana, one of the penultimate stations of the Sufi path, 
annihilation, the passing away of the se lf ,  and of baga, subsistence 
in God, that the Sufi ‘ realises that he never was separated from God 
evan at the outset', (op. c it :  37-8). In the dhikr the person should
be wholly present, his/her mind kept froijM^affdering, centred in the 
heart ( 'th a t is within the body considered in its positive aspect as 
the 'temple' of the s p ir i t '  ( ib id .)  ) so he can more perfectly feel 
the spiritual quality of the experience, a quality the Sufis constantly 
attempt to perfect, at least in theory.
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Anthropology
As far as the development of anthropology goes, the study of 
Islam is new when compared, say, to the study of Australian peoples 
or African religions. The appeal of the exotic was possibly too 
strong for early anthropologists to turn to societies where religion 
was comparable to that of the West, at least to a certain degree,
Islam being like Christianity, a religion of the Book. Also like  
Christianity, Islam is a revealed religion, and in i t ,  specialists 
have a degree of control over the interpretation of doctrine due to 
their conturies old monopoly of education. The Sufis have always 
been involved with education: the Sufi centres ( zawiya in Arabic,
khanaqah in Persian) have provided places of knowledge in turbulent 
times and s t i l l  provide teaching of t'lte'Koran for the communities in 
which they are found. In recent years the interest in Islam has 
burgeoned and now there is a sizeable literature on various aspects 
of Islam. Anthropology is well represented in this and i t  is now 
possible to investigate both 'orthodox' Islam (that is ,  the Islam of 
mosque and ulama) and its  more heterodox face. I t  is particularly  
this face of Islam with which this thesis is concerned: both popular
'fo lk ' beliefs and heterodox Muslim opinion are considered. Additionally 
some attention is given to the relation between 'fo lk ' beliefs and 
the Koranic revelation.
This issue possibly rests on the orthodox/unorthodox dichotomy 
whereby the established religious specialists of formal Islam relegate 
what they cannot assimilate to the outside. Possibly, but not in any 
absolute sense, the problem is also one of the integration of pre- 
Islamic beliefs into an Islamic culture, a process of Islamisation.
This process was considered by I.M. Lewis (1955/6) in the case of 
Somaliland. He provides a study of the social functions of 'present
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day1 (1950's) Somali Sufism, seeking to relate these functions to 
syncretism between Islam and the Cushitic religion, the indigenous 
form of belief pre-dating Islam there.
I t  is interesting to note in N. Africa the prevalence of the zaar 
sp ir it  cult that Lewis classifies as Cushitic, though assimilated in 
a way with Islam. This cult is also found iri the Sudan (Constantinides 
1972; Barclay 1964) and here is considered by the anthropologists 
studying i t  as Islamic unorthodoxy. The matter of classification is 
no doubt a question of approach: i t  is useful to realise that Constant­
inides studied the zaar some years after Lewis' work in Somaliland; 
so the context differed, as do Constantinides' theoretical and practical 
preoccupations. One could say that the historical and political milieu 
might throw a different light on fringe or doubtful Islamic beliefs.
I t  is also interesting to note here that Lewis indicates a similarity  
between the zaar cult and Sufism: despite the fact that women also
participate in Sufism in Somaliland, the zaar cult is seen to have 
certain correspondences with Sufism, yet cannot be said to be a pure 
correlative to the men's Sufism for its mainly female adherents. The 
zaar ritual is an expressive a ffa ir :  possibly one could suggest that
i t  is redolent of Durkheim's ‘effervescence1; i t  is a ritual in which 
women don apparel of certain colours corresponding to particular 
spirits and dance ecstatically to tunes that also are associated with 
particular zaar. The zaar are familiarised: there might be the
'African' zaar, the 'European' zaar; there is even a representative 
of the Muslim holy man among the zaar possessing spirits (Constantinides 
1972).
Lewis is accentuating the syncretism of the zaar cult and Sufism: 
zaar are classified by the Somali as a kind of jinn (Lewis, 1984: 156),
the Islamic invading demons, or capricious spiritual beings. Lewis
uses the description of the dhikr of the Ahmadiya order of Sufis in
Somaliland to indicate how closely their dhikr corresponds to the 
zaar dance, suggesting a syncretism that is purportedly well established 
in Egypt and elsewhere also. Here follows his description, taken from 
Bari l ie  1935:
'Thousands come to the tomb from all parts of Somalia.
The festival lasts 15 days and culminates in a great dhikr 
on the last night when the pilgrims form an immense circle  
and to the accompaniment of singing recite the ir  formulae 
in raucous saw-like voices rythmically swaying their bodies..
This continues until daybreak. Once they have got well worked 
up, large numbers fa l l  foaming to the ground in induced 
epileptic convulsions'.
(Lewis 1984: 157)
Obviously this is neither an informed nor a sympathetic description. 
The excesses i t  recounts do somehow recall the ecstatic dancing of the 
women in the zaar ceremonies as recounted by Barclay (1964) and 
Constantinides (1972). Nevertheless the interpretation is rather bald 
and hardly attempts to penetrate to the meaning of the r itu a l.  The 
purposes of the two rituals could also be considered: the attested
purpose of the dhi kr is to achieve a spiritual state. The purpose 
of the zaar ceremony is to exercise, or indulge, particular spirits.
Lewis points to a similarity in the degree of absorption in God: 
Constantinides' data would seem to contradict this. The sheikha who 
leads the zaar ceremony is not an accepted representative of Allah 
as are the Sufi leaders: the whole thing is far more peripheral, I
would suggest. Whether there is any absolute significance in this 
i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to say. What i t  does do is make a statement about 
the status of women in the Muslim world.
Another instance of the syncretism of Muslim beliefs i f  given by 
M. Gaborieau in a short description of a group of Muslims called 'Les 
Curaute1 (the bracelet makers) in the Samjur village of Nepal. Here
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there are two aspects to popular religion. First is the cult of 
Shah Madar, celebrated at a yearly festival by the Madari fak irs .
This cult originates from Makapur, near Kanpur in North India. I t  
appears to Gaborieau to resemble N. Indian celebrations (1977: 122).
The Curaute consider i t  to be an integral part of their religion, 
there being a chant praising Madar sung on the day of the presenting 
of the newly born infant to his parents and neighbours. For the Shah 
Madar festival the fakirs erect a simulacrum of the tomb of Shah Madar 
in the village. In the praise, two other saints are also venerated, 
including a Hindu deity. During the ceremony the fakirs appear to 
indulge in a dhikr- l ik e  ritual in which they h it themselves repeatedly 
and repeat invocations to the saint that are corruptions of the 
shahhada ('There is no God but Allah1) (op. c it :  122-127).
The second aspect is the cult of Ghazi Miya. The Curaute know 
of his burial place but are not familiar with the legend of his marriage 
and death which forms the focus of an important ceremonial in Bahrraich 
in Bihar. The part of his tradition they concentrate upon is the 
annual fete held on the f i r s t  Sunday in the solar month of Jyesth 
(May-June). Then auspicious chants are made by the women to the 
saint, who is famed for hns ab il ity  as a curing figure, bestowing 
health on children and f e r t i l i t y  on sterile  women. The tomb of the 
saint that is in the village is a replica of that at his real resting 
place, around which the festival occurs. On the Saturday night of the 
ceremony Hindus and Muslims participate without distinction. On the 
Sunday the Muslims resume their festiva l. They place a flag on the 
tomb and make a sacrifice to the saint. The influence of popular Hindu 
cults is f e l t  in that the principal officiant who takes the offerings 
is called ' p u j a r i also Hindus are recruited to play musical instruments, 
(op. c it :  127-129).
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To return to N. Africa, I would like  to discuss possession again 
briefly . This is a somewhat misleading subject to concentrate upon. 
Constantinides suggests that the women who participate in the zaar cult 
are often accused of faking. Her interpretation of the intentions, or 
the latent function of the zaar r i tu a l ,  is one that points to the 
discontent of Muslim women, especially the more wealthy ones. She 
suggests that they indulge in zaar cult membership to obtain attention 
and gifts from their husbands, though pointing out that some of the 
women are genuinely sick, dispirited or i l l  at ease, and obtain re l ie f  
from the experience. Unfortunately this re l ie f  comes at a price: the
ceremonies are expensive to hold, and the members become dependent on 
the sheikha (Barclay 1964: 264). They are bound to hold zaar
ceremonies, once begun, at regular intervals.
Barclay suggests that, in Merton's terminology, as aforementioned, 
the manifest function of the dhikr and zaar r itua ls , the religious 
brotherhoods and the zaar cu lt, are quite different, but they share 
a common function in providing 'opportunity for emotional release 
through approved social means' (op. c it :  204). However, the
individualistic character of the zaar ceremony proper should not be 
overlooked. The dhikr, though a personal meditation, does also 
attempt to bring a company of men to a common ecstatic experience at 
a single moment; the dhikr is held by the Sufis in a group with an 
encoded ritual arrangement and a set liturgy: in the zaar ceremony,
the group aspect is ,  I think, subordinated to the individual. Barclay 
suggests that the dancing in the zaar ceremonies always gives the 
impression of a state of chaos and disorder in comparison with the 
generally orderly movements of the dhikr, where the muqaddim (offic iant)  
is at hand to keep some kind of order or rhythm going.
Gilsenan provides a thorough account of the dhikr and the rule-
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governed nature of the performance; he states that,
'the details of the performance of the dhikr are in most 
cases laid down for an order by the Sheikh or one of his 
predecessors'.
(1973: 164)
He accentuates the dual nature of the dhi kr he has observed, that of 
the Hamidiya Shadhilya order in Egypt: the prayer to the saints, the
founders of the order, is counterpointed by the reiteration of the 
oneness of Allah during the r itua l. Both are combined in the unity 
‘t *ie dhikr. Absorption in the transcendent being is not the sole 
preoccupation of the r itu a l;  although the request for succour from 
the saints does not form in any way the main climax of the r itu a l,  
they are s t i l l  supplicated. They are not, naturally, allowed to 
overshadow the One God, nor is this aspect of the ritual dominant.
(op. c it :  168).
Gilsenan points out that accordingly the ritual has two directions 
oneother-wordly, concerned (as Nasr's account was) with the name of 
Allah; the other is towards this world, albeit in one specific form, 
to the mediating powers of the saints operating in i t .  Gilsenan 
suggests that 'the ritual balances and unifies within i ts e l f  the 
polar tensions of these two elements', (op. c it :  169).
Basilov, in a consideration of Islam in Turkmenian society, 
accentuates the lack of personal control of the Sheikh, the leader
dhikr there. He is pointing, as did Lewis, to the pre-Islamic 
beliefs amalgamated with Sufism in Turkmenian society, tracing 
heterodox, shamanistic elements in their beliefs. He suggests that.  
Sufism there has only been assimilated in its outward aspects 
(Basilov 1984: 228). He indicates how the Sheikh can apparently
suffer breakdown from time to time, having undergone a 'joining' with
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the jinn (op. c it :  223) similar to the mystical illness a shaman
must undergo before taking up his role (Parkin 1979), and is only 
cured of this by the dhikr. The Sheikh's unorthodox behaviour in the 
dhikr is reported by Basilov. In this context i t  is worth remembering 
that the dhikr was usually performed to cure the sick who have been 
harmed by the jinn, incases where the prayers of the mullah, the 
orthodox formal Islamic leader of the community, prove ineffective 
(op. c it :  233).
The dhikr here is a different phenomenon apparently. I t  seems 
to be a ritual completely different from that reported by Gilsenan, 
Lewis and Barclay. The dhikr for these three authors, all discussing 
N. African Sufism, is a participant-orientated performance and though 
attracting criticism from those opposed to Sufi orders, there is at 
least a modicum of control over the Sufi's experiences. Barclay states 
(1964: 186-7) that although the dhikr is 'd i f f ic u lt  to manage' when
the pace of the ritual races, there is a certain symmetry and order 
to the experience. Cathartic i t  may seem, with members achieving 
trance, and subsequently trembling and shaking, or needing assistance 
from fellow Sufis.
Gilsenan stresses the rules that constrain the conduct of the 
dhi kr. He suggests this contributes to a certain 'aesthetic tone' of 
the dhikr among the Hamidya Shadhilya (Gilsenan 1973: 181), and a
controlled ritual performance. There is here a balance between 
freedom and control: possibly i t  is salient to mention that the
membership of this order is taken from both educated and i l l i t e r a te  
groups of people. Gilsenan suggests that the restra int, both in rule 
and conduct of the r itu a l,  minimizes embarrassment for the educated 
while s t i l l  retaining a high degree of satisfaction for the i l l i t e r a te  
( ib id . ) .
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I f  one is intent on asking why the Sufis have developed a ritual
of such a kind a number of reasons therefore emerge. I f  interpreting
the r itu a l ,  several metaphors spring to mind, perhaps the most
explanatory being:
'Stravinsky has said that 'music is given to us with the 
sole purpose of establishing an order in things, including and 
particularly, the co-ordination between man and time'. This 
ordering and co-ordination of men and time are central to the 
meaning of the dhikr. The ritual pivots on the fusion in 
harmony of patterned rhythms in sound and movement with the 
organic inner bodily rhythms of the performers regulated 
through the prescribed forms of breathing control',
and,
'As with a musical score of course, the ritual can be read 
both vertically and horizontally, and in inner time and
outer time For within the frame of the ritual and
symbolic performance culturally given and outer time are 
suspended through the patterns of musical and rhythmical 
synchronisation of the chanted word, breathing and 
physical movement'.
(op. c i t :  185-6)
Metaphor i t  may be, in an etic sense, but the fu l l  social meaning 
to the Sufis is never fu lly  penetrated: the anthropologist can interpret
so much, the apologist can explain a good deal, but the two approaches 
when married, provide a doubtful ground, too expressive possibly, 
inadequate certainly. Nasr's explanations suffice maybe on a doctrinal 
level: the sp iritua lity  of Sufism is underlined. To the unbeliever
the imagination is given freeplay when accounts of observed dhikr are 
read: the disorder, the dissarray, the lack of conscious participation
can surface uppermost in the mind. This coupled with the condemnation 
of Sufi ritual excesses by the orthodox provide a strange impression 
of the dhikr when contrasted with the impressions obtained from, say, 
reading Sufi poetry, or the descriptions of Muslim apologists. I t  is 
interesting therefore to have access to a rather 'poetic' description 
of the dhikr. An interpretation that stresses the 'emotionalism' of
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Sufi ritual is tempting, especially when one considers also the 
language of Sufi poetry, redolent as i t  is with images of drunkenness 
and love, however spiritual that drunkenness, however esoteric that 
love. Excess and emotional extravagance are hardly virtues: they
scarcely accord with the strictness of moral codes, especially that 
of honour, in the Middle East or with the subordination of women, 
classically regarded by Islam as emotional, weak creatures who must 
be confined to the home and its environs to curtail 'immodesty1.
John Gulick (1976) builds up a picture of a 'peril and refuge' 
mentality in Middle Eastern cultures: modernity being a peril ,  a
danger, involving the decline of the highbrow Sufi orders, an 
immigration and emigration of peoples leading to a disruption of the 
t id i ly  ordered, genealogically based land holdings in tribal areas 
(Lewis 1984), a proliferation of sprawling suburbs with the influx 
of a rural population, possibly il l-su ited  to urban living and mores.
In this changing situation, with peasant and tribal societies becoming 
part of a world economy and feeling the effects of industrialisation  
and development, the values of spiritual growth and the place of the 
higher aims of the Sufi orders are questionable.
Rabinow illustrates the position of one holy dynasty in modern 
Morocco (Rabinow 1977), indicating how their authority has become 
undermined with the fa ilure of their spiritual power, when the 
symbols that afforded them influence no longer have their old appeal 
(at least not in the persons of these particular people). Others 
can possibly manipulate power better: the holy dynasty can maybe
fa i l  to obtain what the people who traditionally respected i t  desire 
from the modern state. Gilsenan points out that as social differentiation  
has increased in Egypt the tariga has failed to reflect the breakdown
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of the old system, or to offer any new accommodation to new strata in 
terms of attitude to the world. The orders offer no interpretation 
of the world that has significance to the emerging middle class or 
which demonstrates any significance to their social situation (Gilsenan 
1973: 200-207).
In the sway of fundamentalist resurgence also, the attacks on 
Sufism became more vociferous. In several countries the orders were 
said to be un-Islamic and degrading to the fa ith , making i t  a mockery 
to the non-Muslim. Gilsenan is more explicit:
'The dhikr appeared to have lost its true Sufi meaning and 
become no more than a quasi-institutional channel for frenzy.
As such i t  lost its roots in the collective purposes of the 
tim e'.
(op. c it :  201)
Basilov studies the syncretic Sufism in Turkmenian society in an 
indefinite historical period past; Lewis' study is of th irty  years 
ago; Barclay investigated Sufism in the Sudan in the 1950's; Rabinow 
went to Morocco in the late sixties, also Crapanzano. I t  is 
interesting to postulate what i t  would show about change i f  one went 
to one of these communities now to study the same set of people and 
examine their adaptation to the changes in the Muslim world in the 
intervening years.
Theoretical Considerations
Sufism is a mysticism: th is, according to the dictionary of
philosophy is a spiritual and non-discursive approach to the union of 
the soul with God, or whatever is taken to be the central reality  
of the universe. The definition is of mysticism generally: Sufism,
as mysticism, is also part of a Great Religion. Its  tradition is 
bound up with the traditions of formal Islam. There are d iff icu lties
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in the anthropological consideration of any religious phenomenon, 
le t  alone mysticism, where the rational takes its leave permanently, 
as i t  were, and an interpretive fog descends. Before proceeding with 
the subject matter of this thesis i t  is wise to look at the 'what' 
of Sufism f i r s t ,  and to consider some comments about religious 
phenomena per se.
Certain problems arise in the study of such an area of social 
rea lity . Not the least of these is its status as an area of study.
There may be a certain percentage of 'believers' among social scientists, 
but what happens to those who are le f t  behind in the previously 
mentioned interpretive fog? The 'sp ir itual' is a domain to enter with 
care: this distinction between those who can be credulous and those
no amount of enthusing w ill convince, presupposes a blatant dichotomis- 
ation of approaches. The facts are not as simple as this. I merely 
intend to raise one or two questions in the study of religion by 
recourse to a debate between Clifford Geertz and Tala! Asad. These 
two thinkers l ie  one each side of the divide I have just mentioned.
How far along the 'believing' side to place Geertz I'm not sure.
Suffice i t  to say that he has an empathy with the spiritual that 
Asad lacks.
Asad expresses his concern for one constitutive problem in the 
study of religion in anthropology. This is attributing paradigmatic 
status to religions. In the study of religion and symbolism this 
presents a knotty problem when dealing with abstracts. I mean by 
this any study that is not overtly concerned with what is said or done 
in a particular r itu a l ,  or given in discourse by the actors. Asad 
(1982) explores some of the d iff icu lties  Geertz finds himself in when 
defining religion as;
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'a system of symbols (Geertz 1971: 90) which acts to
establish powerful pervasive and long lasting moods and 
motivations in men for formulating conceptions of a general 
order of existence and clothing these conceptions with 
such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations 
seem uniquely re a l is t ic ' .
(from Asad 1982: 239)
Asad points out that in Geertz's discussion a symbol is different 
from its conception (meaning), but linked to i t :  i t  is la ter  stated
that the symbol is i ts e l f  the conception. The number 6, when laidout 
in a row of stones, say, is for Geertz a symbol. Accordingly, even 
as a conception, 'symbol' has an intrinsic connection with empirical 
events from which i t  is merely theoretically separable (1982: 239). 
The laying out of the stones is naturally an empirical event. Asad 
suggests that Geertz confuses cognitive questions with communicative 
ones, and indicates that possibly a symbol is not an object, or event 
which serves to carry meaning, but a set of relations between objects 
or events uniquely brought together as a complex, or as concepts 
(op. c it :  240; also Vygotsky 1962). More importantly Asad enquires
what conditions explain how symbols came to be constructed; how some 
are established as natural or authoritative as opposed to others.
Finally he argues that the authoritative status of concepts or 
discourses is dependent on the socially appropriate production of 
other discourses and activities ( ib id .) .
Asad wonders how religious symbols act, questioning whether 
there is a distinctive set of dispositions which 'lend a chronic 
character to the flow of man's activity and the quality of his 
experience' (op. c it :  241). His is an atheist's point of view, 
naturally. The believer posits an internal efficacy for religious 
symbols and their workings; evidence for this is unavailable to the 
atheist.
- 35 -
Asad critic ises Geertz centrally for confusing two levels of 
discourse: (op. c it :  245) 'symbols which produce dispositions and
symbols which place these dispositions in a cosmic framework1. This 
is connected to Geertz's ambiguous conception of symbol which confuses 
the referential and indexical functions of the symbol (Crapanzano 1981 
as quoted by Asad). Discourse involved in practice is not the same 
as that involved in speaking about practice. Theological discourse 
does not necessarily induce religious dispositions (op. c i t :  243).
Though Geertz may be said not to have implied the la t te r  the confusion 
of two levels of analysis remains. Asad also takes Geertz to task for 
his notion of an independent religious perspective contrasted with 
those of common sense, science, and aesthetics. The optional flavour 
conveyed in the word 'perspective' seems very misleading to Asad when 
applied to common sense or science as differing perspectives. This 
perspectivist viewpoint confuses the idea Asad has that whereas 
religion is_ a perspective, science is not. This is mistaken i f  one 
is of the opinion that some cultures have alternative perspectives 
anyway: in this framework then the scientific and common sense
outlooks are merely choices, alternatives, i f  one harks back to the 
'open/closed predicament' debated by Horton and Evans Pritchard.
People may have an 'awareness of alternatives', but i t  is only that, 
a choice of perspectives, rather than a belief in the absolute nature 
of western science. Additionally, one could trace back to Kuhn and 
suggest that science is not definitive anyway as its paradigms change. 
Newtonian physics was defin itive , but with the revolution in thought 
produced by Einstein, science could be said to have become something 
different. At least one could say that i t  underwent a 'paradigm change 
Asad's interest to me, apart from the argument with Geertz, is two 
fold: f i r s t  he highlights the importance of the idea of power in
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religion. Geertz connects religious theory and practice cognitively, 
whereas Asad thinks that the connection is a matter of power, of 
discipline creating religion and interpreting true meaning: forbidding
certain utterances and practices while encouraging others. Secondly 
he accentuates the importance of the technical, as well as the expressive, 
elements in religion. Asad hints that religions are rarely approached 
in terms of technical action, pointing to the importance of the 
disciplining of the body and of speech to produce religion in its  
variety. These disciplines are possibly the preconditions for specific 
forms of thought and action but they must be taught and learnt, and 
are therefore dependent on a variety of social institutions and 
material conditions (op. c it:  251).
The importance of power in Sufism is possibly under explored as 
a constituting notion, though implicitly i t  is considered in many ways.
The key notion of baraka ('grace') that I intend to discuss in Chapter 
Five has power as part of its cultural domain: spiritual power,
intermingled, possibly, with awe for that which transcends a common 
sense view of the world. This numinous quality of religious power 
may be sustained by various symbols, but i t  can be grasped in the 
social world, in the meanings and acts predicted upon that power, and 
in the status and influence accorded to those of a religious disposition. 
This type of interpretation is kept wholly within the realm of the 
religious: i t  is not the only possible kind. The idea is to retain
the analysis on a concrete level when discussing power, not on a 
paradigmatic level where i t  can only be an abstract.
On this paradigmatic level power is assumed: its  investigation
is therefore trapped within a set framework that possibly mystifies 
actual social phenomena; needless to say, i t  need not do so. Much 
depends on the nature of the theorist's discourse, and his constitutive
- 37 -
assumptions. The separation of the two levels of discourse is 
possibly d i f f ic u lt  to sustain within anthropology i f  language is 
taken to mean the sum of its  rules. To revert to another strand of 
my concern, a discussion of the technical aspects of religion is 
manifest in the importance of ritual to the Sufis. Nonetheless, the 
rituals have an important expressive element that needs consideration 
also for a balanced interpretation. I t  is interesting at this juncture, 
having discussed power, to observe that in many interpretations of the 
Sufi dhikr power is implicit: the 'atmosphere', one might suggest,
creates an impression of power of some sort. I t  may be the power of 
mystification: something that is indefinite is frequently powerful
and awesome. (See Parkin 1979: 148). To the participant observer
possibly, the observed experience can be sufficiently comprehended for 
the numinous element to subside from the forefront of one's mind.
Geertz may confuse two levels of discourse and discuss religion 
as a system of symbols: Ahmad (1979) assumes a trinary separation of 
levels of interpretation in an analysis of the religious system of 
Muslims in India. Ahmad is concerned with the observable world of 
religious practice and defines three levels within the Muslim religious 
system: f i r s t  that of beliefs and practices traditionally  described
as belonging to formal or scriptural Islam; secondly that of beliefs 
of a more limited spread, reckoned by Muslims who hold them as much 
a part of their religious system as the values of the level above, 
though i t  is not necessary that they should always accord with the 
beliefs enshrined in Islamic scriptural texts. The third level is 
that usually described by social anthropologists as pragmatic or 
practical religion. I t  contains an amount of
1 non-philosophical elements, such as supernatural theories 
of disease causation, propitiation of Muslim saints and 
occasionally at least deities of the Hindu pantheon or other
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crude phenomena such as sp irit  possession and the evil eye'.
(Ahmad 1979: 51)
Most of the elements of this level are antithetical to the beliefs 
of the other two levels and are regarded as heterodoxy by the Muslims.
I t  would be wrong, in«Ahmad's terms, to think of this level as 
eliminable (op. c it :  52): Muslims themselves see no contradiction
between s tr ic tly  Islamic, and non-Islamic practices, ( ib id . ) .  This 
is important to bear in mind given the analysis of Lewis (1955/6 and 
reprinted 1984). One could suggest that this illustrates a specifically 
'Indian' quality of Islam, but the evidence from other Muslim groups 
such as I have outlined previously would suggest that i t  could be 
applied to Islam in other cultural contexts, where extremely hetero­
genous elements of non-Islamic derivation s t i l l  have some significance.
Ahmad suggests that the theological/philosophical elements on the 
one hand, and the local level syncretic elements on the other, are 
integrated in Indian Islam, and that this should not be surprising 
historically: they have come to exist as complementary and integral
parts of a single religious system due to Islam's own struggle for 
survival in an alien environment (op. c it :  53). Whether comparison
with other cultures where Islam also had to fight against local custom 
is wise or not is a moot point: syncretism in Islam is extant in many
cultural milieu, or so i t  would seem from my investigations. The third 
level of Ahmad's analysis is the most significant level for me to 
consider: i t  is useful here that Ahmad considers the actors' opinions
to have significance and to be relevant for an anthropological 
interpretation.
A Hidden World
Before turning to other matters a word could be said about one of
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the more extraordinary sides to Sufism. An assessment as to whether 
Sufis are miracle workers or fakes is one that is generally omitted 
from any kind of academic treatment of the subject, but the existence 
of this type of view has conspired to give Sufism a somewhat dubious 
reputation in some quarters. Some kind of explanation of the more 
overtly supernatural elements in Sufism is called for, and I think 
one can begin this task effectively i f  one consults Gilsenan (1982) 
and considers the idea that a Sufi sheikh can become a kind of 
'community conscience' (1982: 140).
The premiss on which this type of opinion is based is that of the 
superior knowledge of the Sufi: superior or hidden knowledge is a
notion of some import in the study of all mysticisms. The knowledge 
of the Sufi does not appear to be thought of as equivalent with 
mundane knowledge. The Sufis have constructed, or monopolise access 
to, a special knowledge which is based in the power of secrecy, the 
power of the hidden and of mysticism, and in the power of knowledge 
i ts e l f .  I would like to consider how the power derived from this 
'superior' knowledge is seen by people in the community, and how i t  
can be effective as a social sanction. This provides an example of 
pragmatic religion and also helps in the understanding of Sufi 
influence in the Muslim world.
Pragmatic or practical religion is best described as the religion 
of most people in any society. I t  is the religion of the everyday 
where the spiritual can enter the secular. This experience is 
different for a ll members of a community as their l i f e  experiences 
are different, but in Sufism there is a division between the religious 
discourse of the Sufi leaders and that of the remainder of the group. 
There is additionally the religious l i f e  of those who adhere to 
scriptural Islam, that make up the vast proportion of people in the
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Middle East.
The Sufi leaders in Muslim society have a certain status derived 
from their spiritual in itia tion  and their position as inheritors of 
baraka from the founder of their order and from their descent, which 
may or may not be from Quraysh, the family of Mohammad. These two 
aspects of transhistorical legitimation of status, as Lewis points 
out, can be confusing (1955/6: 147-8). Tariga a f f i l ia t io n  alone is
somewhat d i f f ic u lt  to determine sometimes, and genealogical connections 
can be doubtful. Nevertheless legitimation of status by descent 
remains. The status is more the 'regard' for position in society, 
the justif ication for the Sufis to do what they do, and live where 
they live without challenge. Challenge comes, however, as is often 
seen ( I  shall discuss later in Chapter Five how the marabouts of 
Boujad are losing prestige and clients in this century (Eickelman 1976) ).
To return to the question of superior knowledge. There is a 
contrast in Middle Eastern thought between two kinds of rea lity , the 
zahir, or outward manifestations of rea lity , and the batin, or inward 
manifestations. Sufi leaders, having achieved marifa (gnosis), or 
of a high station in the tasawwuf, are masters of the batin and 
have access to knowledge other members of the community cannot aspire 
to. The ordinary Sufi cannot become exactly as his leader unless 
exceptionally devout: the main proportion of Sufis described in the
literature seem not to aspire to the heights of Sufi ecstasy but 
possibly this appearance is not a rea lity , i t  may well be a bias in 
ethnographic data collection. As I stated previously, narratives 
taken from people are relatively few in the anthropology of Sufism.
Those taken are honed to particular purposes and these are not usually 
concerned with progress on the tasawwuf.
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As an illustration  of the significance of the batin in everyday 
l i f e  Gilsenan describes the horror of a young man a f f i l ia te d  to a 
tariga in N. Lebanon (1982: 119) when his sheikh reprimanded him
knowingly for becoming lax in his religious observations during a 
dubious liaison with a g irlfriend. According to Gilsenan, the true 
sheikh 'knows' when a Sufi has omitted his ritual ablutions: in an 
interesting example Gilsenan contrasts the knowledge of a local sheikh 
with the ' imposter!ng' of a visiting Syrian sheikh through an 
i llustration showing how the vis itor entertained the thought of 
including in his tariga a local joker who proferred himself to the 
visiting dignitary in a r itua lly  impure condition and was not 
reprimanded for i t ,  or noticed as being in such a state.
Superior knowledge is slightly doubtful in this instance:
Sufism is essentially a local a ffa ir  within a tariga and involves 
knowledge of persons as well as esoteric lore. Nevertheless the 
s p ir it  of the batin was working for the Lebanese Shei kh as i t  enabled 
him to absent himself from the room in the above example to allow the 
visiting shei kh to destroy his reputation in the manner described.
This denouncement occurred after a dhikr had been held, during which 
the visiting sheikh began to change the normal tempo of the performance 
and created considerable disorder in the meeting. Superior knowledge 
can be glossed as 'insight' or 'in tuition ' maybe: the marginal
nature of the Sufis in their community can be overestimated. They 
probably do know quite a lo t of what goes on in the ir  neighbourhoods. 
Their role as mediators and refuges in times of trouble place them in 
a powerful but equivocal position.
Gilsenan gives an interesting example of the practical significance 
of the Sufis' superior knowledge in the same volume. He indicates how 
the Sufi can be a refuge from social distancing or ostracism because
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of their peculiar, unassailable and marginal position, which is 
possibly a 'function' of their knowledge of the batin. The example is 
of an extended dispute between two cousins on a matter involving 
honour (which could have had disastrous consequences for the families 
concerned i f  i t  had been made public) but which was smoothed over by 
one of the disputants' becoming a disciple of the local sheikh. This 
particular person was socially inept, had few friends and was well on 
the way to becoming a marginal figure without further complications 
to his position. His cousin was his only friend, and a dispute with 
him that no one could persuade them to explain or forget pushed him 
further into isolation from the community. Becoming a disciple of the 
sheikh gave him a fresh status, a comprehensible one. I t  enabled the 
community to accept him as something different; s t i l l  marginal, but in 
an acceptable way that precluded matters of gossip and dispute with 
kin being dragged into the public arena (Gilsenan 1982: 124-131).
Gilsenan's argument here is to accentuate the everyday nature of 
and zahir as notions. The society, according to Gilsenan, 
has a particular emphasis on 'show, manipulations of the surface and 
the acquisition of knowledge of what intentions l ie  behind i t '  (op. 
c it:  139), giving importance to the distinction between what is
hidden and what is not.
The key area in which the power of the batin influences the 
young is that of sexuality, where the classic Middle Eastern notions 
of honour, modesty and purity become important and where open 
knowledge of indiscretions is undesirable. The constraint of the 
sheikh is unspecific, for no act or offender is named publicly. He is 
merely exposed to the knowing glance or the words of the holy man 
that surprise the offender. The sheikh, as aforesaid, becomes the 
'community conscience' (op. c it :  140) although part of the community.
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By virtue of his sheikhliness he is taken to know all that lies 
behind the world of appearances; unlike gossip, which has a source, 
his knowledge is impenetrable. I t  thus might be said to have a 
peculiarly chastising quality, i f  only in its effect on the psyche.
From considering a somewhat hidden world, where what is mysterious 
is intriguing, I now propose to turn to an aspect of Sufism that is 
less frequently discussed by anthropologists but has no less a 
bearing on the subject of this thesis. That is the topic of emotion. 
Some indications have been given in this chapter as to some of the 
more emotional aspects of Sufism, in descriptions of the dhi kr for 
example. The next chapter examines Sufism and emotion more closely, 
thus probing one facet of Sufism's meaning, and also providing a link  
with the main concern of the thesis, Sufism and healing, as emotionality 
has a certain relationship with health, particularly mental health.
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C H A P T E R  T WO  
SUFISM AND EMOTION
Introduction
Of all the subjects discussed in this thesis the place of emotion 
is one that requires some justif ication . Emotion is a d i f f ic u lt  
subject, and hitherto anthropologists have tended to avoid analysing 
i t ,  or imputing i t  as a reason for some particular action. This is 
partly due to the fact that when contemplating emotional referents 
for social action one can be charged with psychological reductionism. 
Another d iff ic u lty  is that of accurately expressing the emotional 
discourse of another culture.
In this chapter I hope to raise some wider issues concerning 
the anthropological treatment of emotion that suggest that emotions 
can indeed be studied fru i t fu l ly  by anthropologists, but to underline 
that in such a treatment there are particular caveats to be borne in 
mind. Some attention is additionally paid to emotion in the Middle 
East: particularly the cultural expression of 'love' in Muslim society.
The emotions I wish to concentrate the reader's attention on are 
Muslim equivalents of love, fear and anger. This f i r s t  becomes the 
main focus of interest for me due to the significance of i t  in Sufism. 
The second becomes relevant due to its position as a factor in the 
causation of illness which is frequently expressed by Muslims. Anger 
is considered the least. This is because i t  has less importance in 
the context of this thesis. However i t  must be mentioned, i f  only in 
passing. The honour and shame complex in Muslim society expresses 
well one cultural directioning of anger among Islamic peoples.
Before I begin to examine any data I must underline the main
- 45 -
diff icu lty  in a consideration such as I intend to make. The term 
'love' has several connotations in English. I t  is a perfect example 
of polysemy, which provides one with an in it ia l  sense of something 
problematic. Maybe this polysemy illustrates the fraught nature of 
this emotion: the depth and breadth of its  compass. In Islam, ' Ishg
and muhabba, which represent connotations of what we would express 
with the term 'love' are also polysemic. When discussing the texts 
necessary for illustration  i t  has not always been possible to ascertain 
the exact connotation of the umbrella term 'love' than an author 
means to use. Such specification is perhaps unnecessary to that author, 
but would have assisted my purposes. Accordingly I hope by stating 
this at the outset that any confusion will be minimal. Fatemi (1978: 47)
talks of 'kinds' of love, the use of 'love' as a translation here is 
obviously inadequate, but the data do not penetrate the problematic 
f ie ld  of concept translation to a satisfactory depth, thus not 
permitting one to be more specific.
Rosaldo's data below illu s tra te  well how western terminology fa ils  
to express the exact significance of indigenous emotional concepts. 
Meeker's on the other hand, point to the d iff icu lties  one can get into 
i f  umbrella terms are used to translate indigenous expressions, and 
i f ,  moreover, western terms are used heuristically in an analysis of 
a cultural context for which they are unsuited. I find, expectedly, 
that the whole area is fraught with p itfa l ls :  they issue from the
lack of specification in the meaning of 'love ', and the loose usage 
of this term in discourse.
Lastly, i t  is d i f f ic u lt  to use the term 'emotion' at a ll with 
reference to Sufism. Sufi purists would demur at the association 
altogether: emotion would be too base or basic a concept for them to 
use with reference to their spiritual feelings. Yet i f  one intends
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to attempt an understanding, an explanation even, of mystical 
phenomena, certain commonplace referents are essential. The mystic's 
experience is in a non-ordinary realm of reality and its expression 
is exotic possibly, opaque certainly. The language of the mystic is 
construed as metaphorical, allegorical in laymen's terms, or its  
meaning is construed l i te ra l ly  and spiritually denied.
Anthropology and Emotion
Needham has several things to say about the study of man's inner
states and emotions. He remarks: (1981: 99),
' i t  is all the more remarkable' (against a background of 
the importance of emotional attachments and aversions 
in history), ‘ that anthropologists have paid practically  
no systematic attention to the topic of emotion'.
He posits a reason for th is, that i t  is ,
'probably the result of an uncritical assumption that 
in their emotional lives human beings anywhere are by 
and large essentially a like '.
This naturally cannot be definitively true: the vocabularly of emotional
states should surely vary, and be exceedingly useful data shedding light
on little-considered aspects of societies.
Needham points to incipient investigations in anthropology of
emotional l i f e .  Here,
'stress is laid upon the premise that emotions are in part 
at least socially defined and socially directed; that is ,  
in certain regards there is not a free play of feeling, 
but society stipulates what emotions are appropriate in 
what circumstances'.
(1931: 101)
He puts against this statement, in another essay in the same volume, 
the idea that inner states are uni versa!s (op. c it :  53 ff). However,
after investigating this notion, he comes to the conclusion that i t  
is not wholly true. (op. c it :  63).
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He suggests that in studying inner states the ethnographer
has d iff ic u lty  as he learns and attempts to comprehend the indigenous
psychological vocabulary: he may be tempted to,
‘ resort uncritically to the terms that in his own language 
designate the inner states that he is confident he has 
identified*. .
(op. c it :  60)
The supposition is that the ethnographer can come to understand an 
'exotic psychological classification' in its own terms, that can 
be used as a practical means of discriminating among the expressions 
and actions of individuals. Needham takes the example of a man scowling 
the observer is told that he is in a certain inner state, known by a 
particular word that the ethnographer translates as ‘angry1. In 
effect he had merely applied an English psychological word to a facial 
expression that he has assumed to convey anger. However he does not 
know yet the conventional significance of grimaces in this society 
and he cannot know by simple observance that the inner state of the 
man corresponds with anything he would recognise as anger.
Needham states,
'the crucial d if f ic u lty  is encountered when he tries to 
identify the cultural signs as natural signs. This is 
almost certainly what he is doing i f  he resorts to the 
word 'angry' when he translates the indigenous word that 
describes the scowling man'.
and further,
'he will need to find out.....what are the particular 
circumstances that justify  attributing precisely this inner
state to the man who he infers is angry. To do so calls
for a comprehensive knowledge of the values, collective  
representations, modes of organisation and so on which 
comprise the society'.
(op. c it :  61)
Needham then argues that utilis ing polythetic classification,
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'the mode of classifying by sporadic resemblances' (op. c it :  62)
can shed light on the problem i f  this is used.
'then the class instances of anger need have no common 
feature but may even constitute what is known technically 
as a fu lly  polythetic class in which no feature is shared 
by all its  members. In that event, the principle of sub­
stitution cannot apply, and what is known of one instance 
cannot be imputed, by reference from the class membership, 
to another instance. This means that 'anger' in another 
civ ilisation is not equivalent to anger in our own. More 
generally the outcome is that inner states are not
universals and do not in this sense constitute natural
resemblances in men'.
(op. c it :  63)
This puts a powerful case for anthropology's considering emotions 
as Needham proposes, as social facts (op. c it :  62). I t  also provides
the possibility of a wealth of comparative data. In psychoanalytical
anthropology a well-worn argument explores the relevance of Freud's 
theories in the study of non-western societies. Maybe these theories 
can throw light on social facts, but is i t  valid to use them?
Possibly they have some value, but here I am concerned only with the 
emotions, and most of a ll their significance in and relationship to 
Sufism. To show how the study of emotions can be useful anthropologi­
cally, I would like to turn to an ethnography that demonstrates this,
M. Rosaldo's ‘ Knowledge and Passion'.
Rosaldo (1980) states in her preface that her analysis 'seeks 
to capture continuities in cultural form and characterise the underlying 
shape, or meaning1 (1980 x i ) .  She explores the ‘ relation between 
language and experience or culture', (op c it :  x i i i ) .  She was
interested in her f ie ld  work in how the people used their language, 
and about the sense of words with which they characterised and explained 
the nature of human action and the interest of diverse activ ities .
She points, quite interestingly, to the way she began to be interested 
in the emotional l i f e  of her informants (1980: 35-36) -
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‘Anthropological tradition te lls  us that strong emotion 
is a sign of social import, because cultural practice 
generates such affects as will guarantee the 
constraining force of social norms upon the self.
But a functional view that renders 'sentiments' the 
servants of 'society' has made us inclined to view 
'a ffective' l i f e  more as a 'sign' that points to a 
social rule than as i ts e l f  a sphere of meaning that 
is as public and as socially significant as the names 
of kin. Unable to participate directly in the 
emotional world of our informants, we have failed to 
see that personal l i f e  is shaped by terms with social 
implications and correspondingly that 'persons' are 
themselves 'constructed' in terms of shared under­
standings that inform the ways they act and fe e l ' .
'My discussions with the Llongot suggested that for
them talk of the emotions provided such
'constructions' Not cosmology, but action and
response, energy and anger, were what concerned 
them'.
Rosaldo came to see that i t  was not head-hunting per se that
could provide understanding of Llongot experience, but rather the
'r itu a l forms and everyday reflections through which 
Llongots communicated something of how, or why, 
activ ities like k illing  made good sense'.
She found the key to this was the heart, an organ which for Llongots, 
unites concern for thought and feeling, inner l i f e  and social 
context, violent anger and such desirable consequences as f e r t i l i t y  
and health, (op. c it :  36).
To explore some of the significance of this emotionally 
orientated discourse i t  is educative to probe the meaning of the 
'heart' among the Llongot. This exploration w ill demonstrate how 
an approach which penetrates indigenous discourse to find the meaning 
in affective terminology can shed light on different aspects of the 
culture under consideration. These insights are not obtained through 
conventional analysis but they should illustrate  how one can study 
emotional discourse in a society.
For Llongots the heart is both a physiological organ, a source 
of action and awareness, and a locus of v ita l i ty  and w i l l .  I t  provides
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a ground that links thought, feeling, and physical well being, and
ties natural and social processes to the development of se lf. Rosaldo
points out that in different contexts the
'heart can be equated with words for ' l i f e '  (biay), 
for 'shade' or 's p ir i t '  (beteng), for 'breath1 
( niyek) , 'knowledge' (beya) and 'thought' (nemnem) ' .
(1980: 37)
In certain contexts heart is identified with beteng. As beteng the 
heart may leave the body during sleep to heed the call of dead or 
living hearts that think of them or name them. The Llongot speak of 
the 'flow' or 'coursings' of the heart (op. c it :  37) when alluding
to depths of feeling and supposedly hidden thoughts. To be a man of 
'breath' is furthermore to be a man of (1ig e t ' - a word suggesting 
energy and anger and also passion, which is associated with a 
variety of physical processes realised in people as enthusiasm, 
agitation, passivity and violent action, and as motion or stillness, 
opening or closing, sp litt ing , spinning, rising or fa ll ing  of the 
heart. These motions of the heart are our emotions, and so the dynamic 
of human feelings, though they may vary in their intensity, are 
similar, no matter one's personality or situation in l i f e .
Beya or knowledge is what gives form, sense and consequence to 
the motions of the heart. Beya is like the body in that i t  develops 
through a lifetim e. Thus babies, lacking knowledge, can lose their 
hearts through fear, because they do not know, for example, that 
they have fa llen .
Talk of the heart is accordingly talk of inner experience (op. c it :  
38) but i t  is also a discussion of social l i f e  and public situations, 
describing not unconscious processes but such qualities of conscious­
ness that inform the ways people act. Affective states are characterised
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in terms that stress inherent continuities between the self and
social action. Rosaldo states that
'explaining joy, a friend once said, 'your heart is gay 
( sipe) as i f  to say 'thank you', and i t  smiles' '
(op. c it :  39)
However, other heart states point to less pleasant types of
motion. Rofteddo says,
' i f  angry ( l ig e t)  and intent on action, our hearts may 
'tense' and 'knot1 themselves displaying hardened 
strength and purpose'.
( ib id .)
In the discussion of illness the heart comes into play. The Llongots
describe illness in terms of 'uget' or bad feelings in the heart,
that produce illness by discouraging eating. Similarly uget refers
to the sense of resignation and withdrawal that encourages an angry
or insulated person to keep a bad grievance to himself and not
confide in his fellows.
Not only do one's feelings affect one's physical state, and
health affect or shape the emotions, but 'the two are conceived in
parallel terms' (op. c it :  42). Discourse on hearts raises questions
about the continuity between one's inner l i f e  and thought and one's
capacities for action. Llongot talk connects good feeling with action
health and knowing sociality, and associates illness with anger,
'chaos and withdrawal, a fa ilure to 'make sense' of 
action and relation, a lack of ' f i t '  between the self 
and its immediate m ilieu '.
(op. c it :  42)
Rosaldo infers that the Llongot use talk of the heart to
'indicate those aspects of the self that can be alienated -
or engaged - in social interaction'.
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She states,
'What matters in such talk is not 'psychology' as we 
understand i t ,  but the 'passions' generated in a 
self that can always be in conflict with its  
environment. Concerned less with 'motivation' than 
with action, Llongots are interested in feelings 
because affective l i f e  has consequences for health, 
co-operation, daily labour and political debate'.
(op. c it :  43)
'U get' is one of the key terms used by the Llongot. Bad 
feeling, bad health, social withdrawal and chaos are a ll associated 
with i t .  The energy, anger and passion attributed to 1iget are 
contrasted with more beneficial dispositions related to knowledge 
and health. However, Rosaldo points out that Longot attitudes to 
violence and anger are ambivalent: anger may be attacked because i t
leads to chaos and illness but they also have a healthy interest in, 
e .g ., 'appreciation of the head hunter with dislike of men too quick 
to fight' (op. c it :  44). Rosaldo quotes the Llongot as saying ' i f
i t  were not for 1ig e t we'd never work' ( ib id .) .  But they also
say 'we don't do everything because of 1ig e t1 ( ib id .)
Rosaldo goes on to examine the significance of 1ig e t , beya and 
related words. Accordingly she is probing the universe of discourse 
connected with knowledge and the emotions to further understanding. 
She found that 1iget was particularly rich in the associations i t  
produced, and provided an interesting ambivalence. For people to 
si l ig e t , or have anger, means that they are not fearful and shy, nor
quiet.
1 Li get points in human l i f e  to a readiness to be
‘different' or take offence to stubbornness and
conviction, but also to the fact that one is quick- 
moving, youthful and active'.
(op. c it :  45)
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Additionally, liget may be switched from one object to another and 
created when things that are opposed meet: storms can obtain 1iget
from tobacco smoke, which makes both storms and people dizzy.
In social terms 1iget is given in insults and slights. I t  is 
born of envy. (op. c it :  45). Rosaldo suggests that the ambivalence
surrounding. 1iget is caused by the fact that i t  is m ulti-directional.
‘ Born of insult, disappointment, envy and ir r i ta t io n ,
1iget is the source of motions in the heart that may, 
unfocused and unsatisfied, produce no more than wild 
violence, social chaos, personal confusion, and an 
ultimate passivity and loss of w il l .  But a lack of 
such motion means a lack of will and purpose - and has 
much the same result'.
(op. c it :  47)
I t  is apparent from this analysis that the translation of 1iget as 
passion is insufficient, and illustrates quite well the earlier  
quoted statement of Needham that pointed to the d iff icu lt ies  of 
using familiar English terms to translate a recognisable instance 
of such an emotion in an alien society.
The Middle East
Such studies as Rosaldo's are as yet rare: the subject of emotion 
could be considered with good effect in anthropology given the 
anthropologist's willingness to penetrate indigenous concepts and 
psychology to a sufficient depth. As Lindholm says (1981: 248) i t  is
easy to find examples of the tr iv ia lisa tio n , or ignorance even, of 
the role of emotion in society. 'Sentiments are related to the 
cohesion of society' is the bare statement of Radcliffe Brown (1958: 
40). Lindholm illustrates how structuralists 'see emotions as By­
products of exchange relations' (1981: 248) and functionalists view
'ties of affection between s ister's , son and mother's brother 
solely as mechanisms for linking unrelated lineages while 
keeping the integrity of the pa tr i l ine '.
(op. c it :  248)
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As Lindholm points out (op. c it :  249),
'Lacking a comprehensive theory of emotional structure, 
social science cannot get to the heart of human 
experience'.
Psychological anthropology even, he indicated, is more concerned 
with 'developing a method for understanding differences between 
populations', (op. c it :  249).
Lindholm continues to l is t  the contributions of anthropologists 
to the study of emotion: the large literature of the compadrazgo,
a formal bond between co-parents in Latin America and S. Europe 
(op. c it :  250) 'the new interest in existential anthropology' (ibid)
which has inculcated an interest in the relationship between informant 
and ethnographer that frequently penetrates the f ie ld  of friendship in 
a cultural complex, but this is a l l .
Lindholm points to Turner's work on emotion and ritual as
another forerunner of emotion studies in anthropology. Turner
notices the correspondence between human and animal ritual behaviour.
In both cases ritual theoretically 'channels' emotion (1969).
According to Turner the symbol is the keystone of human ritual l i f e .
These are multi valent and reconcile the opposing sides of human
nature: the emotional and the cognitive, or in his phraseology, the
'oretic' (or physiological) and the ideological, (op c it :  252).
To quote Turner (1969: 19),
' I t  is hard to locate directly genetic ritualisation in 
man. Nevertheless, as Freud has shown, certain 'innate' 
drives, such as sex and aggression, when they reach 
public expression or threaten to do so, provoke ( l ike  g r it  
in an oyster) the growth of elaborate cultural (symbolic) 
formations. In the polarisation of ritualised symbols 
there is a greater tensile strength and bonding power; 
they command both men's and their emotions and relate  
thought to feeling and action'.
However, Lindholm suggests that Turner is 'a b it unsure of his ground'
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(1981: 252). He questions whether the drives of sex and aggression
are natural or cultural.
Lindholm is concerned with an analysis of friendship. This is 
the second text I wish to explore briefly . He himself, in his f ie ld ­
work, had a deeply significant friendship with one of his informants 
and therefore is involved in the consideration of affect among the 
Swat Pathans. His theoretical position assumes an 'emotional structure1 
(op. c it :  267) in men,
'visualised as dialectical; and consisting of sentiments
associated with separation and independence on the one
hand and attachment and interdependence on the other.
This emotional structure is seen as existing
independently of any particular social structure, 
though i t  can be modified in its  expression by social 
circumstances'.
( ib id . )
He continues that taking this structure as given, ' i ts  elements
must find some expression within the cultural framework', ( ib id ).
He outlines the social structure of Swat as one in which,
'the rea lity  in which people exist is one of 
individual egoism, fear of others, jealousy, 
hostility  and contempt.
(op. c it :  268)
Lindholm is interested in the cocurence of hospitality and refuge in 
Swat, and points out that these and the 'pervasive ideal of male 
friendship' ( ib id . ) ,  though formed by social reality  'cannot be 
traced back to this re a l i ty ' .
In his analysis of this paradox he refers back again to the two 
poles of the emotional structure, ( ib id .) Whereas the emotional 
flavour of the pole of separation f i ts  into the plan of the Swati 
social order, the emotions of attachment 'clash with the trend of the 
society at large'. He suggests that the ritual of hospitality and
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the ideal of friendship must be seen within the total framework, and
further argues that the ritual of hospitality,
'is  a playing out of fantasy, an enactment of relations 
that the conditions of real l i f e  make impossible'.
(op. c it :  269)
He also argues that,
'The outpouring of affection found in hospitality and 
friendship relations shows the power of the underlying 
need, a need kept dammed up save for a few highly 
restricted breaches socially permitted in the wall 
of repression'.
( ib id . )
This example, form a Middle Eastern society, reveals in a different 
way the usefulness of regarding emotion as important in the analysis 
of society. As with Rosa!do's data, a new slant is brought to the 
material and new parallels can be found with social structure and 
social relations in their to ta li ty . The focus of such studies is not 
emotion per se, but socially significant expressions of emotional 
response, examined in a context which can further understanding 
of the society in question. This is achieved for Rosaldo by exploring 
a' certain universe' of discourse/or Lindholm by considering the social 
order with a particular analytical framework. As Needham argues 
(1981: 101)
'Comte proposed in 1840 that the best way to study the 
emotions was from the outside; and la tte r ly  this view has 
led to some incipient investigations on the part of social 
anthropology. In this approach stress is laid on the 
premise that emotions are in part at least socially  
defined and socially directed; that is , in certain regards 
there is not a free play of feeling, but society stipulates 
what emotions are appropriate in what circumstances. This 
makes i t  possible to investigate comparatively the correlations 
between social sentiments and certain institutions in the 
organisation of social l i f e .
A third text I would like to consider in this instance has a
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somewhat different flavour. Here, the concept of love is used 
heuristically as part of an analysis that examines certain data 
from Middle Eastern society. Of the three texts I have chosen, 
this is perhaps the least satisfactory in its treatment of emotion, 
but i t  nevertheless demonstrates how emotion can be significant 
anthropologically, and in a different way from the other texts.
Michael Meeker (1976) attacks social structuralist interpretations 
of the preference for marriage with agnates in Middle Eastern society 
with a discussion of what he intends to be 'meaning'. Now the use 
of meaning in anthropological enquiry is possibly overdetermined, 
but s t i l l  useful facts come to light with such an interpretation, 
and Meeker's artic le  is in some ways no exception. By utilis ing  
heuristic categries which have what he terms 'a semantic d istinction', 
(1976: 401) he can point to different data in his cultural spectrum
and indeed does, contrasting and comparing the cases of the Arabs 
and the Turks with reference to marriage choices and their meaning 
in a wider context than is available to the structuralist, who may 
take social order as a given entity and is possibly hampered by the 
putatative existence of social 'structures'. Meeker indicates quite 
well the contrasting meaning of sharaf in each ethnographic case, 
the difference stemming from the transfer of control over women at 
marriage, and accordingly the importance of the individual's sharaf 
with respect to his married sister or daughter. Among the Arabs 
(1976: 388 f f . )  ‘a disgrace of a woman or a slander touched
directly the sharaf of 'those who love* ' ( i . e . ,  a woman's brothers, 
her father, and by extension, their agnates). Whereas, among the 
Turks, 'a disgrace of a married woman or a slander touches directly 
'those who 'control* ' ( i . e . ,  her husband, his father, and by 
extension, their agnates). From this fact Meeker explains many
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cultural items: particu larly  the significance of the preference
for FBD marriage among the Arabs. I t  refers, in his opinion, 
primarily to the sharaf that is commonly shared by the parties in 
question.
However excellent this explanation may be, the analytical terms 
upon which i t  is based I think are insufficient and possibly point 
to a contradiction in Meeker's approach. Although emphasising meaning 
to the detriment of structure, Meeker is not in my opinion utilis ing  
indigenous categorisation in his analysis where such categorisation 
would really be wise. His analysis depends heavily on the differentiation  
between love and significance, Meeker stating that,
' 'community'therefore can always be expressed in two ways, but 
these two expressions, 'significance' and 'love ', are 
contrary and incompatible idioms'.
(op. c it :  385)
Meeker states of love that i t  has 'a contagious, unbounded 
quality1 ( ib id .) .  He also suggests (op. c it :  386) that 'there is
only one quality of 'love' among men, but there are many 'significances' '.  
I think both these remarks point to an analytical weakness in his 
concept of love: the f i r s t  statement is both loose and uncontextualised;
the second is palpably untrue. His concept of love is further omitted 
entirely from the husband-wife relationship, which is glossed (op. c it :
387) as one of control. The different nuances that are found to 'love' 
in Middle Eastern society are not mentioned or analysed: one is le f t
with an imposed, western heuristic category when the denotation of 
the term, or concept, is a real socially experienced feeling.
Significance, his paralled term, possibly excepts such a charge for 
i t  is a purely analytical concept and does not stand in the same 
relationship to his data as love. I t  is obviously ’from without' the
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society, yet because of th is , its  existence is indeterminate, and its  
referents rather hazy.
The statement about idioms quoted above indicates the equivocal 
position of his category 'love' when compared with the following 
(op. c it :  387).
'The husband and wife t ie  will be glossed as a t ie  
of 'control' which will be contrasted with a t ie  of 
'love' ' .
I t  is evident that for Meeker 'love' is both a heuristic category and 
a type of t ie .  Does this mean that 'control' has some analytical 
paralled with 'significance'? We are not told: the level of analysis
and that of ethnographic data are now blurred and the distinction 
between love as heuristic category and love as social phenomenon not 
explained. I t  is not clear whether these terms are putatatively 
indigenous categories or are imposed on the data by the anthropologist. 
The d iff ic u lt ie s  incurred by this fact have been easily explained.
I t  is mainly a d iff ic u lty  revealed when the choice of an analytical 
concept is paralleled by the existence in the society studied of the 
importance of the same concept.
Meeker points out that the meaning of 'person' in Muslim societies 
has been partly revealed as a concept very alien to our own: 
similarly the meaning of emotion and its cultural expression could 
be shown to be very different from ours. The d iff icu lt ies  he has 
with 'love' are a case in point. One of these is the fact that he 
explains its  analytical significance more fu lly  than the associations 
of the notion made by his informants. His analysis suffers from his 
heuristic use of the idea of 'love' and a corresponding fa ilure to 
examine the cultural meaning of the concept i t s e l f ,  rather using a 
western concept and then adumbrating cultural meaning and expression
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from this connotation of the concept. The 'love' he examines has an 
abstract, analytical quality that seems to separate i t  from emotionality
of any kind. This is nevertheless undoubtedly intentional: the
concept is not embedded in a culturally significant domain of
indigenous discourse. I t  would require ethnographic data on this
subject, the area where love has importance, to study the problem
fu lly .
As a look at emotion in the Middle East would not be complete 
without mentioning at least in passing sentiments other than love, i t  
is worth also considering fear. The data on this emotion (at any 
rate in the connotation of i t  found in Muslim society) provide a 
link with the following chapter on medico-religious discourse. Fright, 
as well as envy, is purported to cause disease in Islamic societies, 
and some description of this process is found both in Good (1977) and 
Myntti (1983). Myntti states (1983: 204) that an illness episode of
this type 'results usually from witnessing an accident or something 
frightening'. Such episodes are 'commonly discussed', and an illness 
resulting from a fr igh t is considered by Myntti to be a 'middle range 
condition between everyday and serious il lness1. She suggests, 
interestingly, that,
'understanding fr igh t provides insight into how people view 
the effect of emotions on physiology and the interconnections 
between body and soul' .
(op. c it :  205)
This statement is fa ir ly  significant for my purposes: i t  seems from 
this text that the emotions are bound up in the Muslim view of one's 
state of health. This could be borne in mind when evaluating the 
data of the next chapter. I t  must be remembered also that the emotion 
of envy, as evidenced in the phenomenon of the evil eye, is widely
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considered to cause illness and distress (many references, e .g .,
Myntti 1983; Constantinides 1972). I t  would be wise to mention also 
another area of significance with regard to emotion in its Middle 
Eastern context. This is the honour and shame complex. Though data 
on this subject is convoluted enough in i ts e lf  and has many drawbacks 
that hamper adequate discussion, the prevalence of the honour code and 
the associated desired state of modesty demanded of women surely could 
be suggested to have some emotional component. The sphere of reference 
for this data is the family, where all over the world the most intense 
emotions are concentrated, experienced and also where the effect of 
emotion is most evident, in disputes and quarrels. The significance 
of the family with regard to honour has already been hinted at in 
Meeker's data, where an account was given of the relationship between 
control and love. Honour in the Middle East could be said to be 
related to control, a concept which here has definite emotional 
components. An investigation of the emotional connotations of 
vengeance killings and feud would also be quite instructive, though 
i t  would be a digression in a thesis concerned mainly with religious 
phenomena.
Love and Sufism
I f  one accepts the statement that religion appeals to the emotions, 
allowing them expression, albeit in a spiritual direction, and that 
mystical religion works even more with the emotions, i t  is perhaps 
salient to examine the significance of Sufi r i tu a l ,  and behaviour 
generally, with reference to emotional exercise and control.
Apart from the accusation from some quarters as to the 'excessive' 
tendency of Sufi r i tu a l ,  there are at least two other spheres in 
Sufism where the significance of some aspect of emotion is highlighted.
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The f i r s t  is the importance of the 'heart' in Sufism, which has a 
connection with the significance of the heart generally in the Middle 
East. (Thinking particularly here of the framing of illness episodes 
in the language of heart distress as in Myntti 1983; Constantinides 
1972; Good 1977). Secondly there is the emphasis on 'love' in Sufi 
writings. I t  is my intention to examine now the importance of various 
connotations of 'love' (used in its most inclusive English meaning) 
in Sufism, but beginning with a consideration of the dhikr.
The dhikr has been variously described and I have analysed the 
ritual elsewhere. Here I wish only to highlight the significance of 
some aspects of i t .  F irs tly , the impression sometimes obtained from 
anthropological accounts of the ritual is one of a lack of bodily 
control. The participant is , maybe, in a trance state, his eyes are 
glazed, his body jerks. Erotic comparisons are made. Yet the ritual 
is indeed that: a r itu a l.  Accordingly a modicum of control is
assumed: the ritual has temporal and spatial referents, i t  does
not occur anywhere or for an unspecified duration of time. There 
are varieties of intensity in its experience: the hadra of the
Hamdsha might be rather higher on a scale of emotional intensity than 
the corresponding ritual of the Hamidiya Shadhiliya for example ( i f  
one could posit such a comparison usefully). (Crapanzano 1973; 
Gilsenan 1973).
The experience demonstrates a ‘ letting out', i f  you l ik e , of 
something. Ordinary parameters are forgotten, irrelevant, and 
behaviour that would not be sanctioned elsewhere is permitted. This 
behaviour is emotionally significant: participants express re l ie f
afterwards (Crapanzano 1973 for example); its  catharsis or release 
demonstrates that there is something escaping here that in other 
circumstances is contained, repressed even. Yet the outlet is a
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sanctioned outlet, and there are parameters for the participants 
as Gilsenan shows (1973) when he indicates that there is someone to 
tap participants on the shoulder i f  their behaviour becomes excessive 
given the constraints of the communal ritual performance. (Gilsenan 
1973: 170). Control is here present, and is imposed both subjectively
by the ritual actor and from the outside by a kind of adjudicator. The 
participant is being taught the necessary rules for participation in 
the dhikr: a certain catharsis is permitted. Excess, however, is
not, but the excess in question has a particular meaning in this 
situation; i t  is defined in Sufic terms.
The heart is where love is experienced, through which i t  is fe l t  
and where i t  is synthesised and controlled through the mediation of 
the conscious faculties, Sufically speaking. The Sufi must 'exercise' 
his heart: 'polish the mirror of the heart' is a frequent suggestion
made to those learning the Sufi way. So, the Sufi is working with the 
heart, using i t  as a tool. In Western parlance, one might state 
that the Sufi appears to be working with his emotions. Experience 
permits him the pleasure of indulging his heart, as love is demanded 
of him. Yet the love that is required of the Sufi is of a particular 
kind. Though described in sensual imagery, i t  is a purified kind of 
love that should be separated from most Western connotations of love, 
from love that is purely physical, based in a certain regard for a 
person or object.
The d iff ic u lty  lies with this last: in Sufi writings, love for
a love object is frequently described. I think that the KEY is that 
the physical emotion of love is yet again used: through physical,
human love the Sufi can learn to experience the divine love that is 
his goal. As Javad Nurbakhsh points out (1978: 25) a few Sufi
masters have considered that real, Sufi love can indeed emerge from
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temporal love. As indicated, there may be some confusion between
ordinary human love and the divine love as experienced by the Sufis.
As Fatemi suggests (1978: 58-59) there has been an argument as to
whether the wine and love imagery used by Sufi poets refers to the 
wines of the s p ir i t  and the love of god or whether they refer to the
real wine and physical love in this world. Fatemi proposes that the
orthodox Muslim regards this style as allegoric: however, interpreters
of literature have diverged from this. Fatemi suggests that the 
allegoric view can be applied to some poets but not to others.
The types of love* acknowledged by the Sufis are various:
Fatemi mentions (1978: 47) three: divine, sp iritua l, and natural.
Nurbakhsh (1978: 24) also underlines three types, and each author
is basically describing the same distinctions. For Nurbakhsh the 
three types are instinctive love, spiritual love and divine love. In 
the f i r s t  the lover longs for the Beloved for his own sake. In the 
second, the lover longs for the Beloved for his own sake as well as 
for that of the Beloved. In the third the lover longs for the Beloved 
not for himself, but only for the sake of the Beloved. Fatemi's 
distinction is as follows: divine love is the love of the creator
for the creature, and that of the creature for the creator. Spiritual 
love is found in a creature who is always in quest of a Being whose
image he discovers in himself is love that has no other concern, aim
or will than to be adequate to the Beloved. Natural love lastly
desires to possess and seek the satisfaction of its  own desires
without concern for the satisfaction of the Beloved.
Fatemi (1978: 48) suggests that the real problem is to reconcile
spiritual and temporal love. This reconciliation is found, according 
*N0TE Here using love in its broadest English sense as a rather 
inadequate translation of the several indigenous terms.
- 65 -
to Ibn Arabi, in the Sufi image of the perfect man, who embodies all
three types of love. This conception of the perfect man, according
to Fatemi, is a result of the concept of love and its  motivating
force in the world.
Nurbakhsh similarly underlines the motivating force of love in
the world for the Sufis (1978: 26). He asserts that Sufis believe
that the foundation of the created world is love.
'All motion, activity and light throughout the entire
universe derive from the rays of love, and true
perfection which must be sought through love'.
(i b id .)
Nurbakhsh indicates the theological derivation of this belief also 
( ib id .) .  He proposes that man's love is a result of God's love, 
love being one of God's attributes. More precisely, love is an 
attribute of the Divine W ill, and Will an attribute of the Divine 
Essence. The special kind of Sufi love Nurbakhsh concentrates on is 
' Eshq. The dictionary definition of this (op. c it :  23) is
'excessive love and complete devotion'. I t  is derived from ' ashaqah, 
a type of vine, which, when i t  winds i ts e lf  about a tree, k il ls  and 
withers the tree. So too, according to Nurbakhsh, does the love of 
the world wither up the tree of the body. Spiritual love, on the 
other hand, withers the root of the se lf. 1Eshq is most of all the
supreme and most fervent type of love. I t  is a result of muhabbah 
(loving kindness) (op. c it :  24). Muhabbah in turn is higher than
gnosis for Nurbakhsh, since i t  arises from gnosis.
According to Nurbakhsh, when 1Eshq acts on anything i t  is 
called 'w i l l '  and the creation of living beings is one of its  results. 
On a Sufi level, God's favouring of manking with this bounty of love 
means that God may burn away the lover's existence as lover and bring 
him to the state of fana (self-having-passed-away) (op. c i t :  26).
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Then, by the illumination which reveals the Divine attributes of the 
Beloved, the lover is pulled from the state of fana to that of baqa 
(permanence-in-the-Beloved). In this state the relative existence of 
the lover has gone and absolute existence has become manifest. So to 
Nurbakhsh progress in the Sufi stations is achieved directly through 
’Eshq.
The one important distinction between real Sufi love and temporal
love is that temporal love of all kinds arises from the beauty of
transient forms. Like them i t  is also a passing state. Nurbakhsh
points out that i t  is the result of 'sublimation and the refinement
of sexual desire1 (op. c it :  25). Real, or Diving love is ,
'a profusion and a rapture from the Absolute Beloved which 
descends upon the heart of the sincere lover. This lover 
is like a moth that flu tters  around the beauty of the 
candle that is the Absolute, burning away its  relative  
existence in His f i r e .  The lover turns away from 
himself and perishes, inclines towards Him and becomes 
alive. When the lover is emptied of himself and becomes 
nothing, he finds eternal l i f e ' .
(ibid.)
Poetically this points to the power of divine love in the Sufi system
of meaning. I t  is the motivating force behind Sufism, for as Nurbakhsh
quotes (op. c it :  23), 'Sufism is a way to God through love'.
A l i t t l e  should be said about the antithesis of love to the Sufis,
in te llec t. Nurbakhsh states (op. c it :  27) that in Sufi discourse
in te llect is signified by reason. However the perfection of love is
the same as the Universal In tellect for i t  comes from God, who is
Love and Universal In te llec t, the difference between love and in te llec t
in Sufi discourse is indicated by a short aphorism quoted by Nurbakhsh:
'Reason says 'There can be no more than three dimensions, 
more more are impossible'.
Love answers 'The way beyond exists and I have been 
there many times' ' .
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Additionally Nurbakhsh proposes that in tellect has knowledge
and eloquence, whereas love is free from both worlds (op. c it :  28).
To Nurbakhsh, love is not in the realm of the sentiments and feelings 
for the Sufis. Rather i t  is an attraction of the Divine, the pull 
of God, exercised on the lover, towards God. Here again i t  is evident 
that Sufis do not primarily locate their type of love in the world of 
the emotions. I t  is something suprasensible, something Divine. Yet 
i t  is recognised as Love, and approximated to this type of emotional 
experience in explanation. 'Pull' and 'attraction' do indeed suggest 
the experience of an emotional type of attachment similar to that f e l t  
in physical love. However, as a Divine object is in question, the 
experience is spiritual and the 'love' divine love.
Next I would like to locate some of this discourse on love in 
an historical context. I t  is possibly wise, for one can then point 
to contradictions in time and illustrate  some of the theological 
arguments that have raged over various aspects of love, divine and 
temporal, in the historical experience of the Sufis. A. M. Schimmel's 
account of love in Sufism is useful in this as she traces some of 
this convoluted history of debate. She concentrates on those mystical 
traditions that praise love as the highest possible state. This love 
is the Divine love for God previously analysed, the love that seems at 
odds in some ways with the usual western experience of that emotion, 
but has a parallel in the experience of western Christian mystics.
However as stated before this love does have elements that are 
derived from worldly attachments. Orthodoxy accepted muhabbah as 
'obedience' in earliest times (Schimmel 1975: 131). However, the
aspects of love were several and were classified differently by 
various authors. Among the different states of love described by 
the Sufis are uns (intimacy); qurb (proximity); shaug (longing);
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these are only a few. God is most frequently referred to as the 
Beloved, and, essentially the only way of approaching the Beloved is 
through constant purification and qualification with the attributes 
of God. In th is , as God for the Sufis is a ll-lov ing , love is of 
extreme importance. The Sufi becomes as his Beloved: he loses his
earthly qualities in his love for the Supreme Other.
Another 'worldly' quality that is of extreme importance to the 
Sufis is suffering. The one who is in love is willing to suffer 
excruciating torment i f  he may at last approach the loved one. The
lover has to remain at the door of the Beloved even i f  he is driven
away. He welcomes death, for this i ts e l f  means annihilation of the 
individual qualities, 'the l i f t in g  of the veil that separates the 
primordial Beloved from the lover created in time' (op. c it :  135).
Death in this case may mean the death of one's own qualities, or 
actual corporal death, the la t te r  leading the lover to the Beloved. 
Accordingly the mystic is willing to accept all sorts of suffering, 
i f  he is willing to accept his own death. These tribulations them­
selves 'were even regarded as signs of special kindness from God', 
(op. c it :  136).
Before the C10th, discussion of love was mainly theoretical, 
concerned with semantic associations. Then an attempt was made to 
intorduce the previously described concept of ' Eshq, glossed by 
Schimmel as 'passionate love' (op. c it :  137) into Sufism. The
inclusion of this concept into the relationship between man and God 
incurred opposition among most Sufis, for the concept implied 'over­
flowing and passionate longing, a quality that God, the se lf-  
sufficient, could not possible possess' ( ib id . ) .  This discussion 
becomes more complicated with the introduction, at Baghdad about 900, 
of the concept of hubb udhri (platonic love).
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Love appears, as A.M. Schimmel points out, as 'a strong personal 
and existential commitment' (op. c it :  138) among the early Sufis.
Hal 1 aj did not hesitate to put i t  higher even than fa ith  ( ib id . ) .
Later in this complicated history, love was contrasted, unfavourably, 
with discursive reason: the mystics named those who did not know
love 'cow', 'jackass', 'hard stone', based on the Koranic statement 
'they are like beasts, even more astray' (Sura 7: 178). Love for the
Sufis is the only legitimate way of educating the baser human qualities. 
For this, reason alone does not suffice. Understanding one's self 
involves more than reason: to accomplish i t  some sort of unique
experience is required, like love for the Beloved, that takes one 
out of oneself to appreciate higher qualities than the merely human.
The discourse suggests learning through the emotions and emotional 
experience, even i f  this is not stipulated as such, even i f  the 
emotional experience in question has a somewhat transcendental 
quality, and its object is a divine one.
The inspiration that the Sufis draw from their form of love is 
self evident in much Sufi poetry. Schimmel emphasises the importance 
of Persian and Turkish love poetry in this demonstration. As she 
states (op. c it :  289)
'a transcendent and absolute object is made the goal 
of every thought and feeling, so that love gains absolute 
primacy in the soul and mind of the lover'.
In these later works sometimes a transcendent love could be 
objectified in a human being 'in which the fullness of divine beauty 
and radiant glory seem to be reflected' ( ib id .) .  As an instance 
there are the inspired poems of Rumi written to Shams-iTabrizi.
However, the earlier Sufis would never have accepted a human 
receptor of the feeling of love, aware,
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'that the inclusion of a human object of love could lead 
to consequences that were more than objectionable, 
and that threatened to pollute purity of feeling'.
( ib id . )
The tradition that Sufis drew on in this instance were, (1) the
claim that Muhammad had seen his Lord in a beautiful form, and (2)
that he beheld Gabriel in the shape of Dahya-al-Kalbi, a handsome
young man. . As Schimmel points out, while a tradition according to
which there are three things pleasant to look at - verdure, a
beautiful face and running water - does not go beyond the usual
limits of ordinary admiration of beauty, another tradition, the hadith
in which Muhammad attests ' I  saw the Lord in the shape of a beautiful
young man, with his cap awry' was suspect in orthodox circles.
'The mystic who is completely absorbed in his love 
contemplates in the human Beloved only the perfect 
manifestation of divine beauty, which is as distant from 
him as God himself'.
(op. c it :  290)
The great Sufi masters of love mysticism, like Ahmad Ghazzali and
Jalaluddin Rumi,
'have regarded this worldly love as a pedagogical
experience, a training in obedience towards God, since
the human Beloved, like God, has to be obeyed absolutely'.
(op. c it :  291)
This illustrates that the Sufis have a concern with the purpose of 
their feeling as well as what these feelings are concerned with.
The emotions, correctly experienced and directed, channel energy in 
a desirable way; one learns from them salient lessons, and in the
human feelings one can sometimes experience flashes of the divine.
Even though Nurbakhsh denies the relationship between emotion and 
Sufi divine love, the relationship appears to stand in many instances.
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The question is ,  I think, the 'use' of emotional experience as a 
tool for learning. Through the human emotions spiritual experience 
is approached, i t  would seem, yet the two types of experience are 
clearly differentiated by most commentators. I t  is le f t  to the 
mystical poets to confuse the reader. For Rumi 'Love was the 
power innate in everything, working through everything and directing 
all things toward unification', (op. c it :  293).
Some Sufi commentators claim that the inclusion of love imagery 
is purely metaphorical in order to escape from charges of excess in 
this direction. Mir Valiuddin contrasts spiritual love with sensual 
love (1968). Sensual love is 'pure Nothing' (1968: 153ff.) and is
far removed from spiritual love. The emotions are purified in the 
experience of spiritual love, and as aforementioned Nurbakhsh denies 
the relationship between this type of love and feeling, or emotion.
The tariqa attempts to show man a Way, the way of love. The Sufi 
(and his Beloved) is the 'Friend', a metaphor that by its  nature 
implies affect. Although Sufism tries to rid man of the debilitating  
effects of his nafs, his lower, animal se lf, the emotion of love 
cannot be s tr ic t ly  included as something purely base in the Sufi 
lexicon. Though there are base carnal desires to which love has a 
relationship the love of the Sufis is a pure thing, and in many ways 
is the apogee of the Sufi experience.
This consideration of the position of love in Sufism is necessarily 
brief. Illustrations from the works of the Sufis would f i l l  many 
pages and yet have very l i t t l e  anthropological interest. To infer 
from Middle Eastern society to the love of Islamic mystics or from 
the love of the Sufis back to the cultural context is perhaps inviting; 
nevertheless i t  is not my intention to do this here. After pointing 
to the usefulness of studying emotion anthropologically I hope this
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examination of love in Sufism has proved the relevance of considering 
emotion here at a l l .
This chapter has attempted to do two things: f i r s t ly  to demonstrate
the significance of studying emotion anthropologically; secondly to 
discuss love in Sufism. The main d iff icu lty  in both these discussions 
has been the creation of a satisfactory discourse within which to 
examine one's data. Using Sufi authors one's limitations are 
understandable: one is le f t  with an entirely emic explanation. Thus 
one finds, for instance, that Nurbakhsh (1978) denies any emotional 
content in the Sufi divine love. Questioned differently by an 
anthropologist, perhaps another pattern would emerge. Talking to 
the Doctor this year I found myself that adequate questioning can 
bring to light the problems the anthropologist wishes to accentuate.
When I went to see him I came armed with a complicated barrage of 
questions. When I talked with him I found myself being distracted 
by his fascinating remarks to ask things of another nature entirely  
that were just as useful, just as informative. I was able to 
c larify  certain issues about Sufism that had previously bothered 
me, mainly its  significance in America, and Dr. Nurbakhsh's opinion 
of its status as a 'psychotherapy'.
To return to the discussion in hand, concerning the problems of 
the data. With regard to the anthropology, one is le f t  with the 
limitations intrinsic to those texts: Rosaldo returned to the
fie ld  to achieve her work 'Knowledge and Passion', therefore had a 
certain fam iliarity  with the culture before attempting a discussion 
of the indigenous discourse of significances from which the importance 
of emic equivalents of western emotional discourse emerged. The 
limitations in Meeker's artic le  also were adequately revealed: chiefly
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there was a lack of data in the f ie ld  so admirably explored in 
Rosa!do's work.
Nevertheless I think this discussion has pointed to the use­
fulness of considering emotion, and particularly indigenous meanings 
for what westerners would term emotional experience, and the 
significance of 'emotional' discourse for anthropological understanding. 
The main problem with this fie ld  of study is the definition of the
emotions themselves: even the English terms such as love, anger or fear
are inadequate because they have several connotations. I t  is simple 
to say that there is a problem translating foreign emotional concepts, 
as Needham does, without stating the equally obvious fact that English
words are also ambiguous in this area.
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
MEDICO-RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE
Introduction
To begin a discussion of aspects of Middle-Eastern society that 
are incorporated in the wide fie ld  that Sufism touches, I turned from 
an outline of what Sufism is , to a consideration of Sufism's relation­
ship with emotion. This issue points - albeit indirectly - to the 
next area that should be covered in an anthropological perspective 
on Sufism that attempts to explore various meanings, or worlds of 
significance, that Sufism has. This next issue I wish to consider 
is the fie ld  of medico-religious discourse, which encompasses to 
some extent the subject matter of the remainder of the thesis. As 
the notion that Sufism can be seen as a system of curing is a 
relatively little-discussed one, I think this idea can be explored 
in some depth.
To do this I wish to discuss three main topics: cosmology, 
spirit-possession and psychiatric illness, which are inter-related, 
and the subject matter of this present chapter does to some extent cross 
over into the area treated in the following chapter. However, I have 
selected for inclusion in this chapter data pertaining directly to 
illness, with most attention focussed on psychiatric disease. One 
artic le  concerns i ts e l f  with healers, another with traditional healing 
methods, and a third with insanity and s p ir it  possession viewed as 
social phenomena. The fourth artic le  is a seminal work on sp ir it  
possession which bears a certain relationship with Sufism. The 
remainder of the chapter concerns i ts e lf  with Islamic cosmological 
systems and some associated material.
In the two following chapters I discuss Sufism as a type of
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psychotherapy, and the notion of baraka. These two topics are easily 
included in the f ie ld  of medico-religious discourse, and one element, 
that of power, is perhaps outstanding in its significance in this 
context. In this chapter, both those who are able to manipulate 
power to create social meanings and those who are to a certain extent 
powerless (that is the insane or mentally i l l )  enter the discourse 
on Sufism. Those who 'create' power for themselves in this way in the 
medico-religious f ie ld  are the holy men and healers of various types, 
and the scholars who have originated, or created, the cosmological 
system on which this power is partly based. The nature of the power 
created by holy men and healers, however, is to some extent dependent 
on the continuing stream of patients who wish treatment (and vice-versa), 
for this legitimises the status and position of the healers. I t  is 
interesting to view the issue of traditional vs. modern medicine in 
this light and point as Good does (1977) to the prevalence of 
'alternatives' in the medical f ie ld  in the Middle East. Additionally, 
the mentally i l l  themselves are possibly making statements about 
power, although in serious cases inadvertently. The women in both 
Constantinides' Sudan and Tapper's Afghanistan are creating their 
own kind of power in their involvement in sp ir it  possession. The 
rebel or the socially incompetent also is expressing his views about 
power and his lack of i t .  He may (Tapper unpubs.) in fact seek the 
comfort of membership in a Sufi tariga to ameliorate or change his 
lo t.
Crapanzano (1973) also has a certain amount to say about the 
involvement of the underpriveledged in Sufism's curing fa c i l i ty .  Yet 
the overwhelming impression is of the power religions and cults may 
have, and can maybe sustain, partly through the continued support of 
those who need them to cure their ailments. That they also need to
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express their powerlessness and obtain some sort of ratification of 
their position as worthwhile individuals is a corollary of this in 
this particular context.
Difficulties
From discussing emotion and Sufism I wish to move to another 
background topic that will ideally provide an introduction to the 
main subject of the thesis, the central issue of Sufism as a type 
of curing system. To preface this discussion I think i t  necessary 
to provide an outline of Islamic views of illness, and of psychiatric 
illness in particular. To’ do this i t  is sensible to indicate the 
wider tradition within which these beliefs are located historically. 
However, i t  w ill be seen that the popular sentiments about illness 
and mental disturbance are neither wholly consistent with, nor 
analogous to, this tradition. Neither are popular beliefs about 
medicine generally homogenous. These facts point to the f i r s t  problem 
in such a discussion as I am proposing; that of levels of belief.
This problem I have dealt with elsewhere at greater length. 
Nevertheless i t  is essential to mention that i t  is a factor to be 
borne in mind. Popular beliefs tend to be syncretic. Many elements 
are drawn together to make up a composite whole. Accordingly i t  
may possibly be d if f ic u lt  to envisage the cosmology of Islam as out­
lined in the local beliefs of a particular group. E. Early (1982) 
points out that the group she considers use a number of cultural 
precepts and a narrative context to negotiate the rea lity  of an 
illness event and the correct curative action (1982; 1491).
Additionally, she suggests that their curative system is based on 
the traditional humoural system, though this is not explic it (1982: 
1493). Additionally, Richard Tapper, in an unpublished artic le ,
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points to the vagueness of Madozai Pashtun knowledge of the humoural
system. All this emphasises the pragmatic nature of the way curing
systems are actually turned into practice in the Middle East. But
additionally to pragmatism there is the difference between traditional
theory or cosmology and popular beliefs and practices. Good points
out that in Iran popular cosmology is essentially simple (1977: 189).
Also he suggests that the modern cosmology derived from traditional
sources provides,
‘ a structure for a seeming diversity of popular beliefs 
about physiology, disease, and therapy in Maragheh 
today1.
(op. c it :  191)
The subject just discussed leads on to a further d iff icu lty :
that is the relationship between traditional and modern medicine.
Good suggests (1977: 243) that 'diverse therapies may provide
alternatives that explain any particular fa i lu re ' .  He further points
to the way in which patients organise types of curing and their
advantages. This is done (1) in terms of availab ility  of the curing
method, (2) in terms of proximity, (3) in terms of the particular
illness for which a cure is sought and (4) in terms of the seriousness
of the illness. Good states (1977: 240) that
'a f i r s t  level distinction is made between illness which 
is dua'lix and that which is davalix, between illness 
to be treated by prayer and that" “t'o" be treated by 
medicine. Medicine is used to treat an imbalance or 
disorder of the body. But i f  the illness is
intractable an old neighbourhood woman may point
out ‘Ay, bu davalix deyir, bu du'alixdi' ( 'th is  is 
no matter forlne^icine, this is a matter for prayers' ) 1.
Good suggests that curative prayers are used for illnesses 
'believed to have one of a relatively delimited set of effic ient  
causes' (1977: 246). However, prayers may be used in one illness
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event along with medicine, (op. c it :  246). Within the category
davalix are included both 'old medicine' and 'new medicine', 
traditional and allopathic. Very often, or so Good suggests, old 
medicine is now used as therapy for non-serious ailments. However, 
the old medicine includes many functional equivalents to modern 
allopathy, and the old methods may be followed, ' i f  money, distance 
or acceptability of cure limits the pateint's access to physician's 
cure' (op. c it :  248). Thus i t  can be seen that the distinctions
between modern and traditional therapies is somewhat blurred, and 
though the decision making process involves discrimination between 
the available alternatives, there is some shading of boundaries 
between the therapies.
The third d iff icu lty  one encounters in such data is the possible 
confusion of the traditional western distinction between study of 
physiology and metaphysics. In discussing cosmology and medicine i t  
is well to bear in mind what Good discusses in a similar context 
(1977: 181), I t  must be remembered that although medicine is
primarily concerned with corporeal man, in Islamic thought
‘man stands also in a cosmic environment and is subject 
to forces in both the heavens and the sublunary world'.
Medicine is therefore closely linked to astrology, and because, as 
A1 Razi said, the body is 'the instrument and implement of the
rational soul ' (A! Razi: Physick: 30), cosmology and soteriology
provide the context for medical theory' (1977: 181). As Good adds
(op. c it :  181), for Islamic scientists the universe was not separated
into the natural and the supernatural. I t  was rather 'an unified 
hierarchy, ordered along a gradient* from things of the body to no 
material forces, 'from body to intellect' (Tambiah: 1970: 36).
Each level of this cosmic hierarchy was related to another as an
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analogue: man is the microcosm of the universe, which
'is a unified whole whose various parts are held together
by the analogy which exists between them the language
with which this interrelation is expounded is that of 
symbol ism1
(Nasr 1964 quoted in Good 1977: 179)
However, information in the cosmologies about the human body can 
be differentiated from cosmological elements which to us have perhaps 
more metaphysical than real significance. Nevertheless the facts that 
Islam generally propounded the 'oneness' of all types of being (many 
sources e .g ., Nasr 1964, 1978; Good 1977) and differentiated the 
qualities of various kinds of being in a hierarchical way should be 
remembered: additionally that man was essentially seen as a microcosm
of the universe in whose body all levels of the ontological hierarchy 
are represented (Good: 1977: 179).
Cosmology
From these in i t ia l  comments I should like to move on to discuss 
Islamic cosmology in some detail. For this I propose to take as my 
source Good (1977) who himself is heavily dependent on Nasr (1964). 
Nevertheless Good's is probably a more concise account than the Nasr 
and has the advantage of being compiled by an anthropologist. Good 
discusses Islamic cosmology as a background to his data on illness 
semantics in Maragheh, Iran, and begins with an account of the 
derivation of the system, accentuating the extraordinary diversity 
of the scheme (1977: 174), marking the strangeness to the modern
student of
'the juxtaposition in one scholar of astrology or alchemy 
with rationalist (Aristotelian, 'Peripatetic') philosophy 
and Galenic medicine'.
The cosmology he indicates ( ib id .)  was built up of elements taken
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from Greek sources:
'the Ptolemaic structure of concentric spheres; the 
Aristotelian elements of f i r e ,  water, earth and a ir ;  
and the Plotinian emanations of pure intelligences 
and soul s '.
He la ter points (op. c it :  175) to the fact that these Greek
phenomena were amalgamated with ‘distinctly Islamic convictions'.
Good attempts to contextualise medicine within the cosmology, 
f i r s t  introducing the theories about the nature of the universe, 
which, as aforestated, is thought of
'as consisting of a unity and hierarchy of being, 
divided primarily between the sublunary world of 
generation and corruption on the one hand, and on 
the other the cosmic spheres of the planets and the 
Intelligences or angels, which have perfect form and 
movement but neither generation nor decay'.
(ibid.)
The cosmos was,
'created by God and is a reflection of his Light and 
Being. I t  consists of a set of concentric spheres
with the earth as centre. The seven planets........
follow a perfect orbit within their assigned and 
bounded spheres; beyond lies the sphere of Fixed 
Stars and the outermost sphere or Muhit. The cosmic 
spheres are the residence of separate Intelligences 
or angels'.
(op. c i t :  176)
To quote Nasr as a further explanation of the outer spheres:
'Each heaven is goverened by an intellect or group of 
angels, moved by a soul, or group of souls, and 
composed of a body generated by the being which 
stands above i t  in the hierarchy of creation*.
..(Nasr 1978: 236)
Good explains the ontological hierarchy as understood by the 
philosophers,
- 81 -
‘ in terms of essence and existence, necessary, possible, 
and impossible beings; In te llec t, Soul and Body; and 
Divine Essence, Universal In te llect, angelic substances, 
and psychic and subtle manifestations'.
(Good 1977: 177)
To turn to the sublunary world, Good states that i t  is ,  'in a
continuous process of ' transformation' 1 ( ib id .) .  Form and matter
are 'co-dependent' ( ib id .) .  The sublunary region is made up of four
simple elements: f i r e ,  earth, a ir  and water, which individually
have a pair of basic qualities: hot, dry, cold and moist. The
earth and the waters are heavy elements, and both moist. The
atmosphere, a band of a ir ,  is moist in its lower altitudes and dry
in the higher. This band of a ir  is surrounded by a sphere of pure
f ire ;  naturally one would assume that this would be dry, but Good
does not say. Nasr (1978: 240) states that f ire  is 'warm and dry'.
The beings of the plant, mineral and animal kingdoms are
composed of these four basic elements. The 'constituent compounds
and the forms which they take determine the nature of the being1 (Good
1977: 178). Man, the other resident of the sublunary sphere, is
regarded as 'unique1 (op. c it .  179). This is because
'unlike other beings who represent a single level of 
the ontological and cosmic hierarchy, man is a 
microcosm of the entire universe'.
Man is material, and as other beings, is made up of an unique mixture 
of the four basic elements. However, he also possesses soul (nafs) , 
or the rational faculty, for which 'sou l'1 is a synonym in this 
account, that 'transcends corporeality and is open to the realm of 
pure form or In tellect' (op. c it :  179). As aforementioned, within
man exists a peculiar individual hierarchy. This is represented by 
three 'souls' or 'facu lties '. Here one encounters a d iff icu lty  in
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terminology, but I intend to adhere to Good's translations, as the 
corresponding terminology in the Nasr I feel is even more confusing.
The terms are metaphysical and are used to refer to the body. The 
system is alien to the westerner however, and confusion may arise.
The term ’soul' here is a different connotation of that term from 
the 'soul1 (nafs) mentioned previously and thus is glossed as 'facu lty ',  
(op. c it :  179). The three 'faculties' are the 'vegetative' or 
'natural', the 'animal' or 'v i ta l '  and the 'ra tiona l'. (Possibly 
this 'faculty' could be said to correspond to the nafs, but the 
correspondence is not specified by Good).
The 'natural' faculty resides in the liver: its  functions are
nutrition and reproduction. I t  is the locus of the appetites and the 
baser human passions. The 'v ita l '  or animal faculty is located in 
the heart: i t  provides the 'innate heat' and 'v ita l breath' (op.
c it :  180) to the body and is the locus of the emotions, particularly
fear and anger. The 'rational* faculty is found in the brain: i t
produces sensation and rationality. The rational activities are 
ranked hierarchically
C.
'from sensation through imagination, cognition and 
memory, to acts of the in tellect that place man in a
relation to the ‘ in te llig ib le  worlds' '.
( i b i d . )
'Thus man stands between the sensible and in te ll ig ib le
worlds, the world of form and matter and the world
of pure forms'.
( ib id . )
Good points out that medicine concentrates mainly on the 'natural' 
faculties, and 'secondarily the interaction between the natural and
vital facu lt ies ',  ( ib id .) .  Each person has a natural temperament which
is produced by the unique balance of the four 'humors' ( ib id . ) ,  the
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basic elements, and the fundamental qualities (hot, cold, moist, dry) 
of which he is made up. Four ‘humors' (blood, yellow and black bile  
and phlegm) are necessary in man. They are made in digestion ( ib id .) .
Each humor possesses a pair of fundamental qualities. The temperament 
resulting from the ensuing individual balance is thought to be typical 
of 'race, climate, age and sex, as well as to each individual' (op. 
c it: 181). Each temperament (sanguine, bilious, atra-bilious,
phlegmatic) 'structures both emotional and physiological character­
istics of the individual' ( ib id .) .  Illness is caused by over or 
under-functioning of the faculties and from the humoral imbalance.
Myntti (1983: 145-6) suggests that this balance is 'never constant
and only ideal'. Medicine attempts to stimulate the body's innate 
proclivity to restore its balance. Good states ( ib id .)
'thus medicine's primary concern is corporeal man, conceived'as 
a balanced set of functions interacting both within the body 
and with the external environment'.
From this i t  can be seen that Good places medicine well away from any 
surrounding metaphysics, although what was mentioned before about the 
importance of elements in the cosmology as a context for medical 
science must s t i l l  stand.
Nasr (1964; 1978) points to the involvement of association with 
Sufism of the scholars who inculcated these cosmologies. However 
estimable S.H.Nasr may be in his own milieu, he is perhaps out of 
context for an anthropological interpretation. Nevertheless he has 
some interesting ( i f  unvalidated) comments to make about the nature 
of Sufism as a metaphysical system, or possibly its  metaphysical 
elements, and also its connection and resemblance to a form of psycho­
therapy. Here Nasr is highlighting metaphysical aspects of Sufi 
doctrine that subsist on a certain level and he links them with phenomena
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from a different level of analysis, one must point out. Additionally 
he is a true apologist for Islam, so his remarks must be prefaced 
with a certain caveat. His comments might i l lu s tra te , however, how 
elements from Islamic cosmology may be seen in the light of a 
discussion of illness i ts e lf .  He demonstrates how what is essentially 
a practical system can have points of contact with theoretical 
expositions in a practical manner, despite his confusion of levels 
of analysis.
Nasr suggests (1980) that Sufism has always included a deep 
psychotherapy, which, he considers, is more complex than modern 
psychotherapy. The Sufi therapy, in his opinion, is bound up in 
Islamic cosmology, and with its hierophany. The names and attributes 
of God (which is the hierophany) also represent the to ta lity  of the 
human being (cf. the ontological hierarchy subsisting in man as 
described by Good 1977).
Sufi doctrine, according to Nasr (1980: 33) consists of meta­
physics, cosmology, psychology and an eschatologv. This eschatology 
is apparently linked with psychology and occasionally with metaphysics. 
The metaphysical aspect contains (1) the nature of rea lity  (2) the 
Oneness of the Divine Essence (3) the theophany of Essence (through 
the Divine Names and Qualities, and through the determination of 
different states of being) (4) the nature of man as the total theophany 
of the names and qualities (op. c it :  33). The doctrine of tauhid
or unity forms the axis of a ll Sufi metaphysics.
The significance of unity is revealed in Sufism's integration 
of many medieval sciences into its perspective, or so Nasr states 
(op. c it:  34). This is because these sciences reflect ‘ the uni city
of nature and the interrelatedness of things' ( ib id .) .  Nasr believes 
that to the extent that these sciences consider the symbolic and
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qualitative nature of things they ally well with Sufism ( ib id .) .
However, this integration is a peculiar thing: the sciences never­
theless exist in their own right and Sufi contributions to them, for 
instance, can be interpreted in two ways, (1) as significant scientific  
essays, and (2) as Sufi treatises.
However, as Nasr points out (ib id .) as Sufism is based in experience, 
i t  has been able to support the natural and mathematical sciences and 
encourage them, according to its own perspective. Also, doubtless, 
as based in experience, Nasr indicates the fact that Sufism contains
'a complete method for curing the illnesses of the soul and 
in fact succeeds where so many modern psychiatric and 
psychoanalytical methods, with all their extravagant 
claims, f a i l ‘ .
( ib id . )
To examine in a l i t t l e  more detail the nature of the psychotherapy 
Nasr explains (op. c it :  35) that in Sufism the soul is ,
'presented as a substance that possesses different 
faculties and modes of existence, separated yet 
united by a single axis that traverses all these modes 
and planes'.
He further points to a close link between psychology and cosmology 
in Sufism
'so that man comes to realise the cosmic dimension of 
his being, not in a quantitative but in a qualitative  
and symbolic sense. Moreover, this cosmic correspondence 
objectifies the inner structure of the psyche, thereby 
releasing the soul from its  own knots, illuminating its  
darker aspects, and displaying to the traveller of the 
spiritual path the manifold traps lying in his way, in 
the inner journey of the soul towards its own Centre'.
( ib id . )
Also,
'Sufi psychological doctrine lays the scheme before the 
adept, in both its microcosmic and macrocosmic aspects, 
before the actual journey is undertaken. But even the
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theoretical presentation has the effect of integrating 
the mental and psychic plane of the person who is 
fu lly  able to comprehend i t 1.
( ib id . )
Here one would presume that Nasr is again referring to the afore­
mentioned hierarchical and analogic constructs in Islamic cosmology, 
particularly the importance of the correspondence between man and 
cosmos.
Psychiatric illness
To move on from an individual's opinion of Sufism's relationship 
with psychotherapy I would like to turn now to more concrete data 
that outline certain aspects of psychiatric illness in the Middle 
East. F irstly I w ill consider two articles that deal with different 
facets of this issue, and then will turn to a consideration of sp ir it  
possession. Lastly I wish to refer to an unpublished artic le  that 
nevertheless provides some interesting data with which to end this 
discussion of both insanity and possession.
The f i r s t  artic le  is 0. M. Ozturk's 'Folk treatment of Mental 
Illness in Turkey'. This discusses indigenous healing to some
extent, but one obvious drawback of this piece of work is the
perspective of the author, who appears to regard the phenomena he 
describes as somewhat strange and eccentric. He is not an 
anthropologist and possibly this fact is self-evident in his 
treatment of the data. He approaches the data with the categories 
and prejudices of western medicine. For instance (1964: 350) he
hints that villagers he has studied fa i l  to distinguish between magic,
superstition and religion. This comment can hardly have been a 
considered one: i t  serves mainly to indicate Ozturk's ambivalent
attitude to his data, and to the people who provide i t .
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Nevertheless, the ethnography he provides e lic its  some useful 
facts. He points out, for instance, that in the average village, 
people take patients to both western allopathic doctors and to 
traditional healers, but bodily complaints are more readily taken to 
the allopatic physician. He additionally suggests (op. c it :  349)
that folk beliefs about illness are usually non-specific and can be 
applied to all sorts of ailments.
He states that a ll kinds of psychotic and neurotic reactions 
are frequently found in Turkey: the most common are schizophrenic
and manic depressive illnesses (op. c it :  348). Mental illness,
according to Ozturk, carries the ’usual stigma1 found in western 
society, and he sees f i t  to remark that,
'cruel and inhumane treatment of patients has, however, 
never existed to any remarkable degree in this part 
of the world'.
( ib id .)
However, he does not probe the meaning of mental illness socially, or
for the patients and their families.
He points significantly to the distinction between the terms deli 
and weli. The former glosses as 'insane', the la t te r  as 'sa in t'.
He suggests that this is a problematic distinction (op. c it :  349).
According to Ozturk the criteria  for diagnosis as insane include (1) 
aggressiveness, (2) instab ility , (3) non-conformity. A person may 
hallucinate or have delusions but as long as he is not destructive 
or very unstable he w ill not be considered insane, especially i f  
the content of his experiences is religious or mystical. This 
ethnographic fact is interesting per se, but points not merely to
a localised phenomena, but an issue that has meaning in many parts of
the Middle East, i f  I may be permitted to generalise here. The Sufis
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are frequently considered excessive in behaviour, and unlike the 
normal individual. The connection between sainthood and insanity 
can well be understood and so is possibly not the problem to 
others that i t  is to Ozturk, i f  the social meaning of a certain type 
of re l ig io s i ty  is borne in mind.
Ozturk has a certain amount to say about the jinns (op. c it :  
350-1) and other supernatural illness causation, such as the evil 
eye. Jinns are prone to attack people: numerous daily activities
are preceded by remarks like 'excuse me' uttered specifically for 
the jinns. Jinns may be seen accidentally or one may be 'struck' 
by a jinn following some ordinary, everyday incident such as washing 
one's hands or emptying water. ( I  will be discussing the world of 
the jinns in more detail in the next chapter of this thesis). The 
result of such contact with the jinns may be a confusional state, 
such as a schizophrenic reaction, a mania or a delusional depression. 
I t  was observed by Ozturk that many of the patients complained of 
free-floating anxiety or repetitive anxiety, and were likely  to 
remark that 'they' (the jinns) 'are frightening me' (op. c it :  351).
Ozturk's conclusion about Turkish health practices is perhaps 
less informative than his ethnographic data. To quote him (op. c it :  
360),
'the prevailing beliefs about illness in Turkey serve as 
institutional channels for the projection, displacement, 
and indirect expression of aggressive and other 
undesirable associated impulses, as well as attempts 
at mastering the unknown.'
Further he adds that though the aforementioned beliefs and practices 
reduce g u ilt ,  as atonement devices (prayers, fasting, sacrifices), 
they do not have a gross self-punitive element. Guilt denial is to 
him more significant in the framework than guilt reduction. This
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tendency in Muslim belief systems has been pointed to elsewhere 
(see Crapanzano 1973, Pfleiderer 1981 for examples). However, 
whether i t  is formally recognised as such by Muslims is another 
matter.
Ozturk, in referring to the channels of aggression is here 
fa lling into the trap that Turner became involved in (see Chapter Two 
of this thesis: Turner 1969) concerning drives being either innate
human things, or affected by society. This is another version of the 
conflict between views of what is natural and what is cultural. 
Whichever opinion one happens to hold, the effect of human drives 
such as aggression takes on a different significance, and may have 
different influences on cultural phenomena. However, cultural 
determinism is perhaps the least of one's problems in this context: 
one is also applying (indirectly, maybe) psychological theory to 
anthropological data and possibly being reductionist in such an 
interpretation, however inviting this analysis might be.
The second text takes data from Indonesia, yet again on the 
subject of mental health and traditional healing. I t  is not my 
intention here to discuss modern western medicine and its  effect on 
traditional curing systems and on the curers themselves. I hope 
this omission is excusable, but the subject of this thesis concentrates 
on traditional methods of dealing with illness, particularly that of 
a psychiatric kind. In this piece of work, Muslim and Hindu 
communities are reviewed, but here I wish to concentrate on the 
Muslim healers discussed. Sal an and Maretzki point to the syncretic 
nature of traditional healing in Indonesia: but two different
strands exist that are quite distinct, the western methods of 
medical care and the loosely traditional. I will select from Salan 
and Maretzki's data the information about healers from Patembay in
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S. Sumatra, as here religion is predominatly Muslim, and is 
influentia l. (1983: 383).
The f i r s t  healer, Aba, began his career at twenty and took an 
apprenticeship with older religious healers. He alleged that after 
a long period of fasting he heard voices telling him to stop his 
fast and receive the g i f t  of healing powers as a reward. His 
healing methods consisted of placing a copper key between each 
patient's fingers and examining the patient by touching the forehead, 
tracing the pulse and manipulating the diseased part of the body 
(op. c it :  386). Occasionally, pieces of paper, inscribed with
quotations from the Koran were placed on the affected area. Evil 
spirits were exorcised by bathing the patient, at which ceremony 
the patient was required to provide white cloth, chickens and other 
i terns.
The second healer began his career when he was 6 years old. Then 
his advice would be administered after a sp ir it  consultation: this
fa c i l i ty  was obtained by being 'taken away' (op. c it :  387) by the
spirits for 3 days. He did not enter trance to communicate with the 
spirits . However, after marrying, at 17, his methods changed, and he 
could only cure when possessed by the spirits. Trance was achieved 
after calling up the s p ir i t ,  and during this trance the healer spoke 
in a strange language. He identified illnesses by placing a broken 
needle on a plate and a magnet or a dagger on the affected part.
After diagnosis the healer again consulted the spirits and conveyed 
their advice to the patient. Treatment is made up of herbs and advice.
The last healer is female, and belongs to an affluent middle 
class. She began healing after a 3-month illness, when she started 
speaking to her husband in a strange voice and announcing herself 
to be Cik Maris ( ib id .) .  The s p ir it  agreed to leave her body
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conditionally, and she then told her husband that she had healing 
powers given to her, the persistence of which required sacrifice to be 
made regularly. Curing for her involved trance and possession by 
the sp ir it  Cik Maris. The patient and the sp ir it  commune and advice 
and herbs are usually suggested after a fee is paid. In d if f ic u lt  
cases Cik Maris may issue an amulet. After the healer has recovered 
from her trance she claims to remember nothing.
Research results from this study pointed to a significance of 
chronicity and mental disturbance among the patients that attended 
healers' ceremonies and sessions. The two factors are associated by 
Salan & Maretzki (op. c it :  399) and they suggest that psychological
factors were important in guiding the patient towards a traditional 
healer rather than a western medical practitioner.
Research findings indicated several things in this example. The 
therapeutic sessions seemed to effect an impact on the patient in 
a variety of ways (op. c it :  401). Often healers visited patients'
homes and would observe their status, family interactions and the 
events of everyday l i f e  which might all provide useful information 
for therapy decisions. Sessions were leisurely, and relatives often 
accompanied the patient both for support'; but also minimising privacy. 
Attitudes of healers to their clients tended to be paternalistic (op. 
c it:  402) and this to Salan & Maretzki reflected the hierarchical
relationships of Indonesian society.
Symbolism was used widely, and cosmological concepts were utilised  
to c larify  interpersonal relationships when 'treating somatic ailments' 
( ib id .) .  One patient had a repeated abscess and eventually visited a 
healer who told her, in trance, that the abscess was 'caused by spirits 
dwelling in the place where she lived' ( ib id .) .  This particular woman 
had le f t  her village against her parents' wishes to work in the c ity ,
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and the explanation aforementioned was further developed by elaborating
on the manner of her leaving home. To quote Salan & Maretzki,
‘ she thought that these spirits could easily enter her 
home because of her lack of protection caused by 
leaving the village without her parents' blessing'.
( ib id .)
This indicates the statement of the researchers to the effect that:
'healers were conversant in using a psychological 
idiom of communication, even when in trance'.
(op. c it :  403)
The researchers suggest (op. c it :  404) that
'therapeutic intervention..........was in harmony with
cultural symbolism, but also had non-symbolic
practical components'.
These two texts illustrate  several points about the relationship 
between the supernatural (including religion in its widest sense) and 
healing in the Muslim world. Elements of a causality different to 
that current in the west are made evident. These excerpts serve as 
an useful introduction to the more detailed data on Sufism and psycho­
therapy that w ill follow in the next chapter. They also indicate the 
significance of 'magical' thinking among traditional Muslims. Trance, 
for example, is mentioned several times in the la t te r  paper, and all 
the methods of healing listed in the f i r s t  are loosely mystical. 
Additionally, the writing of dua that Good mentions (1977) or papers 
with verses or words from the Koran inscribed upon them are seen in 
the f i r s t  text to have therapeutic significance. In the Maragheh 
(Good 1977) illnesses cannot be distinctly categorised, but some 
kinds can be sp lit  into (1) those treatable by dua, and (2) those 
treatable by medicine. Good's analysis of illness and its  semantics 
in Iran points to a less concrete meaning of illness phenomena than
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is suggested by these two texts, and turns one away from such concepts
as 'magical' thinking or 'mystical' thought to a discussion of
categories and disease semantics. As he says (1977: 289),
'Fright may be cured by prayer, but its symptoms may be 
heart distress, to be cured by medicine and doctors. I t  
becomes clear that these are not 'a irtight categories' 
and that description of their taxonomic relationships 
is not adequate to describing what i t  means to have 
heart distress1.
Most of the data dealt with above were basically anthropological 
interpretations of events and findings from empirical research.
However possibly less care than is preferable was taken with the 
matter of indigenous concepts and meanings. As Good points out (1977: 
292-3),
'The meaning of an illness term is generated socially as i t  
is used by individuals to articulate their experience of 
conflict and stress. Meanings of terms change as social 
conditions and the social context of their use are altered*.
Here one could bear in mind the *de li /w e li1 distinction cited by 
Ozturk (1964 as above).
Spirit Possession
I would like to consider work on possession next. Spirit
possession, and the zaar cult in particular, has several links with
Sufism. I t  also provides a kind of therapy for the people (usually
women) involved. Crapanzano and Garrison (1977) discuss sp irit
possession, pointing out that early observers saw nothing but
psychopathology in i t .  The trance state, which is characterised by
dissociation, was thought by early observers to be either faked or
else indicative of pathology. Crapanzano & Garrison define sp irit
possession as,
'any altered state of consciousness indigenously 
interpreted in terms of the influence of an alien 
s p i r i t ' .
(1977: 7)
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During possession, there are changes in emotional expression, 
perceptual distortions and hypersuggestibility. I t  is associated 
with trance (1977: 8). The trancer is lost from his socially
constructed self and the interpretation of the experience is in 
terms of s p ir i t  influence, which is a cultural construct according 
to these authors.
Possession metaphors are used in Morocco for extreme rage, 
sexual excitement, love, morbid depressions. The dynamics of sp ir it  
possession in the restricted sense may be regarded (or so Crapanzano 
& Garrison suggest) as the metonymisation of a metaphorical relation­
ship (op. c it :  10).
Spirit possession provides the believer with an idiom for 
articulating certain kinds of experience (Firth 1967). I t  renders 
such experience meaningful and becomes a basis for action. Although 
this idiom is probably structured as a language i t  is really more 
than a language as the word is used in its daily sense. The idiom 
is comprised of cultural units (Schneider 1968) that are interrelated 
in a systemic way and obtain meaning much as do the minimal units of 
meaning in a language, that is through their relationships of 
similarity and opposition to other units. Possessing spirits are 
the principal idiom, and whatever their ontological status, their  
existence is not questioned by indigenous participants any more than 
the existence of the human vehicle. The spirits serve as a way of 
articulating what the westerner would analyse as being within him, 
as outside him*, yet s tr ic tly  speaking, Crapanzano & Garrison decide 
there is no projection in this (op. c it :  12). Differing from paranoia,
possession induces the possessed to believe that the spirits exist. 
Obeyesekere (1970) suggests that the possession idiom may minimise a 
psychotic loss of contact with the outside world, or additionally
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provides a therapeutic system that involves the possibility of 
therapeutic intervention. The authors believe that i t  is wrong to 
emphasise pathology with reference to sp irit  possession.
Many Moroccans who were possessed by the sp ir it  A'isha reported 
their f i r s t  experience of possession when they mocked the possessed 
or the demon herself. However, the in it ia te  must 'learn' to be 
possessed (op, c it :  15), which suggests cultural parameters for
the experience. There are two kinds of curing: (1) permanent
expulsion and exorcism, (2) creating a symbiotic relationship with 
the possessing s p ir it .  The possessed can join a cult or become a 
curer himself or herself (many references: Lewis 1971; Crapanzano
1973; Obeyesekere 1977; Garrison 1977). The possessed time is thought 
to be a time of 'wandering'. Yet though strange to the possessed 
individual, the experience suggests that the spirits mirror some 
portion of the person; additionally, the authors suggest that the 
experience may be a means of articulating impossible desires.
Constantinides' thesis is a seminal work on sp ir it  possession 
and demonstrates among other things that the zaar cult can be seen 
to be similar to Sufism (1972: 21). However, for my purposes i t  is
interesting to examine Constantinides' data for other reasons, mainly 
to elucidate a l i t t l e  about treatment of illness in the Middle East 
and the predilection for a particular type of healing which has a 
parallel with the Sufi healing ceremonies to be described later.
Historically the zaar cult can be traced to Solomon (1972: 100)
or even to Muhammad's family. The legitimising legend te lls  of a 
zaar appearing to A1 Hussein and being asked by him why i t  entered 
peoples' bodies to make them i l l .  The zaar cult is said to involve 
dancing because Solomon, wishing to entice the birds (a type of devil) 
down out of the skies, told people to sing and dance to f la t te r  them
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down. Zaar are loosely associated with jinn or sheitan; they are a 
red jinn, and unlike jinn of other kinds, congregate in clean places.
Zaar cult leaders can be contrasted with another indigenous 
healer, the fe k i , (1972: 106) as the zaar cult leader is thought to
be more religiously inclined than the fe k i . However, the feki share
a certain relationship with the local tariqa (ib id .) and appear to be 
immensely powerful. This may be due to the fact that some disreputable 
fekis are thought to be in league with the jinn and can actually 
cause the possession they are called upon to cure. They believe 
in the existence of the zaar and couch their diagnoses in its terms.
However, they object to zaar cult treatment.
I t  must be remembered that the feki and the zaar cult leader are 
competing with each other, and while recognising the validity of each 
other's diagnoses there is s t i l l  an ambivalent relationship between 
them. This is evident from the opinion that regards fekis as impious 
and zaar cult leaders as religious. Additionally, the zaar cult 
leader believes that zaar do not like fekis and will trouble a patient 
further i f  he or she continues to consult one.
The explanations of illness causation and the reasons for distress 
in the Sudan may be mystical or non-mystical (op. c it :  119-122). Also, 
explanations may be confused and non-specific. Symptoms that resist 
treatment are not usually viewed pragmatically (op. c it :  121). Evil
eye beliefs are widespread: as in many Muslim societies compliments
are disliked because of the potential existence of unconscious or 
conscious envy.
The indigenous theories of s p ir i t  possession suggest that the 
spirits enter the victim and harm him or her from within. The 
possessed may exhibit behavioural disorders (op. c it :  127-8). This
behaviour is usually socially tolerable, however. I t  provides the
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sheikha, the zaar cult leader, with the basis for her in it ia l  
diagnosis. Zaar sp irits , unlike jinns, who are beaten out of the 
patient, are coaxed and cajoled in order to make them leave. The 
zaar are offered costumes, sweets and sacrifices, and they are sung 
flattering songs.
There seems to be a basis for suggesting that zaar victims are 
neurotics with psychosomatic symptoms (op. c it :  132). The zaar
group then provides important support for the individual zaar victim, 
although the experience of zaar healing is naturally a personal one, 
and possibly has more significance as an individual experience. 
Constantinides suggests (op. c it:  133) that i t  is possible in a
country like the Sudan that there is an organic base of some kind for 
the disorders. She notes (op. c it:  135) that in the zaar group one
is dealing with the normally neurotic rather than with the mentally 
i l l .  She reports (op. c it:  143) that 31 out of a sample of 60
women linked an antecedent personal crisis with their ensuing zaar 
possession. There were complaints of adolescent problems, f e r t i l i t y  
and childbirth d iff icu lties  and deaths in the families involved.
The zaar cult leader makes a diagnosis in an audience with the 
patient. She receives the patients and listens to their complaints.
She grasps the affected area, and may smell i t .  I f  there is a smell 
of zaar the sheikha administers incense and cross questions the zaar. 
When she makes her diagnosis, her statements are couched in terms of 
envy and anger. In order to reach a compromise with the zaar she 
bargains with i t .  The appearance of the f i r s t  sp ir it  is the true 
diagnostic breakthrough, but later other spirits may appear. Dreams 
are also significant: the sheikha may dream what i t  is that particular
spirits require. She can communicate with the zaar, but they are the
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controlling agents, who must be placated in order for the patient to 
get better. After the ritual is held the patient should obtain re l ie f .  
Additionally, the sheikha must be r itua lly  pure to obtain the best 
results out of her transactions with the sp irits , and she may be either 
punished or loved by the zaar. As she may become possessed or fa ll  
into trance herself, she may suffer illness as a result of her work.
There are seven categories of zaar sp irit;
(1) El Daraweesh,
(2) El Habash (the Ethiopians),
(3) A1 Bashawaat (the Pashas: administrators and doctors),
(4) A1 Arab (nomadic tribes),
(5) The Christians/Europeans,
(6) A1 Sitlaat or A1 Baracht (the ladies: who are mixed
ethnically),
(7) A1 Zurus (the Blacks).
Each category of sp ir it  demands certain particular things, and 
demonstrates its own peculiarities in the ritual ceremonies. 
Constantinides suggests (op. c it :  164) that there is a certain
conservatism in the zaar group as their rituals must be exactly 
correct, and f i t  the demands of each sp ir it  precisely. Additionally 
i t  is sometimes modelled on the tariga ceremonies (that is ,  becomes 
more establishment-orientated).
There are public and private zaar rituals. The public one 
closely remembles the ceremonies of the tariga in some respects (op. 
c it :  171). The rituals take place like the Sufi dhikrs at
significant points in the Muslim calendar. 300 women may attend the 
6-7 day ceremony.
The fu ll  zaar ritual involves an immense amount of preparation, as
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costumes and sacrifices have to be made ready. The women must wear 
particular costumes that correspond to the particular sp ir it  or 
spirits that possess them, and must change at the pertinent time i f  
possessed by several of them. The private ritual is centred on the 
incense box, its  opening and its passing over the patient. The main 
climax of the ritual is however the sacrifice that occurs afterwards.
The ceremony begins with invocations of the spirits after ritual prayers. 
There are songs, and special rhythms associated with each sp ir it  are 
played. During the ceremony the sheikha may become possessed. I f  
she does, then she possesses a particularly strong healing power.
She manipulates the affected parts of the patient, and offerings are 
made to the spirits .
When the sacrifice begins, the sacrificial animal is led to the 
arena; i t  is covered with a white cloth and is fumigated. The patient 
is in trance while the animal is slaughtered; perfume is added to the 
blood, and the patient leaps over either the animal or the blood 7 
times. Then the blood is smeared over the patient, with particular 
attention being paid to the affected areas. After th is , the head of 
the animal is opened, which is in i ts e l f  a separate r itu a l.  When the 
sacrifice is over, coffee is poured, and then there may be a ritual at 
the riverside where the remains are thrown into the water (op. c it:  
212-214).
The therapy is therefore quite complex and can be boldly contrasted 
with the treatment of mental patients. Victims are essentially mild 
sufferers, and part of the r itua l's  importance for Constantinides is 
the significance of the group qua group. Like the sufi tariqas the 
zaar groups provide certain social benefits for those who participate.
This consideration has been quite brief and conclusions are not 
drawn here from the data, for I am not intent on making a comparison
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between the zaar cult and the Sufi brotherhoods. The purpose of citing  
the data on the zaar was to illustrate  a mode of healing and a type 
of therapeutic experience in the Middle East and to point to a certain 
tendency that these curing techniques seem to have: a correspondence
with loosely 'religious' phenomena and some degree of loosely 'religious' 
meaning. Certain elements (such as the significance of and the power 
of prayer, and the importance of cosmology) may be elicited from the 
data quoted here.
Crapanzano (1973) points to the fact that in Morocco there is no 
distinction between physical and mental illness and i t  is evident from 
a sizeable amount of the data here presented that l i t t l e  significant 
separation does occur between physical and mental symptoms. In some 
cases different symptoms are taken to different practitioners, in 
other cases the choice of therapy seems to depend on the chronicity
of the complaint or the degree to which i t  has previously responded
to treatment. In Constaninides' example stress symptoms can be cited 
as physical, and certain illnesses are associated with the symptoms 
of mental distress. The causality of the disease is perhaps the most 
significant part of the illness process, supernatural causation being 
the most interesting and relevant phenomenon for me, given the 
cosmological elaborations that exist when a disease is attributed to 
a vaguely mystical cause. The world of the jinns and possessing 
spirits is here introduced to outline some popular beliefs and 
treatments that result from its purported existence. The next text 
I wish to consider discusses this further, and more will be found 
in Chapter Four on this subject.
After this consideration of sp ir it  possession as discussed by
Constantinides i t  is instructive to turn to the situation in 
Afghanistan. Richard Tapper is working on a paper that examines the
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phenomenon with a view to its relationship with social responsibility, 
and additionally has comments to make concerning the nature and 
meaning of insanity. I will f i r s t  look at the nature of insanity in 
Afghanistan among the Madozai Pashtun, and then consider what is 
said about possession.
The indigenous Pashto explanation of insanity ( lewantop) is 
'lack of reason1 ( 'a q l) .  This is the main quality required for 
carrying out the male responsibilities in society. Insanity and 
possession both are characterised by dissociation occasionally. In 
this they have something in common with certain Sufi experiences 
also. (This refers to the behaviour found in the dhikr r itua l:  
this type of experience - although in this instance not that of the 
dhikr - will be examined further in the next cKlapter. Also in this 
context, the role of Sufi leaders in the exorcism of jinn will be 
studied, and the interesting fact that membership of a tariga or 
association with one, is the way the mentally i l l  deal with their 
condition). Insanity is characterised by a variety of speech or 
hearing defects and real or apparent incoherence of thought patterns. 
There are three main types of insanity,
(1) mental deficiency,
(2) people who, though obviously in te lligent, make 
a series of erroneous decisions through lack of 
reason (Tapper suggests that 'irra tiona l' is a 
frequent synonym for 'insane' among the Madozai),
(3) the madness exhibited by people who appear to 
resent their position in society or reject the 
entire system,
(4) this category includes professional criminals, 
who take to murder and robbery.
One term, ‘ lewantop* covers a ll categories, although i t  must be 
emphasised that ' lewantop' i ts e l f  is not a category. There is a
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distinction made between the categories in terms of responsibility 
and culpability. The f i r s t  category of the insane are never 
considered to be responsible for their situation whereas the persons 
included in other categories are. However, people of all the groups 
mentioned are treated as mentally defective and such persons are 
made increasingly socially impotent and invisible.
Possession is a frequent diagnosis among the Madozai. Tapper 
describes in some detail the jinns that are said to a f f l ic t  the 
possessed. He explains how men and women are said to have demons 
(sheytans)living within their bodies. Their object is to make mischief. 
Women are thought to possess more sheytans than men, and this is 
considered to account for their putatively more quarrelsome natures.
The jinns are only one cause of illness among the Madozai that is not 
directly a manifestation of the will of God. The evil eye and curses 
also cause affl ic t ion  and as in Good (1977) these ailments are treat­
able by dua, or prayers. Tapper states that the dua are used primarily 
in connection with love and marriage, but they can also be used to 
in f l ic t  madness, or death, or to foment quarrels. The efficacy of 
the dua ultimately depends on God's w i l l ,  and one dua can be counter­
acted by a stronger one. Possession, on the other hand, is generally 
treated with exorcism.
Possession may or may not be accompanied by f i t s .  Usually the 
behaviour of the victim is self-destructive. The jinn may speak 
through the victim and i t  appears that this phenomenon is the only 
symptom which occasions any untoward notice being taken of the victim. 
Otherwise the victim of jinn possession will be paid scant attention, 
and the authenticity of such an episode is frequently in doubt.
However, the victim may eventually be taken to a shrine or holy man.
The exorcism of the jinn is effected by f i r s t  'raising' the jinn, and
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then the holy man enquires what i t  wants and promises to f u l f i l  its 
demands i f  i t  will leave the patient alone. I f  the jinn will not 
respond, the holy man may beat the jinn ( i .e .  the patient).
Eventually the jinn identifies i ts e lf  and what i t  would like . This 
is promised, and in return the jinn is forced to swear an oath by 
Solomon to leave the victim. Then the jinn is required to repeat 
the profession of fa ith , by which time i t  is believed to have le f t  
its  victim.
Tapper suggests that jinn possession is most often diagnosed in 
women and insanity in men. He emphasises that jinn possession 
explains a range of biological failures in women, and additionally 
in their children, who are also susceptible. The f i ts  that may occur 
are frequently examined for authenticity. This is only claimed when 
the f i t  is suffered by a strong willed woman who has serious social 
grievances. The authentically possessed woman is active and articulate, 
a social rebel distinguished by her irresponsibility. Her rebellion 
is recognised by her family by giving her behaviour the same label - 
insane - as that given to male rebels who evade their responsibilities. 
Tapper concludes by suggesting that possession is an all-encompassing 
diagnosis for all women with social d iff icu lties . I t  provides them 
with a sense of personal importance and an explanation of their  
grievances. Additionally, and what is possibly more interesting,
Tapper suggests that among the Madozai the notion of social 
responsibility appears to take precedence over the ideas of sanity 
or insanity.
This chapter has attempted to outline an introduction to views 
and issues concerned with psychiatric illness and associated phenomena 
among Muslim peoples, and has highlighted a wider context within 
which the cures and diagnoses, treatments and illness episodes exist,
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the context of Islamic cosmology. The association of Sufism with 
psychotherapy has been introduced along with the ideas of the 
supernatural that have some significance in the realm of medical 
discourse in the Muslim world. An introduction has been made to the 
importance of the world of the jinns which will be further considered, 
and certain meanings of psychiatric illness and its social significance 
emphasised. The framework of this chapter has essentially been a 
medico-religious one, thus the t i t l e  for i t .  Further ramifications of 
this association, that of religion and medicine, will now be 
considered with particular reference to Sufism.
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C H A P T E R  F O U R  
PSYCHOTHERAPY AND SUFISM
Introduction
Healing is carried out in the Middle East and elsewhere in 
contexts, and on the basis of knowledge, unfamiliar to the West. 
Additionally, medicine and religion, defined in the West as distinct 
fields of belief and action, do not correspond to distinct fields  
in the Middle East. They overlap each other and are distinguished 
in different ways. Healing, various cults and Sufism occupy similar 
transitional areas between them, and all these phenomena are viewed 
as 'peripheral' by establishment, literacy-based Islam.
Sufism to Gellner is in effect a 'residual category' (1982: 115)
in which to place all kinds of Islam that are not the establishment 
type. Gellner suggests that under the general heading of Sufism 
people tend to associate sincere mystics with holy men whose 
relationship with mysticism is really negligible, A passage from 
Gellner is quite illuminating as an illustration of how one can 
dichotomise such a subject:
'Roughly speaking, urban Sufi mysticism is an 
alternative to legalis tic , restrained, arid (as i t  seems 
to its crit ics) Islam of jth-e.Unama. Rural and tribal 
'Sufism' is a substitute for TTT"
(op. c it :  115)
In this chapter I am mainly concerned with urban Sufism and 
with a particular facet of that. The context is one of curing, and 
the object to e l ic i t  how one can equate Sufism with psychotherapy.
To return for a moment to Ahmad. I propose in this chapter to 
examine phenomena that could be included on Ahmad's third level of
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beliefs and values: that of pragmatic religion. This level exhibits
a certain disorder: popular beliefs are local alone, and thus in
one way have a purely ethnographic interest. I am examining this 
level because of an interest in the Sufi curing techniques and their 
importance on the paradigmatic level, jj^amining this type of data 
also provides one with an insight into the place or religion in the 
daily lives of some, at least, of the people in the Middle East. 
Accordingly, I have chosen two particular ethnographies to concentrate 
on: in these the narrative plays a part in the analysis, and both
authors concerned are attempting to approach Sufi curing as a form 
of psychotherapy.
There are some problems in viewing Sufi curing in this way: not
least the accusation of erroneously employing Western terminology. 
Suffice i t  to say that the method is a fru itfu l one as i t  does cast 
a different light on religious manifestations, and given an interesting 
slant on Sufi ritual participation (here thinking mainly of Crapanzano 
1973). I t  also throws into re lie f the comments of such authors as 
Nasr and Shah, who are interested in demonstrating the particular 
technique of Sufi learning as unique.
In addition to the two main examples I also consider Basilov's 
comments about the vestiges of shamanism in Turkmenian Sufism. From 
this and the remainder of the data I conclude provisionally that i t  
is possible to compare Sufi healing to the divinations and curing of 
the Giriama as illustrated by David Parkin (1979). The interpretation 
he uses in this case adds more useful insights to the problem of 
explaining the Sufi curing system anthropologically, or at least 
with reference to certain theoretical perspectives. I would like  
to underline that I am wary of a purely paradigmatic status for my 
conclusions. I am undertaking an ethnographic survey of selected
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texts, thus the theoretical implications are a secondary matter.
I do not want to fa ll  into the trap Asad crittic ises Geertz of, that 
of confusing levels of discourse.
Before I begin I would like to state that the treatment of 
discourse in the sense of reported speech and its discussion by the 
two main authors I am considering is essentially inadequate: the
studies are not based in semantics or in linguistic anthropology, i t  
is merely that spoken discourse is a necessary tool in their 
ethnopsychiatric approaches. Ethnopsychiatry should be distinguished 
from ethno-psychoanalysis as posited as a subject by George Devereux 
in several articles from the 1930's onwards and collated in book form 
in the late Seventies. His work contains examples from non-Muslim 
societies so in the context of this chapter I have le f t  him aside.
His concerns are with mental illness i ts e l f ,  and its relationship 
to mental, emotional and social behaviour disturbances in other 
cultures. As an ethnopsychiatrist Beatrix Pfleiderer has an approach 
better suited to my purposes. (Pfleiderer: 1981).
With relation to discourse and the usefulness of narratives of 
varying sorts in soliciting information, I cite Dwyer (1982). Dwyer's 
approach is to interview one individual in depth, with questions about 
events in his/her l i f e ,  or occurrences in daily l i f e ,  to e l ic i t  
information about indigenous culture, and also about the individual's 
nexus in society, his friends, enemies, family, contacts, his worries, 
joys, all in a l l ,  one might suggest, his character socially defined. 
This approach has its critics and its followers, naturally. I think 
one thing i t  can do is to preserve the immediacy of the fieldwork 
situation in text form, and also indicate the relevance of spoken 
discourse as a medium for information dissemination. I t  is possibly 
a case of anthropology 'in the raw', from the point of view of the
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reader of the text, and as such, might be interpreted by some as 
t r iv ia l .  But as regards the anthropology of the person, and that 
of daily l i f e ,  its  findings are useful. Also i t  presumes the 
importance of language of the spoken variety (la parole): here
cultural classifications and categories emerge quite usefully. Also 
indigenous metaphor-making can be examined, and the import of Middle 
Eastern polysemy could be explored. Also, origions and instances 
of the poetic symbolism found enciphered could be compared with poetic 
or emotional expression, and understood in the light of la parole 
as well as la langue. This would be of the greatest use in study 
of Sufism. I t  is my intention to explore my topic as part of the 
discourse of daily l i f e .  This involves concentrating on practical 
activity and the significance of curing in its  social context: not
memly what paradigmatic significance i t  has, as metaphor for 
psychotherapy, but what people may gain by i t ,  and what they lose, 
what other options they have, whether i t  is part of religion alone, 
or thought of as medical also. I t  also involves emphasis on social 
meaning. Behind these concerns l ie  ideas and assumptions about the 
world. In these data one key notion is baraka, so from the 
ethnography I w ill move to examine this polysemic notion. I hope 
this and the foregoing will serve to show why a study of baraka is 
integral to a consideration of Islamic mysticism. In Geertz's terms 
i t  is part of the Muslim system of symbols (Geertz 1971: p.89).
The question 'what is Sufism?' is the last item I wish to return
to before I commence this chapter properly. This can be more adequately 
posed after some sort of discussion of its popular manifestations.
I t  is unwise to propose some unique status for any one sort of
mysticism in the Islamic world: the area i t  covers is too vast to
make sweeping generalisations to order. To centre on the curing
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aspects of Sufism alone would yield a vast quantity of information.
I propose to separate the doctrinal aspects of Sufism, and the rules, 
and place them on Ahmad's f i r s t  level: the rules are enciphered,
and as such, though varying from order to order, have much in common 
with the Islamic hadith, or traditions, and with the Koran. They 
are guides for action, and as they d iffe r , could also be included on 
Ahmad's second level of local manifestations. One should add that 
'rules' as such are different from scriptural tradition epistemologi- 
cally and possibly require another domain of analysis to accommodate 
them. To continue with my breakdown, I should include the local 
variation of ritual on the second level, and the curing aspects 
firmly on the third level. I wish to concentrate mainly on phenomena 
of the third level for the remainder of this chapter.
As an introduction I il lustrate  from Rabinow (1977b) who, in his 
book on fieldwork has as one of his informants a marginal individual, 
A li, a pimp, small time Sufi curer and urban vagabond. This man 
was part of a curing brotherhood in Sefrou, Morocco. The brotherhood 
is the Aissawa. Rabinow was lucky enough to be able to attend a 
l i l a  (translated as 'night') where the brotherhood hold a curing 
ceremony at someone's invitation. The ceremony was held late at 
night, with the accompaniment of music and prayer reading. Rabinow's 
description of the event (1977b: 52ff.) exudes an atmosphere of
warmth and comfort, most alien when compared with descriptions I have 
quoted earlie r , and different from Crapanzano's accounts also.
Crapanzano's data (1973: 185-211) are factual, c lin ica l, and
possibly a l i t t l e  terrify ing. The anthropological subject is distanced 
from the observer and the reader, as the author is intent on proving 
his point about the parallel with psychotherapy. This may be a
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pedestrian way of explaining the difference: Crapanzano's account
is part of an in-depth study of a band of Sufi curers; Rabinow's 
description of the 1i 1 a is a small section of what is a rather colourful 
book recounting fieldwork experiences. Rabinow presumes the therapeutic 
nature of the dhikr (here the word therapeutic is used in its loose 
connotation signifying 'curative'). His language is informal, chatty 
even. He describes the 'very peaceful and graceful movement’ (1977b: 
53), and the 'mood of protective intimacy' (op. c it :  54). His
informant comes to the fore of the ceremony late in the performance 
and slashes his forearms with his fingernails, the next day having 
l i t t l e  trace of the se lf-in flic ted injury. He does not have a good 
experience, however. He has a headache, and feels unsatisfied. The 
patient, though, has his curing well and truly performed. This part 
of the ceremony seems very stylised in the account given (op. c it :  56).
The Sufis alternate between behaving as aggressors and protectors of 
the sick person, affecting the movements of a group of lions, f i r s t  
assaulting, then guarding. The patient is borne a lo ft by the group 
and then set down. Rabinow additionally states, as most authors do 
of the women present at such ceremonies, that their movements are 
less graceful than those of the men, and they exhibit less control: 
their participation is more a case of freeplay.
Essentially this account is not given to e l ic ity  theoretical 
insights, i t  is merely to communicate the experience in discourse.
The net result is the impression that Rabinow is attempting to
share the experience with the reader: a d if f ic u lt  but not too onerous
task.
The Hamadsha
The Hamadsha are members of a loosely, diversely organised
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religious brotherhood which traces its spiritual genealogy back to two 
Moroccan saints of the late C12th- and early C 18th.s Sidi ben Hamdush 
and Si di Ahmed Dghugni (Crapanzano 1973: 1 ). They have been
classified by French scholars as an extreme example of the 'confreres 
populaires', a degenerated form of the Sufi brotherhoods of the Muslim 
high tradition, corrupted by local and extraneous influences of 
superstition and syncretism. They are considered to be part of the 
cult of saints, or maraboutism, which has been generally regarded 
as the mark of Maghrebian Islam. The word marabout is derived from 
the Arabic murabit, which describes a man attached to God. For 
Crapanzano's purposes i t  seems to devine two basic institutions, the 
cult of saints and the religious brotherhoods.
The focus of the cult is the saints' tomb, usually a squat, white, 
cubelike building with a domed roof. The tombs are cared for by the 
saints' descendents, or by a caretaker who received alms to live on, 
donated by the pilgrims. The tombs are visited and venerated by 
men and women who come to obtain some favour from the saint such as 
a male child, a cure for a bout of illness or a case of sp ir it  
possession; or simply good fortune in a law suit, political asylum 
or just luck. A particular set of behaviours is designed to aid the 
pilgrims obtain blessing (baraka) from each particular tomb. Sacred 
springs, grottoes, trees, stones and animals believed to contain 
baraka and spots where jinn or devils are said to gravitate, are 
found near the tomb.
The brotherhoods associated with the cult of saints, or their 
members, whom I shall call Sufis for want of a better term, follow 
the tariqa of a spiritual leader or sheikh who is usually considered 
to be a saint. There is a great degree of variation in the organis­
ation, function, degree of theological sophistication and ultimate
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aim of the brotherhoods. The members of the more sophisticated 
orders are recruited from the wealthier, best educated strata of 
Muslim society; the members of the Hamadsha come from the i l l i t e r a te  
classes (Crapanzano 1973: 3). As I have discussed before, all of
the orders involve certain ritual acts: recitation of prayers,
listening to music, dancing, a ll part of, or additional to, the main 
Sufi r i tu a l,  the dhikr. The popular orders tend to be extreme, with 
wild dances inducing ecstatic frenetic trances, the drinking of 
boiling water, the eating of spiky cacti and other defilements, 
charming poisonous snakes, and innumerable acts of self-mutilation. 
All of these are designed to effect some extraordinary psychic state 
which may be interpreted as union with God, or possession by a demon, 
or simply as hal (state, translated by Crapanzano (1973: 195) as
'temperature' in Arabic.)
Unlike the members of the more sophisticated orders, who think 
of their saint as a spiritual master who provides a path to God, the 
popular orders often consider their saint as an ■*object of devotion 
in his own right and a source of power for their miraculous feats' 
(op. c it :  3).
The members of the Hamadsha brotherhood are divided into teams: 
a team may have a specific meeting place or lodge. Although the 
Hamadsha may be related historically to the mystical tradition of 
Islam, Crapanzano does not believe that they conceive of their goal 
as union with God, but rather as curing people possessed by demons. 
Crapanzano states that,
'to ask whether they conceive of their cures as
essentially religious in nature is to ask a
question which has no meaning for them'.
(op. c it :  4)
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All activities are, he says, religious, 'in so far as they are 
contingent upon the will of Allah1 (op. c it :  3-4).
The Hamadsha are not merely curers, but are successful in terms 
of the standards their society sets and in some instances in terms 
of the standards set by modern medicine (op, c it :  4 ). They are
able to effect, often dramatically, the amelioration of symptoms, 
even their remission. Paralysis, mutism, sudden blindness, severe 
depressions, nervous palpitations, possession all lead the patient 
or his/her family to seek out their help. Many social factors 
additionally encourage the Moroccans of Meknes to go to the Hamadsha: 
possibly they may have quarrelled with a doctor, possibly they have 
had advice to go alone, maybe i t  is a matter of the type of illness 
that is a fflic ting  someone, (op. c it :  134).
Crapanzano regards the Hamadsha complex as a type of therapy: 
this he defines from Parsons 1964 as,
'a structured set of procedures for the rehabilitation  
of an incapacitated individual - an individual who is ,  
from a sociological prespective, unable to meet role 
expectations and effectively perform valued tasks'.
(op. c it :  5)
This pushes the analysis on to the paradigmatic level: talk of roles
precludes some definition of what is meant by this statement as 
evidenced by social behavioural discourse. Crapanzano seems to take 
this terminology as given. Therapeutic procedures can be said to 
effect changes in the ailing individual's social situation as well 
as in his physical and psychological condition. Theoretically he is 
moved through the role of sick person and back ( i f  the treatment 
works) to his original condition, and role. The ideal naturally, 
or perhaps not so naturally, is the restoration of his/her old 
self ( ib id .) .
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The Hamadsha therapy does not aim to restore the sick person to
his previous condition. Rather i t  provides him with a new social
role and associated tasks. The individual will probably become a
member of the Hamadsha group. He is ,
'provided thereby with a new social identity but also 
with a new set of values and a new cognitive 
orientation'.
( i b i d . )
Or so the theory goes. Possibly i t  is new to the individual, but as 
part of Meknes society i t  is probable that the patient will have a 
certain fam iliarity  with'the order and its values. This new outlook 
may be said to furnish the patient with a new set of symbols by 
which (in the case of psychogenic disorders at least) he can express 
those particular psychic tensions which were in part responsible 
for his illness. This symbolic 'set' is associated with the Hamadsha's 
explanation of his illness and the theory of therapy ( ib id .) .
The elements of explanation consist of symbols which represent 
both social and psychic realities for the sick person and other members 
of his group. They could be said to be part of Moroccan discourse.
They must, theoretically at least, be congruent with postulated 
'psychological needs' and sociocultural realities . This is possibly 
a truism. They are 'givens' in the world the individual was born in, 
in a certain way, and as such serve from the start to mould his 
reality and realise themselves in his psychic l i f e .
Possibly this is not the case given the example of an immigrant 
to the city from an area where such beliefs are not current: how
aware most i l l i t e r a te  people in Meknes are of the fu ll significance 
of the Hamadsha therapy theory is also worth questioning. Neverthe­
less the locus of these values in a world of saints and demons in this
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particular case may reflect a characteristic stance of an 
individual within a particular cultural tradition compared with 
others within his world. (These last paragraphs are heavily 
dependent on Crapanzano 1973: 1-11. I assume his parameters
for the moment to avoid confusion. These I find adequate 
enough, where I disagree or question this has been discussed.)
The curing that the Hamadsha accomplish takes place at 
Hamadsha ceremonies. Crapanzano suggests that during these,
'a symbolic expression of incapacitating conflicts 
and the consequent discharge of tension which may 
impede social behaviour1,
(op. c it :  6)
are achieved. The resolution of these conflicts, part of a highly 
structured process, then serves to re-establish an individual's 
'motivation', to 'resocialise the deviant into the objective reality  
of the symbolic universe of his society' (Berger & Luckman 1967: 114,
as quoted in Crapanzano 1973).
The Hamadsha beliefs are essentially a fringe phenomenon: they
do not represent the majority of Moroccan society to any extent.
The Hamadsha are Sunni Muslims and Arab, and do not consider themselves 
to be unorthodox. As heterodox as their beliefs might appear they 
s t i l l  accept the fundamental importance of the five pillars of Islam: 
profession of the fa ith , prayer, almsgiving, fasting and pilgrimage 
to Mecca; and they find the origin and source of their inspiration 
in the Koran. Much of Crapanzano's presuppositions about illness 
and deviance do not fu lly  convince me. His Parsonian interpretation 
of the role of the patient is far too westernised to have currency 
in Islamic society. Nevertheless the conclusions these suppositions 
lead to are well worth bearing in mind. The role of the traditional
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curer is possibly well on the way to becoming obsolete: i t  would be
interesting to return to Morocco to observe Meknes society now, 
fifteen years after the study was undertaken.
There are two main branches to the Hamadsha in Meknes: that
of the medina and that of the shanty town, the bidonvilles. There is 
a distinct bifurcation of method. The medina Sufis operate mainly 
from lodges, whereas the bidonville Sufis are more loosely organised 
and perform more often in teams. Also, the bidonville teams have 
more of an economic focus to their curing activities: they live
solely by curing and are said to obtain as much money as they can 
from the patients, the devotees and their families. The bidonvilles 
provide a social background to the Hamadsha activities that 
demonstrates a sharp contrast with the more settled milieu of the 
medina. The bidonville people have migrated from the country and 
may have l i t t l e  contact with family or friends in the new city. 
Nevertheless the integration of the bidonvilles and the medina is 
to some extent fac ilita ted by the very structure of Middle Eastern 
cities: Crapanzano suggests (op. c it :  105) that there are signs
of the bidonvilles becoming quarters of the city.
Accordingly the locus is in a state of change. As far as 
religion is concerned there is considerable hostility  between the 
urban and the slum brotherhoods. Nevertheless Crapanzano does 
state (op. c it :  75) that there are a number of medina inhabitants,
usually recent immigrants to the c ity , who are a ff i l ia ted  with the 
slum brotherhoods.
Before I examine the ceremonies as described by Crapanzano and 
the theory of therapy, with its accompanying world of jinns that 
enables i t  to have currency, I would like to state that I do not 
wholly accept Crapanzano's interpretation of the way the Hamadsha
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effect their cures. I do not think that the Hamadsha necessarily 
provide the patients with a set of symbols with which to readjust 
themselves to Moroccan society. Crapanzano's interpretation is 
predicated upon a certain viewpoint implicitly reviewing male: 
female identity in Meknes society. He suggests that illness is 
'feminine1: that the sick, as they cannot fu l f i l  their masculine
role as providers, are in a state of neo-femininity, and in the 
curing rituals when they slash their heads effect a symbolic 
castration to become men again (op. c it :  244-9). This might be
so in the resolution of the ideas of masculinity/femininity in Meknes 
society. The study was accomplished in a male-orientated society 
where values of honour, modesty e tc ., upholding the male line  
(Dwyer 1978), associating weakness, darkness, helplessness, 
unfaithfulness with women (Crapanzano 1973: as above) could be
said to be the underpinnings of social reality.
One could suggest that Crapanzano is utilis ing the theories of 
psychoanalysis, or rather western notions of psychology, in his 
interpretation. Whether this is a justifiable tack is a matter 
for debate. Western notions of psychological medicine are the 
products of a particular tradition and a certain cultural milieu: 
i f  one can transport them to Morocco one cannot expect them to reveal 
an absolutely accurate account of data from there. I t  presupposes 
an uni versa!ism however attractive, i t  is of necessity what i t  is , 
the imposition of western categories of thought upon a Middle Eastern 
historical and cultural situation. The interpretation may elucidate 
some things: as I suggested previously, Moroccan society i_s male-
dominated, but such an analysis may equally obscure other things. 
Crapanzano's data on women, for example is lacking in this text. I f  
this unspoken desire for femininity is there among the Sufis and
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among the people of Meknes; i f  indeed the sick are ' l ik e ' women, i t  
is s t i l l  necessary surely to ask people i f  they do indeed believe 
this of themselves. Dialogues would have benefitted the analysis 
and the reader no end: his case studies (e .g ., 199-200) are brief and
do not fu lly  explore all that could have been elicited from people.
Nevertheless, women as well as men are discussed by Crapanzano.
They become possessed and partake in the Hamadsha cures. To return 
to the symbolic readjustment mentioned earlier I feel that the Parsonian 
association of illness with deviance is partly to blame for Crapanzano's 
interpretation of this part of his data. This association ignores 
the salient social reality  for the sick themselves, who although 
unable to work do not necessarily lose their position in society or 
their previous notion of the meaning of that position. Role can be 
separated from value: the values are s t i l l  in existence for the
sick/person, and unless that person loses these he needs no read­
justment, and in all probability does not feel 'feminised'. What is 
at issue is the treatment of patients by those around them: the 
question of social discourse and the significance for him, and for 
those who interact with him, of the illness episode.
To return to the key area of interest for me I would like to 
emphasise that the treatment that Crapanzano provides of jinn 
possession and curing by the Hamadsha is thorough in the extreme 
in investigating the nature of the psychic reality that is experienced 
by those who seek out the Hamadsha. I s t i l l  fee l, however, that 
Crapanzano does not publish fu ll accounts of the subjective experiences 
and opinions of those in this position.
The Hamadsha therapy is one of the many therapies in the Moroccan 
world. Apart from the Hamadsha there are other Sufi orders, and also 
the herbalists, the doctor, the wise woman, the exorcists, and Western
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doctors. Symptomatology (op. c it :  134) plays a role in the choice 
of cure: also the causality, ava ilab ility , cost, relations of family 
with practitioners, acceptance of cure, nagging by relatives, advice 
of diviners, current image of practitioners, whether the complaint is 
acute or chronic. In Morocco there is no distinction between 
physical and mental illness: Crapanzano divides illness into
preternaturalistic and naturalistic causations. The preternatural - 
istic  causality is further divided into that caused, (1) by jinn,
(2) not by jinn. The jinn-caused illnesses produce possession, else 
one is merely 'struck' by the jinn. The remedy for these phenomena is 
to call in the Hamadsha. For diseases with preternaturalistic 
causation where jinn are not involved, other folk remedies such as 
amulet wearing, prayer reciting or the obtaining of curative prayers 
written especially for the sick person's a ff l ic t io n , are sought. These 
illnesses or misfortunes are those of poisoning (presumably sudden 
in onslaught), curses, the evil eye or witchcraft.
The world of the jinns is that of demons attested to in the Koran 
(Sura 72): they are referred to by the Moroccans as 'those people
there' or 'those people below the ground', e tc., (op. c it :  136).
Jinns should be distinguished from the huge cannibalistic spirits  
and ogres 1a f a r i t ' and ' ghwal'.  One of the most powerful ' ghwal' ,  
and the most potent member of the sp ir it  world in Meknes is A'isha 
Qandisha. She is unique among the jinniya; her origin etymologically 
is said to derive from a temple harlot in a Canaanite cult; her 
husband is Hammu Quyu, derivatively the Carthagenian God Hamam (op. 
c it:  143). There are parallels between belief in A'isha and belief
in other female spirits in other Near-Eastern societies, especially 
throughout the Mediterranean and in sub-Saharan Africa (Lewis 1955/6, 
Barclay 1964, Constantinides 1972). A'isha is a Cththonian monster,
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libidinous, quick-tempered, she is supposed to strangle and assault 
all who do not obey her commands. Like Kali/Parvati she can be a 
beauty or a hag. Among the Hamadsha the grotto of Beni Rached is 
sacred to her. She is a seductress; men have no defence against her 
unless they plunge a knife into the ground. She appears to men in
an experience like a dream and persuades them to have sexual in ter­
course with her and occasionally persuades them to enter into a 
strange marriage contract with her, which is told to be of advantage 
to them. She might convince her victim that she will help him with 
money, threatening him not to te l l  anyone of his experience. The 
man might repeat: ' I ' l l  marry her. Everyone knows me. I don't
want them to see me change1 (op. c it :  144).
A'isha demands old clothes, uncleanliness, and restricts a man's 
sexual l i f e .  The special 'marriage' relationship, which does not 
occur too frequently, does not relate to members of the Hamadsha,
In the aforementioned relationship she demands that her 'husband' 
wear red, black or chartreuse green. She is placated with black 
incense, and also with the music of Hamadsha ceremonies, the hadra, 
during which she is purported to appear out of the ground in front 
of those possessed by her. She is fond of blood and requires
frequent sacrifices, (op. c it :  145).
Crapanzano analyses only the diseases caused by the jinns, 
dividing them into those in which the jinns cause the ailment but 
do not play a role in the cure and those in which they cause the 
ailment and play a role in treatment. These categories are not 
distinguished by the Moroccans and are classified by Crapanzano as 
f irs t ly  the explicative mode of responsibility and secondly the 
participational mode of responsibility (op. c it :  150). There are
degrees of possession ranging from temporary possession through
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being obsessed with an idea, being transfixed with fear, to someone 
fu lly  possessed. M.askun, the ultimate category of jinn-affect  
signifies being 'inhabited' by a jinn: this is the strongest word
used to describe someone possessed. A person in such a state might 
be said to have 'something pinching their brain', or 'the ir  head 
turns' (op. c it :  154). Sudden changes in conversation are singular
symptoms of Maskun. The main important distinction in the serious­
ness of the a fflic ted  person's situation is between being 'struck' 
by a jinn and being possessed by one.
Most illnesses for which the jinn are responsible are the result 
of offences committed by the sufferer against the jinn. There are 
named and unnamed jinn: in it ia l  attack by named jinn resembles an
attack by an unnamed one. When the name of the jinn is uncovered, 
from then on the person is considered to be dependent on the jinn. 
There are two types of cure for jinn possession: exorcistic or
symbiotic. The former are one-off affairs whereas the la tte r  are 
continuous and the patient is incorporated in the Hamadsha, and 
thus must undergo periodic curing, (op c it:  157-9).
The f i r s t  step in a symbiotic cure is to establish the identity 
of the jinn. This may be done by a Hamadsha, or by an exorcist or 
seer. Then the curer or diviner establishes what the jinn wants 
from the victim; when this is accomplished i t  is then essential to 
satisfy these demands to effect the patient's recovery. Crapanzano 
states (op. c it :  165),
'the manifest aim of the cure is the elimination 
of the symptoms, and not the permanent expulsion 
of the j in n '.
The cures are said to be brought about by the intervention of one of 
the saints, commanding the jinn to leave its victim alone. However,
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the most frequent explanation is in terms of baraka. The baraka of 
the saint, lodged in the saint's tomb, or in his person, or in the 
person of his descendants is said to be the cause of the cure.
The baraka may be sufficient to drive out the patient's symptoms, 
but this is rare in the case of an attack by a named jinn.
In these cases a patient is only affected by the baraka i f  he 
follows a regime at the command of the jinn. (op. c it :  166-8).
The explanation by the Hamadsha is more complex: the baraka
of the saints enables the adepts, devotees and patients to perform 
the hadra (the curing ceremony), which pleases the saints and jinns 
alike. I t  also enables the musicians to play the tunes which draw 
the jinn into the patient and then expel i t .  Finally i t  enables the 
performers to enter trance and possibly slash their heads to produce 
blood which is pleasing to the jinniya. Crapanzano states the,
'baraka of the saints is , then, a potentialising force
enabling the adepts, the devotees, and the patients
to enter an extraordinary state (hal) in which they
all - in varying degrees - have the' ab ility  to pass
on "^e baraka of the saints. This baraka is the force 
behind the cures'.
(op. c it :  167)
Some explanation of the hadra should follow. The hadra is 
performed at a 1i 1 a or 'night': i t  can be called 1sadaga' (charity
g i f t ,  or alms: op. c it :  185). The verbal form sadaq means to te ll
the truth, and the Hamadsha emphasise that their ceremonies must be 
performed with sincerity. There are complicated preparations for the 
ceremony. When a ll is complete and the guests have received 
hospitality the muqaddim (leader) begins the litany of prayers.
Then the dhikr begins during which a ll the Sufi adepts sway back 
and forth; during this the women and children present are expected
to restrain themselves, as the dhikr is 'for men1 (op. c it :  192).
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When excitement is at a peak the adepts stand up and begin to dance 
the hadra. In the 'hot' part of the hadra the men jump up and down 
while the women, likewise in a trance, swing their heads. The 
hadra is designed to lead all into an altered state of conciousness, 
the hal, or the jidhba. The hal has a special meaning to the Sufis. 
Crapanzano suggests that hal_ has the meaning of wajd, which the 
Sufis refer to as 'ecstasy'. Jidbha signifies 'a ttraction ', and i t  
is a more frenetic trance state, (op. c it :  195).
Women apparently fa l l  into trance more easily than men (op, c it:  
196). They are driven out of the audience by the music of one 
particular instrument, the ghita, into trance. They dance, then 
collapse. Before collapsing, the female dancer appears semi­
conscious. I f  someone speaks to her she acts as i f  awakened from a 
dream and is slightly ir r ita te d . The men work themselves into trance 
slowly; their movements follow the rhythms and dance steps of the 
hadra and appear graceful (op. c it :  199). Subjectively, according
to Crapanzano, informants report a loss of temporal and spatial 
orientation and of body consciousness, except in the head, which may 
feel swollen and itch slightly ( ib id .) .
I f  some have not had 'enough' during the 'hot' part of the
hadra they will be encouraged to enter ' jidhba' in the 'cold' part 
of the ceremony. After the hadra is over, dinner is served, and 
the atmosphere is relaxed. Then the adepts say a last prayer for 
the patient who is usually recovered from paralysis or possession 
after participating in the hadra.
The ceremonies of the two different branches of the Hamadsha
differ  in a few respects. The bidonville ceremonies are simpler in
organisation than those of the medina. The mugaddim (leaders) and 
the adepts play a more extensive role in inviting guests and they are
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anxious to earn as much money as possible from the ceremony: 
accordingly they tend to invite devotees who will give generously.
Here the hot part of the hadra is frequently held out of doors; 
there is usually trancing and head slashing. The patient is much 
mo„re in evidence than he would be in a medina ceremony at this stage 
the hadra, the dhikr is shorter, the cold part of the hadra 
is more important and, significantly, the muqaddim and the other 
team members do the best they can to extract as much money as 
possible from the audience, as they subsist from this living alone 
(op. c it :  210-211).
Crapanzano's explanation of the therapy suggests that the Hamadsha 
provide the following elements that are recognised in western psycho­
therapy as therapeutically effective:-
1) Group Support
This is evidenced as the group provides the patient with an interpre­
tation of his illness, displacing guilt. The group of participants 
additionally are party to the therapy. The ceremony enables other 
members of the audience to work out their frustrations also, possibly 
reducing social tensions that are partially to blame for the patient's 
i l l  ness.
2) Patient Participation
Needless to say, the patient is involved in the cure; he helps with 
the preparations for the ceremony; he tends to the requirements of 
the guests i f  he is the host; he has to f u l f i l  ritual obligations 
such as making a pilgrimage. All this is additional to dancing the 
hadra. The active nature of this role should not be overestimated, 
however. The patient is passive before the saints, the jinn, the 
adept leader, and the musicians.
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3) Patient/Curer Relationship
This could hardly be recognised as significant in these cases. There 
is no 'transference' of the patient's traumas to the Sufis; i t  is 
deflected on to their spiritual 'agents'. Also the curer does not 
try to make the patient 'confess' his l i fe 's  d iff icu lties  or problems.
4) Insight and Suggestion
There is no occurrence of the Hamadsha's providing either of these 
for the victims of jinn possession who go to them.
5) Cult Membership
This provides several fa c il i t ie s :  putatatively, a new social status, 
a relationship with A'isha, maybe a change in self-image, a rein- 
forecement of trust in the Hamadsha and their world view.
6) Trance Abreaction and Catharsis
The trance is the most significant element of the Hamadsha cure, one 
could say. For Crapanzano, Hamadsha therapy involves the manipulation 
of 'images' of psychic reality . Crapanzano points to one possible 
comparison with the shamanistic cure described by Levi Strauss (1968) 
(op. c it :  222). Here the patient constructs an individual myth
with elements drawn from his past, the experience providing the 
patient with a language by means of which unexpressed and maybe 
inexpressible states can be immediately articulated (Levi Strauss 
1968: 198).
Whether or not i t  is true that a symbolic transformation is 
effected, i t  is evident that there are certain parallels with western 
psychotherapy. In a classificatory paradigm, also, A'isha is opposed 
to the saints in the cure; the healing attempting to reconcile the 
opposition of the two figures.
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The cure demands a change in the patient's relationship with 
her, therefore, a change in his characteristic response to a given 
situation or experience. As such, the cure could be said to have 
psychotherapeutic overtones. Crapanzano's interpretation, though 
stressing the psychotherapeutic nature of the hadra experience, 
is essentially grounded in the subjective accounts of that experience 
and not necessarily its significance to the patients, as the whole 
complex is part of a cultural 'given' the therapy of the Hamadsha. • 
The narratives he quotes (e .g ., op. c it :  206) are designed to
illus tra te  the experiences that have occurred: reflection on these
experiences is not obtained. -Additionally, the opinions of the 
mugaddim and the Hamadsha adepts are not elicited. The discussion 
is continued on a level that possibly ignores portions of potentially 
useful discourse. Crapanzano does not much concern himself with the 
meaning of the experiences to the women present to offer a more 
balanced picture of the Hamadsha's contextualisation in Meknes 
society. Despite these objections, I find the interpretation 
interesting in that i t  is the only fu ll one of its kind, even i f  
lacking in several spheres.
One of these spheres is .defin ite ly  the importance of narratives 
in such an analysis: those of the patients and the adepts alike.
In a study of a shrine in Gujarat, Beatrix Pfleiderer does have 
recourse to the text of at least one patient's illness narrative.
Here the situation is different: curing is achieved on a one-to-one
basis at the dargah (lodge or shrine). The patients here are also 
required to suspend 'normal' belief and participate in an illness 
theory that involves, in this case, belief in the maleficent forces 
of witchcraft.
Here the mujwar (Sufi curer) receives the patient and mediates
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the shrine’s healing capacity. There is a suggested shamanistic 
residue in the r itua l: the mujwar ties a red thread about the
patient's neck and anoints him with peacock feathers after involving 
the saint of the shrine in the cure. In the ritual anointing there 
are passed over the patient's head 25 horses made out of cotton, said 
to symbolise the 125 horses of Mira Qatar's army (Mira Datar being 
the founder of the shrine, and a successful'assailant in battle).
The cotton horses are passed over the patientf5 times fc5 xZ5 =125, 
equally the number of horses in the army). There are group rituals  
also, involving only the peacock feathers (1981: 223).
The rituals are only steps in a process that joins the patient 
possessed by a s p ir i t ,  to the saint. Similarly, as when the patient 
undergoing psychotherapy will refuse to comply with his/her analyst, 
the spirits are said to rebel against the saint's influence and 
become obstinate. This obstinacy may reflect the patient's unwill­
ingness to undergo the cure, which is manifested in the patient's 
reluctance to approach the interior of the saint's tomb, in the f i r s t  
stage of his/her encounter with the Sufis.
Pfleiderer suggests (op. c it :  225) that the social function
of the trance into which the patients fa ll  ( i f  i t  can be said to 
have a social as well as a personal function) is to allow the patient's 
relatives to hear all the utterances of their sick kinsman/woman 
during a semi-conscious state when the victim is supposedly unaware 
of what is happening. I t  is suggested that the sp irit  starts speaking 
during the trance to reveal its identity. There is a change in the 
victim's voice, and a difference in the patient's nature, representing 
the personality of the possessing sp ir it ,  ( ib id .) .  The patient in 
this example is not essentially concerned with the cure: i t  is a
matter of a conflict between the sp ir it  and the saint. The victim
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incurs no blame for the invasion, which is both a re l ie f ,  and an 
important part of the therapy. I t  is interesting to note than an 
allopathic doctor was observed by Pfleiderer at the dargah seeking 
a cure for a relative (op. c it :  225). Also, that the dargah is
used by Hindus, Sikhs, Parsees and Christians as well as Muslims 
(op. c it :  198).
Shamanistic Healing
In the face of the foregoing data, concerning belief in the 
sp irit  world, and the role of spirits in popular Sufism to uphold 
credence in a supernatural rea lity , i t  is interesting to examine the 
case of Turkmen society described historically by V.N. Basilov. He 
is at pains to point out that the syncretism of belief among the 
Turkmen illustrates the remaining importance of shamanistic 
influences despite conversion to Islam. To summarise Basilove's 
data, the dhikr among the Turkmen is performed to cure the sick 
harmed by sp irits . I t  is performed mainly by a privileged descent 
group called the Atas. The Sheikh is the key figure in the dhikr: 
he fa lls  into a frenzy and may h it  his head against the framework 
of his tent, or perform miraculous feats. I f  curing, he may, or 
may not, beat the sick person across the face and throw him against 
the tent frame. In trance, the Sheikh loses all sensibility. He 
is believed to be endowed with keramat (the Arabic karamat) which 
is translated as the 'force* of the saint by Basilov (Basilov 1984: 
232).
There is a widespread belief that the Sheikh has helping spirits  
at his service, some animal, some human. These are the jinn. They 
are purported to te ll  him of the future, and to help him to drive 
away spirits from the sick. I t  is interesting to note that obtaining
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help from the jinn per se is unKoranic in the extreme. The patient 
can hypothetically be cured only i f  theShieikh's 'troop' of jinn is 
stronger than those causing the disease. Struggling against a 
superior force of jinn could expose the Sheikh to the risk of madness 
himself, or even jeopardise his l i fe .
Thus Basilov suggests that the Sheikh has much in common with the 
Shaman (op. c it :  232-3): trance, animal familiars, a jinn illness
that does not abate (but is cured by ritual participation) yet is 
contained, and continues from time to time once rapport with a sp irit  
has been established firmly. Occasionally the Sheikh suffers break­
downs when he can only l ie  down covered with blankets and can neither 
eat nor drink. He is cured by the dhikr alone. The possession by 
helpful sp ir its , inheriting these, and the ab ility  to te ll fortunes 
and cure lunatics are apparently features of Turkmenian shamanism. 
Basilov states that the very ritual of curing has some features in 
common with shamanistic performance: thus both shaman and Sufi te l l
the colour of the wool of the animal to be sacrificed for propiti­
ation of the spirits (op. c it :  257). From the point of view of
the Nokhuri Turkmen the difference between the shaman and the Muslim 
hodja is v irtually  n i l .  This is understood more easily i f  i t  is 
borne in mind that the last shaman among them was descended from a 
Muslim hodja. To the question 'Who is the stronger, the hodja or the 
shaman?' some believers replied ‘The stronger is the one whose troop 
of jinns is larger1 (op. c it: 238).
Parallels can also be found with Sufi curing in the activities  
of the Muslim bakhshi, a kind of shamanistic healer found in Afghan 
Turkestan (SIobin & Centlivres 1971). There is a direct reference 
to Sufism f irs t ly :  the bakhshi invokes the spirits of Sufi pirs at
the beginning of the ritual he uses, for aid. He is called upon,
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secondly, to cure illnesses that others have d iff icu lty  with, mainly 
of a psychiatric kind. Thirdly, there is a certain technique that 
he employs that is similar to one reported by Pfleiderer (1981) and 
Basilov (1984) in that the bakhshi strikes the patient during the 
r itua l. Lastly there is a parallel with the data from Basilov (1984) 
in that the bakhshi has control over spirits , to the extent that 
his method involves the removal of a possessing sp ir it  from a patient 
either into himself or into the organs of a sacrificial animal, or 
into an inanimate object.
There are several correspondences between the Sufi cures and 
the divination of illness by the several shaman quoted by David Parkin 
in his artic le  'Straightening the Paths to the Wilderness'. Here the 
diviner, not the curer, is the focus of the analysis. The performance, 
or psychodrama, is the event of diagnosis, much as the example of 
Pfleiderer, where the key ritual reveals the name of the possessing 
sp irit .  However, the progress from a 'tangled state' (1979: 147) to
a state of sequential ordering is also similar to the condition of 
the patient in Meknes before and after he assimilates the Hamadsha 
theory of therapy and cure. The diviner among the Giriama begins 
his divination with confused, jumbled speech, and guides himself and 
the patient through his sp ir it  familiars to recognition of the area 
of the patient's body afflicted with disease. Here physical as well 
as mental illness is involved, as in some of the Sufi examples.
Outside spirits are normally found to be the cause of disease: 
once the diviner has discovered the afflic tion and its  cause he can 
prescribe remedies and treatment.
The divination progresses f i r s t ly  by establishing links between 
the patient's home and the outside world to ascertain conflicting 
sources of distress that have been produced. Secondly the diviner
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probes the body. Finally a foreign element is interpreted as having 
entered 'home' (that is , the patient's body). The merging, jumbled 
ideas at the start of the divination settle into separate areas 
through the idiom of following different parts of the body (op. c it :  
150-4).
There is a process at work here revealing individual creativity: 
the jumbled ideas show different interpretations, but give way to 
sequential ordering and a limited interpretation that f in a lly  ascertains 
the cause and divines the cure of the sickness. The spirits order and 
classify in advising the curative materials and methods as the diviner 
turns chaos into order with aid of the sp irit  world. During the 
process of rea lity  negotiation the patient guides the diviner by his 
responses: in this situation, unlike the Sufi curing situation,
there is mutual dependence between the participants.
Comment
1) Boundary Shifts and Crossed States
Parkin suggests that the states involved in divination, 'crossed 
states' (Parkin 1979: 147) could possibly be similar to instances of
boundary confusion as in Douglas (1966). (Here these states are 
taken to signify states of sexual identity confusion paradigmatically, 
mental confusion syntagmatically). This idea could be applied to the 
'states' experienced by both the Moroccans of Meknes (Crapanzano 1973) 
and that of the Turkmen Sheikh (Basilov 1984) and also the states of 
the people who attend Mira Datar Dargah (Pfleiderer 1981). I t  might 
be a slight exaggeration to include the majority of women who seek out 
the zaar cult in N. Africa in this paradigm. The reporting of their
'states' does not truly give the impression of boundary confusion
0
(Constantinides 1972; Barclay 1964;) though the inclusion in the zaar
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sp irit world of 'foreign' spirits (e .g ., the European, The Black 
African etc.) would point to the importance of boundaries between the 
indigenous society and the outside world, epitomised by alien intrusion 
seen as dangerous and translated into the idiom of possessing spirits . 
These 'boundaries' are crossed by the medium of the belief in the 
zaar: by believing in the zaar, one could suggest, one is acquiescing
in a 'paranoia' of the outside world, crossing over from 'normality' 
into neurosis, maybe. However, this is a tentative exposition, and 
relies on imputing western psychological jargon to a non western 
cultural setting. One can, nevertheless extend the suggestion of 
boundary confusion to the zaar in this way.
The application of this idea of boundary confusion to the 
aforementioned 'states' (of mind, one might suggest) further associates 
phenomena of Ahmad's third level together, albeit analytically (Ahmad 
1979) as Lewis' comparison of the zaar cult with Sufism does (1955/6). 
Possibly this 'association' says more about that degeneration of 
Sufism that Arberry so admirably analyses (1950) than anything else.
The association speaks volumes of historical change, naturally, 
which leads on quite nicely to the applicability of Douglas' 
suggestion, that of the importance of cultural boundary sh ift.
Social groups are empowered to erect boundaries, between that 
which is permissuble for their members and that which is not. As a 
corollary, they are also able to persecute those who cross such 
boundaries. In times of boundary change those who find themselves 
le f t  on the wrong side of a new boundary become the victims of this 
persecution. What was once acceptable no longer is. The revival in 
fundamental Islam this centuwy is a case in point: the altered
opinions of excess in worship and religious experience can therefore 
be seen as a case of boundary change. Possibly some of the less
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'orthodox' Sufis could suffer as the persecuted in this case as on the 
unorthodox end of a continuum from extreme finicky orthodoxy to 
heterodoxy.
Leading from this are several interesting ideas about the people 
of Meknes. Here the Hamadsha and their devotees do not enjoy a 'good' 
reputation. This may have multi valent meaning but here I take i t  to 
indicate that they are not socially esteemed by the majority of the 
town's population. They are stereotyped generally as 'black' (1973: 
85-6). The excessive behaviour of the hadra and the association with 
A'isha and the world of the jinns lend a certain awe, intermingled 
with imcomprehension, amazement or plain dislike, of Hamadsha 
activities in the eyes of better educated Moroccans, Also the 
association of the Hamadsha with curing, as well as their mysticism, 
could produce an ambivalence in attitude towards them on the part of 
the other inhabitants of Meknes. Curing ab ility  and baraka signify 
power: the power of the batin as a resource not accessible to others.
One way this unknown can be challenged is by affording a low status, 
an equivocal status, to the possessors of the power of the batin and 
by refusing to acknowledge the possessors of such power as socially 
desirable persons.
I t  is impossible to be categoric about why the Hamadsha are 
frowned upon by other Moroccans in Meknes. There are several suggestions 
here. In addition the habit of the bidonville teams of maximising 
their gains from their curing sessions cannot improve the general 
reputation of the Hamadsha. I t  would be interesting to have access 
to opinion and ethnography on the Hamadsha's position vis-a-vis 
Meknes society at large, or some other aspect of city l i f e  in Meknes.
This would yield data that provided a more balanced picture of daily
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l i f e  and preoccupations in Meknes.
2) From Disorder to Order
Among the Giriama the patient has a chance of becoming a diviner 
as the patient in Meknes can become a member of the Sufi tariqa.
The prevalence of narrative in the Giriama cures is a decided 
difference to the Sufi cures, especially Crapanzano's data. (Here 
by narrative I refer to the te lling of narrative by the patient, not 
use of narrative in interpretation). However, the theoretical argument, 
that the diagnosis is achieved at a level closer to the orderless 
networks of deep structure semantics (1979: 159) has some relevance.
In the Giriama divination there is a movement from deep structure 
(disorder) to surface (order) underlying the diviner's speechstyle 
and narrative theme. The curing speeches of the patients at the Mira 
Datar Dargah exhibit a similar tendency: the narratives are persuaded
out of the patients as part of a ritual ceremony beginning with the 
anointing. Through these narratives, and r itua l, the patient and 
curer negotiate a reality  out of a ritual discourse, an amount of 
which is the spoken narrative of the patient. These seem to be 
classic cases of jumbled speech. Patient and curer progress through 
this process to the divination of the sp irit 's  identity. Cure can 
then be effected with further ritual anointing or by other methods.
There is a similar movement from disorder to order in the narrative; 
i t  is formless, but from i t  the Sufi can identify the s p ir i t  that 
is causing the problem. There is a parallel concern with confused 
states and confused language.
The parallel is a loose one, but i t  exists. The ‘bricolage1 
Parkin discusses as being the shaman's talent is creative, yet i t  
has its own scientific  status in its particular terms. Similarly
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the method of the Sufis is essentially creative, involving personal, 
individual expression in dancing and trance as part of the cure, or 
the recitation of an illness narrative. Though routinised in r itu a l,  
each experience is unique and individual, as is a divination. The 
parallel possibly f its  the Indian case better than the Moroccan, 
as spoken discourse is provided in at least one instance as data by 
Pfleiderer. In Crapanzano's account, divination occurs prior to the 
main curing ceremony, which seems to provide (as well as personal 
satisfaction and re lie f  for the patient) group support and a certain 
catharsis. However, the progression from a tangled state, awesome 
and power-exuding (because, as Parkin suggests, similar to boundary 
confusion (1979: 148) ) to a straightened one s t i l l  exists. In the
Moroccan case the progress is apparently on a physical plane rather 
than through discourse, one might suggest. The element which 
provides the underlying structure for the cure is naturally missing 
in this consideration. That is the importance of baraka. To this 
I now intend to turn.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E
BARAKA
Definitions
There are several areas of l i f e ,  both for the religious and for 
the not so religious in the Muslim world, where the notion of baraka 
enters. Many authors who discuss Middle Eastern topics consider 
baraka, and from a variety of perspectives. All place i t  at some 
point in their analyses. In a discussion of mystical Islam the notion 
is central. I t  provides Sufis with a great deal of their moral 
authority; i t  is tied in with the social acceptance of their status 
and role; i t  is involved in their curing, in the workings of their 
miracles, and in the consensus about their daily lives and actions. 
Nevertheless its manifestations are somewhat differently interpreted. 
One can suggest that i t  is both an idea and an entity, for example.
I t  is not a case of mere ethnographic variation, though this does 
have some importance. I t  is also a difference in each author's terms 
of reference when analysing religious phenomena.
Definitions of baraka abound: i t  is a real, objective phenomenon
in many studies. Geertz provides a description of its  significance:
'L ite ra l ly , 'baraka' means blessing, in the sense of divine 
favour. But spreading out from that nuclear meaning, 
specifying and delimiting i t ,  i t  encloses a whole range 
of linked ideas: material prosperity, physical well-being,
bodily satisfaction, completion, luck, plenitude, and, the 
aspect most stressed by Western writers anxious to force i t  
in to a pigeon-hole with mana, magical power. In broadest 
terms, 'baraka' is not, as i t  has so often been represented, 
a paraphysical force, a kind of spiritual e lectric ity  - a 
view which, though not entirely without basis, simplifies 
i t  beyond recognition. Like the notion of the exemplary 
centre, i t  is a conception of the mode in which the divine 
reaches into the world. Implicit, uncriticized, and far  
from systematic, i t  too is a doctrine. More exactly, i t  is
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a mode of construing - emotionally, morally, intellectually - 
human experience, a cultural gloss on l i f e .  And though 
this is a vast and intricate problem what this construction, 
this gloss comes down to, so at least i t  seems to me, is the 
proposition (again of course, wholly tacit) that the sacred 
appears most directly in the world as an endowment - a 
talent and a capacity, a special ab ility  - of particular 
individuals. Rather than electric ity , the best (but s t i l l  
not very good) analogue for ' baraka1 is personal presence,
force of character, moral viv'idnes’s The problem is to
decide who (not only among the living but among the dead) 
has i t ,  how much, and how to benefit from i t 1.
(Geertz: 1968: 44. From Crapanzano 1973: 19-20)
Crapanzano (1973: 19) has certain criticisms to make of this
view. He reckons Geertz's encapsulation of its  meaning is 
'impressionistic' and 'romantic'. He believes i t  to be important 
to see how i t  manifests i ts e l f ,  or is believed to manifest i ts e l f ,  
a view I share. He states pointedly,
'Although baraka is indeed in certain circumstances a 
quality, not always as positive or beneficial by 
either Moroccan or Western standards as Geertz's 
definition might lead us to believe, i t  has at 
times, in the popular imagination at any rate, a 
more independent existence - and, in either case, 
a logic of its own which, as we shall see, must be 
situationally understood'.
(Crapanzano 1973: 20)
This I have been attempting to do as far as I can: the 'independent'
existence of baraka is possibly captured quite well in Crapanzano's 
language and his methodology in examining the concept.
Geertz's definition conveys: accurately the impalpable nature 
of the phenomenon, expressing its intangibility. However, one can 
be more concrete about i t ,  as Geertz is also, by stating that he 
thinks i t  is a 'doctrine'. Things, places, people, situations, can 
all possess baraka. I t  can be contagious, passed from hand to hand. 
I t  is glossed as grace, power of a spiritual kind, blessedness.
Baraka is usually thought of as being obtained (1) by membership of a
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holy lineage, (2) by religious service and contact with a highly 
endowed individual. Crapanzano (1973: 118-25) mentions two types
of baraka (1) institutionalised, (2) personal. The former is passed 
agnatically. The la tte r  is contagious, not heritable. Personal 
baraka depends on individual merit, and accordingly some persons 
have more of i t  than others. The baraka of the Hamadsha team members 
may be separated into,
1) that obtained from the saint in the same manner as a
pilgrim, this type being translated into some potential
or actual state of being, and
2) that possessed as a follower of the saint.
I t  is a moot point to consider here whether the patient actually 
receives baraka as a concrete phenomenon, or merely benefits from the 
baraka of the saint. I t  is certain that the patient receives something, 
or at least, believes that he has done so. (Crapanzano 1973; Kurin
1983; Geertz 1968). I t  is more accurate, I think, to postulate that
what the patient receives is the effect of baraka in the shape of 
healing or, in the case of a supplicant, not a patient, in the shape 
of the amelioration of some unfortunate condition. Repeated visits  
to a shrine or repeated curing rituals are after all often necessary 
to obtain permanent re l ie f .  Baraka is not particularly in fa l l ib le ,  
and supplicants accept that one may have to continue one's visits i f  
baraka is to be transferred successfully. All kinds of ritual taboos 
may have been broken.
Despite what has been said, i t  may be implied in some of the 
data that i t  is indeed baraka i ts e l f  that has been passed to a 
patient, or into some object.
Baraka and its effects are positive, and so can be contrasted 
with negative power, such as that contained in curses or the Evil Eye.
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I t  includes the possibility of resisting evil forces, and accordingly 
enables the recipient to develop potential, especially for good.
I t  blesses the recipient and brings out the best in him or her. I t  
can be associated with both productiveness and effectiveness: 
these benefits result directly from divine favour shown towards the 
recipient of the baraka.
Baraka in Action
Baraka (Crapanzano: 1973) is transformed into a potential state
of health which will be actualised only i f  the patient follows a set 
regime. I t  enables the devotee to perform the hadra healing ceremony, 
enables the musicians to play their tunes, lets the performers slash 
their heads^causes the adepts to enter trance (hal_)during which they 
have the ab ility  to pass on the baraka of the saint. The baraka 
actualises the cure, and to achieve this, the follower must be in an 
extraordinary state (Crapanzano 1973: 167). Often merely the
presence of an adept in trance is sufficient to pass on baraka.
The passage of baraka often involves the incorporation o f  vomit, 
polluted water or other undesirable materials. Baraka can also be 
passed on in semen. Women, however, cannot pass i t  on. After its  
passage from person to place or supplicant i t  can no longer be 
transferred. The individual, on receiving baraka, receives something 
good fortune, potential good health, business success, or f e r t i l i t y ,  
for example. I t  can be passed in exchange for wealth, as part of a 
redistributive system. Crapanzano suggests (op. c it :  226) that
when the saint endows the patient with baraka he is communicating the 
symbolic equivalent of semen: v i r i l i t y ,  or the principle of
pa tr il inea lity , by which one can 'revitalise the feminized': the 
feminized being in this case the sick, as hitherto discussed, (see 
Chapter Four).
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Baraka is exhibited as a significant element in the exchange 
system. The Muhibbin give wealth to the adepts and obtain baraka.
The adepts in turn work for the saint, giving what they have collected 
to the saints through the mizwar and obtain baraka. The mizwar 
redistributes the wealth (op. c it :  119-20). The people provide for
the mizwar and the children of the saint in order that they in turn 
may provide for the pilgrims. Accordingly the system is redistributive. 
Crapanzano suggests (op. c it :  121) that the passage of baraka mirrors
and in a sense potentialises the passage of wealth in a redistributive 
system which serves ideally to care for the poor and ailing. The 
emanating, intermediate nature of baraka as existing somewhere between 
the ordinary mortal and God, or between people and objects is dealt a 
heavy blow by Kurin (1983). In a study of ‘The Structure of Blessedness1 
in Abdullah Shah Ghazi's shrine in Pakistan he attempts a view that 
concentrates on the system of interpretation used by the actors them­
selves, a method missing from the foregoing data. He wishes to point 
to the 'positional and relational message in the context delimited and 
envinced by such interpretations' (1983: 313).
Here again one is faced with another gloss for baraka, blessedness. 
The sympathetic approach of Kurin underlines one important aspect 
integral to any consideration of mysticism, that of emotion. Geertz 
indicates how there is a difference between religion experienced and 
religion remembered, and that the religious man is working in everyday 
l i f e  without the immediate perception of the 'really re a l ' .  The point 
I think is justif iab le: the nature of religious experience could be
said to be one of 'feeling' for the sp iritual, Geertz's religious 
perspective. Geertz postulated a social and psychological basis for 
the religious perspective: the psychological is not intrinsically  the 
subject for an anthropological discussion, whereas the emotional can be,
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as its focus is both subjective and objective, emotions entering the 
world in mood, behaviour and attitude, one might suggest (Geertz 
1968: 110-111).
To return to Kurin: 'blessedness' (baraka) here is a trancendent
spiritual quality originating from Allah. I t  is beneficial to humans 
and cooling in its effect. I t
'flows constantly and continuously; i t  is identified with 
the sp ir it  ( ruh) of humans at all times and is available to 
all through various types of actions'.
(Kurin 1983: 314)
Some humans, for example, the saints, are particularly receptive to
this flow. They have the ab ility  to channel and direct this flow
in such a way as to allow for the concentration of blessedness as
well as its  dispersal.
Kurin's language is explanatory: the offerings taken to the
shrine serve as 'vehicles' through which the supplicant may benefit 
from the saint's blessing. These 'vehicles' as well as the supplicants 
themselves must be processed (op. c it :  316) to allow for the flow of
blessedness. The supplicants must perform ritual ablutions 'to open 
up a channel through which blessedness may flow' ( ib id .) .  The 
material offerings are mixed, or burnt, or absorb certain qualities 
as a catalyst for the combination with blessedness. Ingested by 
humans, the blessedness is thought to cool and relieve the supplicant 
in a variety of physical, emotional mental and spiritual ways. Human 
actions have similar results: 'cooling' actions are performed also 
so the actor becomes a receptacle for blessedness. These actions 
when performed entail a certain emotional release: the prayer and
supplication given by the supplicants at the shrine are thought to be 
redolent of Ishg: this is an intensely fe l t  giving up of oneself
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that occurs in the prayers at the shrine, so Kurin believes (op. c it :
318). The supplicants wail and weep, their bodies throb and they 
grasp for the coffin, kiss and caress i t .  1Ishg is an intense, 
energetic, giving, hot form of love.
' I t  is this emotion, rooted in the heart at the meeting 
point of body and s p ir i t  which seems to serve as the 
catalyst, as the means by which human action can be 
united with and fe l t  as divinely blessed'.
( i b i d . )
'The cool sp ir it  of Allah, focused by the saint, and the
sp ir it  of the supplicant, under the gaze of the saint,
are united by a heating process - in this case, intense
love'.
( ib id . )
(For a further consideration of ‘ ishg see Chapter Two of this thesis).
As well as obtaining blessedness, women come to be cured of 
jinn possession, a process Kurin also interprets as a heating/cooling 
one. The 'hot' jinn is exorcised out of the women by 'hot' gyrations, 
in a 'cool' place with deep intent. Kurin therefore suggests that the 
offerings and supplicants are components 'in tension' (op. c it :  320).
The manipulation of the blessing at the same time may be seen as an
attempt to resolve this tension by allowing for the controlled re lie f  
or 'cooling' of the unresolved condition. This resolution is accomplished 
by linking the offerant through the offering with Allah's sp iritua lity  
through that of the saint ( ib id .) .  To achieve this resolution the 
offering undergoes a catalytic process, generally heating, which effects 
a separation of the hot/cold components.
This interpretation Kurin attempts to f i t  with Van Gennep 1960 
and Turner 1969. Offerings, he suggests, come from a state of human 
affairs in which,
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'basic conditions of objects, actions and bodies exist 
in dualistic form - combining materiality and s p ir i t ,
hot and cold humanity and animality. While such
a state of affairs may be deemed normal or natural
for those who live in i t ,  i t  does not mean that such
is accepted without some degree of equivocation'.
(op. c it :  321)
I t  is interesting to note in this light that dargah (lodge) is 
translated as 'threshold' on occasion, and that this might well 
accord with a Turnerian view of the '1iminality' of a shrine, a locus 
of transformation, where the spiritual 'can become personal and 
substantiated' (op. c it :  322).
Kurin points out that the blessedness is differentiated and 
assimilated after leaving the shrine. I f  the flow is a good one and 
a meeting of sp iritua lity  and animal humanity effected, the undesirable 
condition may be resolved and transformation achieved. I f  this is not 
the case a return v is it  to the shrine may be necessary ( ib id .) .
Accordingly this treatment of hot and cold oppositions with 
reference to the process of the incorporation of baraka suggests that
emotionality does have a part to play in the subjective experience of
those seeking blessing. The Sufis attempt to subdue the nafs 
(animal impulses) and purify their hearts of base motives to enjoy 
only pure spiritual love for God. This love surely does involve some 
emotional participation, i f  of a spiritual kind. The 'ishg description 
by Kurin is definitely the description of an emotional state: emotion
would become a key to the interpretation or religion and spiritual 
phenomena i f  one were trying to explain its cultural construction.
One of the most interesting fields for an examination of baraka 
is that of the Sufi legends. All Sufi orders, marabouts and saints 
are surrounded in legend and folk tale. Crapanzano interprets and 
analyses the tales of the founders of the Hamadsha order in depth,
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finding all kinds of psycho-social factors at work in their legends.
The obtaining of baraka by Sidi Ali in his opinion presumes the femini- 
sation of the saint: he obtained baraka by a ruse: he went to the
house of his master and blinded his slave woman. The saint was angry 
and evicted Sidi A li, though touched him on the arm. After this 
episode the older saint fe l l  sick. Due to the blinding ruse Sidi Ali 
was able to obtain a bucket of the saint's vomit, which he drank and 
thus imbued the saint's baraka. Crapanzano suggests (1973: 49) that
the incorporation of baraka is analogous to insemination (this 
connects with the nursing of babies: mothers' milk is purported
also to contain baraka). He adds that power obtained by ingesting 
bodily secretions is a frequent fantasy associated with the pollution 
of these secretions, and the admitted opinion of the defilement of 
the sexual act. The saint was deemed to have 'become pregnant' with 
baraka (op. c it :  50) and is gradually recognised as a saint - this
being equivalent to a period of gestation. Crapanzano hints at a 
hidden desire on behalf of the Moroccan male for feminine character­
istics especially on the part of the Sufis. In th is , added to the 
suggestion that the sick patients who seek out the Hamadsha are also 
undergoing a process of feminization and defeminization in the 
experience of their cure, the theory is credible. One may add that 
the interpretation ignores the female side of things: there is no
analysis probing whether or not Moroccan women have hidden desires 
for male characteristics. Also the analysis does not consider what 
is particularly special about the Moroccan situation for this to 
apply here and not elsewhere, when legends such as that involving the 
ingesting of vomit are the norm among Sufi tales of obtaining baraka.
I t  is worth mentioning that Pastner also illustrates the use of
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story te ll in g , miracle and baraka as part of the same complex. He 
repeats the tale of one of the well known Zikri pirs securing his 
reputation by a quasi-miracle. Although this particular pir had 
been through many fasts he only achieved his reputation as a holy 
man after he stopped a train on which he had been refused a seat 
by his baraka (Pastner 1978: 241).
A frequent motif in Sufi history has been the tr ia l  of strength 
between spiritual leaders. Basilov (1984: 237) recounts occurrences
of such behaviour. Pastner (1984: 306) shows how a Zikri pir uses
his baraka against a r iva l, Simon Digby (unpubs.) explores Sufi 
encounters with Yogis during the 'contact' period of Indian history 
between Hinduism and Islam. These are taken from Sufi hagiography 
and have varying forms:
(1) tales of the voluntary conversion of Yogis,
(2) magical contests in which Yogis were subjugated 
by Sufi pirs then converted with a subsequently 
high spiritual station,
(3) regionally significant tales where conversion of 
the Yogi is accompanied by the replacement of an 
erstwhile Hindu shrine or sacred place with a 
Sufi shrine,
(4) tales involving the Yogi who offers a g i f t ,
(5) tales including casual reference to the lore of 
the Yogis.
Additionally there are plenty of legends in Turkey of similar 
confrontations between Sufi pirs and Christian holy men, (personal 
communication).
Dale Eickelman also explores the significance of baraka in the 
lives of the Sherqawa in Morocco. Eickelman appears to regard baraka 
as a physical substance which can be obtained by physical contact 
with a marabout or his shrine, and can be taken away from clients 
again i f  they reveal their aquisition of baraka to others. Here
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baraka is involved in secrecy: (Eickelman 1976: p. 160) Eickelman
suggests that the foregoing fact is the reason why tribesmen are 
often reluctant to speak openly of their dealings with marabouts 
and their descendants: knowledge of these ties by hostile third
parties can threaten their efficacy. This makes a patent statement 
about the nature of religious patronage.
Eickelman illustrates how marabouts can lose their baraka. In 
the 1970's marabouts began to cease visiting their clients. Then 
the size of their offerings diminished. They realised they were 
faced on such occasions with the open opposition of the emerging 
group of reformist Muslims, and the tribesmen themselves. In such 
circumstances the marabout lacked full control over the conditions of 
his public exposure, suffered loss of prestige, and hence of his 
reputation for baraka. Here baraka is linked with right social 
action on behalf of the Sufis and their clients: the marabout is
'tied ' to God and men: the obligations to men affect his relationship
with God. In this interpretation the social appears to relect the 
sp iritua l.
As baraka can be lost, so i t  can be preserved by correct conduct. 
The marabout maintains a social distance from all but the most 
prestigious of his clientele: the current marabout is seen about the
town of Boujad, but there are none of his clients in the place. Here 
no-one pays him any attention. On busy market days he confines 
himself to the house, to which there is controlled access. Direct 
rejection of access to those who cannot afford to pay for his prayers 
is considered improper, but too frequent involvement with such clients 
would dilute the economic and status base necessary to maintain 
his marabout?s reputation for baraka, (op. c it :  179).
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Eickelman considers baraka among the Sherqawa to resemble the 
'ethos of competetive settlement among merchants' who wait for God 
to bring them business rather than openly so lic it  i t ,  so as to avoid 
overt fr iction between themselves (op. c it :  180). Eickelman
points out that the Sherqawa were evasive when asked i f  a particular 
marabout had baraka. To them the proof of baraka is the existence 
of clients who act as i f  a particular marabout has i t .  Eickelman 
further suggests that this approximates to a 'pure example of Weber's 
concept of charisma' ( ib id .) .  The d iff icu lties  for maintaining 
reputation for the one remaining Sherqawa marabout are compounded, 
for example as in obtaining revenue from pilgrims. This is particularly 
d iff ic u lt  for as some groups sever ties with him and others reduce the 
size of their offerings he is s t i l l  expected to maintain his reputation 
for unrestrained generosity in entertaining them.
To retain pilgrims the marabout has in recent years added music 
and female dancers for their entertainment, but the numbers s t i l l  
decline; a pending inheritance dispute may bring about the division 
of the large house he uses to entertain guests. I f  this dispute 
goes against him he will lose most of the manifest symbols of his 
baraka, according to Eickelman. Unlike his predecessors his reputation 
is practical rather tahn mystical: up until the 1930's marabouts
were deemed to be able to change themselves into lions, the uncle 
of the present marabout being reputed to have had this a b il i ty .  The 
current marabout does not: this demystification means that current
marabouts are more liable to censure for their practical activities  
and immediate behaviour, (op. c it :  181).
Stephen Pastner likewise underlines the temporality of baraka 
and Accordingly the actions of the Sufis in many spheres. To quote
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him:
'since the time of the Prophet, the maintenance of local 
level Islamic tradition has been i-n the hands of lesser 
men i and i t  would be incorrect to assume that such
figures, no matter how supposedly imbued with divine
blessing or power and the ascetic values of the
medieval Sufis, from whom they derive their theological 
roots, are themselves always exempt from the same 
competetive drives that motivate their lay followers'.
(Pastner 1978: 232)
In a last look at the Middle Eastern literature before I sum 
up i t  is educational to review the social significance of baraka.
I t  is united in a meaningful sequence with miracle working, as i t  
predicates this occurrence, issuing as i t  does from Allah to imbue 
the everyday world with the sense of the transcendent. Gilsenan 
discusses baraka quite thoroughly (1982). He emphasises that miracles 
are potentially dangerous as they oppose the given order of things 
(Gilsenan 1982: 77). This in a spiritual universe is possibly
untrue. Nevertheless one can accept that disruption of causality 
is in essence subversive: however the nature of acceptance of
causality can be doubted in certain cases (Crapanzano 1973: 134)
Gilsenan postulates that miracles are a refuge of the dominated, 
an essential part of the discourse of the poor. (1982: 77), He
suggests that i t  is not unusual for the politically influential to 
discredit miracles: the powerful in this context can be equated with
the divine. Those who possess political power will naturally seek 
to monopolise the miraculous to ensure their dominance, and acts of 
a miraculous nature not by them destabilise their power base 
potentially.
Predicated on a generally accepted, universal common-sense 
view of the world, i t  is obvious that miracles involve a significant
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shift in social meaning. Given the conception of a dual nature of 
reality (zahir/batin; as discussed earlier) this shift is a shift 
of emphasis from the world of common sense to an unseen hidden 
universe, that nevertheless enters the everyday in the Muslim world. 
Miracles break everyday routine to illustrate  the unseen at work.
Gilsenan points to the disconnection and unpredictability of 
the lives of, for example, the urban Muslim poor. Many members of 
the Sufi orders, poor, i l l i t e r a te ,  with sporadic work chances and 
lacking social and financial resources, lead disconnected, 
discontinuous lives that are unpredictable in the extreme, though 
they believe that they are not so. Hidden determination and 
continuity in their lives may be a function of the secret purposes 
of the d ivin ity , manifested through the 'visible' actions of the 
divine power through, frequently, the holy man's deeds and words. 
These manifestations occur in the miracles and acts of blessing 
and grace.
In this paradigm of interpretation the saint can be a lens 
through which the Muslims see. Gilsenan underlines in their terms 
and his own the hazards and changes that play a part in the lives 
of ordinary people. Those who do not belong to the orders or have 
anything to do with them frame r&ther a different interpretation 
of the world. This is concerned only with those everyday lives of 
the Sufis and the people who are affected by them. For Gilsenan 
baraka is 'at the core of the apprehension of the world in symbolic- 
conceptual terms', (op. c it :  90). I t  is held to produce ecstasy
and that same ecstasy is seen as proof of baraka's presence. The 
presence of the saints in this theoretical perspective provides 
powerful and symbolic experience of this reversal of daily rea lit ies ,  
of the dominant sets of categories that serve in this culture to
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to interpret and structure the world and l i f e  within i t .  This 
perspective is set against that of the non-miracle worker; though 
religious, these people do not participate in the continuous working 
of baraka: even as Sufi devotees they are part of the spiritual
world, yet act in the everyday reality of Muslim l i f e .  The batin 
is the prerogative of the highly endowed and as such, in Gilsenan's 
terms, is a resource, access to which is limited for the ordinary 
Sufi.
Gilsenan points to the variations in the nature and operations 
of baraka within Near Middle-Eastern society. He looks for an 
answer in
'the degree of directedness by which people experience 
the operation of power and determining forces in their  
lives and those areas that are relatively unstructured 
in terms of everyday l i f e 1.
(op. c it :  109)
Gilsenan is attempting a wide generalisation from a number of 
concrete examples. He illustrates how in N. Lebanon baraka did 
not seem to be so important: there was a closure of sheikhly groups
and a restricted social interaction between strata: he suggests
that this degree of ideological and social control coupled with 
direct workings of power and sanction combined to explain the sense 
of the 'problematic' (op. c it :  111) force of baraka, so significant
in many places. Among the Muridya of Senegal Gilsenan suggests 
that grace = work ( ib id .) .  These peasant producers experience 
baraka as a highly structured and directed ideological power, a 
religious technology. Baraka here, as in N. Lebanon, is excluded 
from the religious domain per se, or rather ‘harnesses' i t ,  to 
refer to Gilsenan's terminology again, as a
- 151 -
‘basic legitimating concept to an institution that is 
defined as in essence religious but also constitutes 
a highly organised political and economic un it '.
( i b i d . )
Baraka among the Muridya is part of an exchange complex: we can see
how in Meknes among the Hamadsha the workings of baraka are part of 
a redistributive system; here i t  is constituted in a direct relation 
of murid (pupil)/shei kh (leader, master). In N. Lebanon i t  is 
conceived as being an opposition between religious specialists and 
worldy rulers, operating in a kind of tension between domains and 
dynasties (op.;c it: 112). In Cairo among the Hamidiya Shadhiliya
order of Sufis, baraka enables the devotees to create visions of the 
baraka of their founder and to watch for the signs of its operation 
in their world: the signs of grace are channelled into 'safe' areas
(ib id .)
Domination over, or monopoly of, baraka is also power over the
way the world is thought of, symbolised and experienced ( ib id .) .
I t  has a crit ica l effect in the realm of everyday logic and the
construction of an universe, since above all i t  expresses notions
about causation. I t  is incoherent and variable, clustering events,
but not organising them scientifica lly  in the western sense of the
term. Its power is sought for in highly real, objective phenomena:
cures, bodily/mental disturbance, attainment of violent and intense
ecstasy, placation of the jinns. Gilsenan postulates that baraka
is part of l the religious bricolage of the poor', part of,
'a cobbling together of all kinds of different events, relations, 
and persons into a single form that contains objects of 
many different colours, shapes, and sizes. Certain particular 
poles of attraction (shrines, trees, murids and so on) serve 
as immediate and concrete foci and sources of access to 
blessing',
(op. c it :  115)
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Secondly, he summarises baraka socially as the,
'refuge of those whose lives are most unstructured,
or destructured, in terms of immediate experience........
i t  can be the language of domination or of the 
dominated'.
(ib id .)
This discussion is one of the 'manifestations' or baraka, a 
topic I think Vincent Crapanzano would highly approve of. However 
the terms in which i t  is couched would possibly be less pleasing to 
him. The 'manifestations' are concerned with domination and submission, 
with power and legitimation. These aspects of the social construction 
of baraka have the barest relevance to 'actors' models' of the 
workings of baraka. Nevertheless I think Gilsenan provides a cogent 
explanation of the situation of many Sufi devotees in the Near Middle 
East: the comments about lack of structure and unpredictability of
l i f e  would certainly be apposite to the milieu of the Meknes Hamadsha, 
at least in the bidonvilles. How baraka manifests i ts e l f  is perhaps 
skirted or passed over for the meatier subject of baraka's potential 
significance and its incorporation as a 'force', maybe, that has some 
effect on social discourse. Baraka conclusively is_ potential: as
Crapanzano suggests, i t  also actualises i ts e lf  in 'things', persons 
and places. I t  becomes concrete; its effects are socially 'seen'.
There is a lot more that could be said about i t ,  and far more that 
could be investigated: particularly its historical meaning in the
contexts mentioned. Also there are other works where i t  is discussed 
historically and socially: lives of people are affected by i t .  In
changing Morocco Paul Rabinow investigated the baraka of the holy 
dynasty of Sidi Lahcen and how i t  came to fa il  when meeting opposition 
from opposing, essentially modernist forces in an inept way. Baraka 
is here placed in history: the politics of culture move away from
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the spiritual into a more social elan where competition weakens the 
traditional power bases of lineage and spiritual excellence.
Tradition is attacked and suffers: as in Gilsenan's Cairo the process
of modernisation leaves l i t t l e  room for the holy to manoevre themselves 
into a commanding position unless they have alternative resources at 
their disposal.
I f  baraka is potential, i t  has to have certain conditions in 
which to actualise i ts e l f .  Interpretations do not always bring these 
conditions to the fore: either they are deeply entrenched in
particulars, and the workings of baraka are assumed and described 
situationally, or they generalise, and the conclusions have only a 
limited application. Study of the importance of baraka in less 
'modern' Middle Eastern societies such as that of the Turkmen, 
described by Basilov, might be educative. Nevertheless in a town 
such as Meknes, the workings of baraka were extricated from the social 
'web' by Crapanzano in the late sixties. The anthropologist is 
tied to his/her context unless he/she has a predilection for general 
themes. The general theme of baraka necessitates some delving into 
particulars: the authors here considered demonstrate to my mind an
useful variety of slants, both factual and theoretical, on the 
interpretation and understanding of the topic.
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CONCLUSION
The short consideration of baraka completes the overall picture 
I have attempted to create in this thesis. My task has been to 
isolate one core spect of Sufism and explore!it. In the pursuit of 
this aim I have had to digress into certain related areas: a
necessary introduction to Sufism and an examination of the associated 
area of emotional discourse in order to illustrate  one important 
component of Sufism, a component that has been adversely treated by 
some authors and needed some explanation and investigation here.
Sufism is of course much more than a system of curing illnesses. 
I t  is a mysticism, and diverse in its manifestations. I f  one thing 
has led me to investigate its relationship with medicine i t  has been 
the data I have used: i t  seemed to me that the various discussions
of both Sufism its e lf  and its parallel with psychotherapy, and of 
indigenous traditional curing in the Middle East, could benefit 
from some systematisation, and to provide a framework within which to 
view these topics has been something of a challenge to me. In 
this thesis I have not attempted to put forward a concrete framework: 
I have merely gathered data from a variety of associated fields  
within anthropology and by so doing have, I hope, suggested how these 
different topics could be associated and linked usefully. I f  this 
thesis reaches any conclusion, i t  is that when discussing indigenous 
notions of the supernatural and their force in the world, one is 
covering a wide subject area that encompasses religion and medicine 
in i t .  Yet religion and medicine are only convenient subject 
headings: the important issue is that in discussing loosely mystical
phenomena one is concerning oneself with an entire outlook, a way 
of viewing the world, and even a way of living.
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The underlying thread running through this study is the 
significance of some of anthropology's shady areas: the world of
the mystic and the shaman, the realm of emotional discourse, the 
underdetermined area of illness causation and explanation. As I 
pointed out at the beginning of Chapter Three, the discourse of power 
speaks softly in all these areas: i t  underlies explanations of these
phenomena, and perhaps dwells at the back of peoples' minds in the 
cultures involved.
The main d iff ic u lty , which is the last thing I wish to mention, 
has been the problem of translating concepts. For instance, what 
exactly is mental illness? Is sp ir it  possession a form of mental 
illness? Even at the end of this thesis I cannot make a categoric 
statement one way or the other. The issue is relative, the parameters 
of the subject cultural parameters. When we in the west are unhappy 
with our definitions, as I think is the case with regard to mental 
illness, how can we expect to examine parallel notions in other 
societies successfully? Love, too, proved a similar can of worms.
Our world is signified by our words and concepts: we are at
the mercy of them when attempting to describe the smallest part of 
i t ,  and we are hampered by the mystifications language can sometimes 
make of i t .  This is due both to the intricacies of syntax and the 
difficu lty  of translating concepts, and ways of expressing ideas. We 
are handicapped to the greatest extent when foraying into areas 
where understanding is most stretched. The world of the miracle 
worker, the shaman, is such a place. I hope in this thesis I have 
been able to shed a l i t t l e  light on that place; that I have made i t  





1 aql - reason
1ashaqah a type of vine
bakhshi (baxsi) - a shaman curer
baqa - permanence-i n-God
baraka - blessing, grace, spiritual power
batin - inner reality
beteng - spirit/shade
beya - knowledge
biay - l i f e
dargah - lodge, shrine
davalix - cured by medicine
deli - mad
dhikr - Sufi ritual
dervish - Sufi, wandering mystic
dua, dualix - prayers; cured by prayers
fana - annihilation
fakir - holy man, generally impoverished
feki - a curer
f ik r - meditation
ghita - a musical instrument
ghwal - ogre
hadith - tradition, the sayings of Mohamm




hodja - religious man
hubb udhri - platonic love
insan-i-kamil - Perfect Man
'ishq, 'eshq - passionate love
jidhba - attraction
jinn - Islamic devil or sp ir it
karamat/keramat - force (of saint)
khalifa - spiritual successor
khanaqah - lodge
Koran/Qur'an - Muslim scriptures
lewantop - mad
l i la - night
1 i get - anger, passion, energy
maqam - station, stage
marabout - one tied to God
ma1ri fa - gnosis
maskun - inhabited by the jinn, mad
mizwar - custodian of a shrine
muhabba - loving kindness
muhibbin - Sufi devotees
mujawar - Sufi curer
muqaddim - leaders, officiants
murabit - man attached to God
murid (morld) - Sufi pupil
murshid - Sufi teacher, master
nafs - soul, base instincts
nafs-al-lawamma - the blaming soul


































officiant (at r itua l)
heart
proximity
descendants of the Prophet 
spi ri t
alms, charity g i f t
l i te ra l ly  hearing; also Sufi ritual dance 
'There is no God but Allah' 
mystical religious figure 
longing
■religious leader 
religious leader ( f . )  
devil, s p ir it
Islamic mystic, one who follows the tariqa
verse (of the Koran)
order
way of the Sufi 
unity (with God)
Muslim priests
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